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An argument has arisen that a ‘security-industrial complex’ (SIC) exists in, and is 
damaging to, the United Kingdom. The oft-repeated assessment is that, like the ‘military-
industrial complex’ (MIC) which existed before (and continues to operate alongside) it, a 
damaging system of public-private sector interaction has emerged in the non-military 
aspects of national security strategy. Critics portray the purported system - the SIC - as an 
organised alliance of self-interested government and profit-making entities that exploits 
the security environment for its own gain. 
The suitability of using ‘SIC’ terminology is untested within security studies, 
however. This thesis reassesses how to conceptualise the public-private sector cooperation 
that has arisen in the contemporary security environment by analysing the origins, 
characteristics and consequences of the private sector’s involvement in the domestic 
counter-terrorism (CT) aspects of contemporary UK national security strategy following the 
terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001. It demonstrates through reference to 
existing theory on the MIC, original interviews, and analysis of certain contracts and other 
case studies concerning companies’ involvement in the UK Government’s CT strategy that, 
instead of replicating the MIC in the new security context exactly, a more nuanced system 
of public-private interaction has arisen. Whilst some of the dynamics associated with the 
MIC exist in the CT sector, this thesis questions whether the aggregation of these dynamics 
in the CT field should be understood and presented in the same way.  
A lack of systemic scholarly research on ‘the SIC’ in the UK has hindered the 
development of policy-making and debate in respect of the private sector’s involvement in 
the non-military aspects of national security. The thesis seeks to address this gap, making 
an original, policy-orientated contribution, which aims to stimulate informed discussion 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology 
 
1.1 Introduction to the thesis  
The system known as the ‘military-industrial complex’ (MIC) - an expression 
famously introduced by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1961 - is said to have 
undergone ‘a considerable amount of restructuring’1, if not a major transformation since 
the end of the Cold War.2 Contemporary theorists on the evolving character of the MIC 
including Dunne and Sköns, for example, have introduced the idea that the MIC has been 
deeply affected by changes arising in the ‘new’ post-Cold War security environment; these 
authors were pioneers in highlighting that different types of public and private interests 
were coalescing around contemporary security issues.3 As a recent article put it; ‘…we are 
(…) witnessing the emergence of a new security-industrial complex that should be received 
with the same caution as that which Eisenhower sought to convey about the military-
industrial complex in the 1960s.’4 
Therefore an argument has arisen - and been advanced most notably by scholars 
associated with the school of critical security studies - that, particularly after 9/11, the 
negative dynamics that critics have associated with the MIC have emerged within ‘new’ 
non-military security sectors.5 Most prominently, Neocleous has identified what he refers 
                                                          
1
 J Paul Dunne, ‘The Changing Military Industrial Complex in the UK’, Defence Economics, Vol.4 
(1993), p.91 
2
 As suggested in J Paul Dunne and Elisabeth Sköns, ‘The Changing Military Industrial Complex’, 
Economics Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, University of the West Of England, March 
2011, Via:  http://carecon.org.uk/DPs/1104.pdf (accessed 01.06.11). Chapter 2 examines the origins 
of, and theory on the MIC. 
3
 Their first paper highlighting these developments was J Paul Dunne and Elisabeth Sköns, ‘The 
Military Industrial Complex’, Economics Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, University of 
the West of England, May 2009, Via: http://carecon.org.uk/DPs/0907.pdf (accessed 10.11.14). See 
also ibid., p.7 
4
 Richard Godfrey, Jo Brewis, Jo Grady and Chris Grocott, ‘The private military industry and 
neoliberal imperialism: Mapping the terrain’, Organization, Vol.21:1 (2014), p.119  
5
 Critical security studies encompasses a large body of literature; for an introduction to the 
approach and work of this school, see Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Eds.), Critical Security 





to as ‘the deadly complicity between security and capital’6, documenting what he argues 
amounts to harmful interaction arising between government and the private sector in the 
‘war on terror’: 
To make a profit, the security industry must sell security. And to sell 
security, it must first help generate insecurities. In so doing, it reiterates 
the central logic around which the national security state is organized: that 
citizens need to be afraid, and need the state to secure them.7 
The idea (if not accusation), then, is that, much like the MIC, governments and the private 
sector (amongst others) have inflated threats arising from the new security context and 
(deliberately or inadvertently) colluded to mutually profit from them.8 In short, the 
proposition is that, particularly in the context of the increased Western attention being 
paid to non-military security issues such as terrorism, something resembling a ‘security-
industrial complex’ (SIC) has emerged in the UK and other allied countries.9  
At the theoretical level, the idea of the emergence of an ‘industrial-complex’ in the 
security sector has developed further recently with the contention that the MIC may have 
actually been superseded by a broader, all-encompassing system. According to two 
scholars; ‘…the ‘military-industrial-complex’ and other related ‘industrial complexes’, are 
parts of an overarching ‘security-industrial-complex’.’10 Whilst this thesis will argue that 
                                                          
6
 Mark Neocleous, ‘Security, Commodity, Fetishism’, Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, Vol.35:3 
(2007), p.341 (Emphasis in original) 
7
 Neocleous, ‘Security, Commodity, Fetishism’, p.350 
8
 Mueller calls this coalition of interests ‘the terrorism industry’. John Mueller, ‘The Terrorism 
Industry: The Profits of Doom’, in George Kassimeris (Ed.), Playing Politics with Terrorism: A User’s 
Guide (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp.301-320 
9
 This is the argument and terminology advanced most notably in Hughes’s disapproving analysis of 
companies’ involvement in the ‘War on Terror’. Soloman Hughes, War on Terror, Inc.: Corporate 
Profiteering from the Politics of Fear (London: Verso, 2007). This terminology and line of 
argumentation also appears in Robert P. Weiss, ‘From Cowboy Detectives to Soldiers of Fortune: 
Private Security Contracting and Its Contradictions on the New Frontiers of Capitalist Expansion’, 
Social Justice, Vol.34:3/4 (2007), pp.1-19 
10
 This argument appears in the abstract of a paper titled ‘The Emergence of the Security-Industrial 
Complex’ by Baker-Beall and Robinson at ‘Neoliberalism and/as Terror: Critical Studies on Terrorism 
Annual Conference 2014’, Full Program, Via: http://www.leejarvis.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/Neoliberalism-and_as-terror-2014.pdf (accessed 10.11.14). See also 
Barry’s earlier argument that the MIC has evolved into a ‘National Security Complex’: The 





the application of SIC-type terminology in exactly the same way as the MIC has been used 
does not sufficiently capture the complexity of the public-private dynamics at play in the 
counter-terrorism (CT) arena, this conceptualisation might add some value in the sense 
that - at least in theory - it could help to provide a new way of thinking about the growing 
list of security-related ‘industrial complexes’ that several authors have posited now exist.11   
Outside the academic community, over a dozen media reports, accounts from 
investigative journalists and political opinion pieces have suggested that a SIC has 
emerged, or more simply that the dynamics associated with the MIC have extended to 
non-military aspects of national security such as CT.12 Many such accounts provide few 
                                                                                                                                                                   
emerged in our times’. Tom Barry, ‘Synergy in Security: The Rise of the National Security Complex’, 
Dollars & Sense: Real World Economics (March/April 2010), Via: 
http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2010/0310barry.html (accessed 19.05.11). 
11
 Shorrock has identified an ‘intelligence-industrial complex’, for example, arguing that ‘[t]he 
analogy between the intelligence industry and the military-industrial complex described by 
President Eisenhower in 1961 is fitting.’ Tim Shorrock, Spies for Hire: The Secret World of 
Intelligence Outsourcing (London: Simon & Schuster, 2008), p.12-13. Risen refers to a ‘Homeland 
Security-Industrial Complex’ in James Risen, Pay any Price: Greed, Power, and Endless War (New 
York: Harcourt Publishing, 2014). 
12
 In addition to Barry, ‘Synergy in Security’, Shorrock, Spies for Hire, Risen, Pay any Price, and 
Hughes, War on Terror, Inc, see especially: Paul Harris, ‘How private firms have cashed in on the 
climate of fear since 9/11’, theguardian.com, 5 September 2011, Via: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/05/private-firms-fear-9-11 (accessed 12.11.14); 
Louis Uchitelle and John Markoff, ‘Terrorbusters Inc.’, New York Times, 17 October 2004, Via: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/business/yourmoney/17home.html?_r=0 (accessed 
12.11.14);  Linda Danil, ‘The arms trade and the military-industrial complex: a UK perspective’, 
Critical Legal Thinking Blog, 20 July 2012, Via: http://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/07/30/the-arms-
trade-and-the-military-industrial-complex/ (accessed 12.11.14); Aminata Kone, ‘The Military-
Industrial Complex in the United States: Evolution and Expansion from World War II to the War on 
Terror’, Student Pulse, Vol.5:8 (2013), Via: http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/749/the-military-
industrial-complex-in-the-united-states-evolution-and-expansion-from-world-war-ii-to-the-war-on-
terror (accessed 12.11.14); Jonathan Turley, ‘Big money behind the military-industrial complex’, Al 
Jazeera, 11 January 2014, Via: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/big-money-
behind-war-military-industrial-complex-20141473026736533.html (accessed 12.11.14); Simon 
Jenkins, ‘If the MoD can’t name the enemy, it shouldn’t buy the weapons’, theguardian.com, 16 
January 2014, Via: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/16/mod-cant-name-
enemy-shouldnt-buy-weapons-threat-cold-war-defence (accessed 12.11.14); Simon Jenkins, ‘Oh! 
What a Lovely War on Terror - it's the number the arms dealers love’, theguardian.com, 14 
September 2007, Via: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/sep/14/comment.politics 
(accessed 12.11.14); Soloman Hughes, ‘Shining A Light On Raytheon’, The People’s Daily Morning 
Star, 22 November 2013, Via: http://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-b0f3-Shining-a-light-on-
Raytheon (accessed 12.11.14); David Rohde, ‘The Security-Industrial Complex’, The Atlantic, 15 June 
2013, Via: http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06/the-security-industrial-
complex/276906/ (accessed 12.11.14); Edward Luce, ‘Data intelligence complex is the real story,’ 





references and resort to generalised statements on the supposedly corrosive character of 
this system; some, such as the work of Soloman Hughes, provide fuller (and more critical) 
analysis of what is seen as a highly damaging SIC in the UK.13 In the US context, James Risen 
and Tim Shorrock have been amongst the most vocal critics to detail the same 
phenomenon.14 
The presentation of ‘the SIC’ as the emergence of a detrimental system of public-
private interaction around contemporary security issues can be seen to have arisen directly 
from - and by adopting its ‘industrial-complex’ terminology can be seen as an evolution of - 
what has been labelled the MIC: it follows that any study on this subject therefore needs to 
properly understand its predecessor concept. Put simply, the MIC has traditionally been 
viewed as an undesirable, even unethical15 coalition of public-private (and often wider) 
entities pursuing shared (political-economic) objectives in the defence sector. In the 
popular imagination, it can be understood as a ‘cosy’ network of financially self-interested 
government and profit-making organisations that inappropriately pursue their own 
interests, which is considered to be unaccountable and/or highly damaging to society. 
Whilst (as will be discussed in thesis) both the character and impact of the MIC are 
contested within existing academic literature, this has not prevented the concept being 
presented almost invariably in ‘pejorative’16 terms.17  
                                                                                                                                                                   
00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl (accessed 12.11.14); Glenn Greenwald, ‘The decade’s biggest 
scam’, salon.com, 29 August 2011, Via: http://www.salon.com/2011/08/29/terrorism_39/ (accessed 
12.11.14); Stephen Armstrong, War plc: The Rise of the New Corporate Mercenary (London: Faber & 
Faber, 2008); Naomi Wolf, ‘The spectacle of terror and its vested interests’, The Guardian, 9 May 
2012, Via: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/may/09/spectacle-terror-
vested-interests (accessed 15.08.12); and Solomon Hughes, ‘Follow the money: the “war on terror” 
and the multinationals who are profiteering from it’, Socialist Review (March 2008), Via: 
http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=10305  (accessed 24.02.12). 
13
 Hughes, War on Terror, Inc 
14
 Risen, Pay any Price; Shorrock, Spies for Hire.  
15
 Edmund F. Byrne, ‘The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex is Circumstantially Unethical’, Journal of 
Business Ethics, Vol.95 (2010), pp.153-165 
16
 Ledbetter argues this way in James Ledbetter, Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and 





As indicated above, contemporary characterisations of ‘the SIC’ have frequently 
but not always been presented in a similarly negative way.18 In the modern-day security 
environment and particularly the context of the wider identified trend of the private 
sector’s increasing involvement in supporting governments on national security issues19, 
the idea has arisen that similarly harmful public-private dynamics have ‘followed the 
money’ as higher levels of public expenditure have been allocated towards mitigating non-
military security issues such as terrorism. Whilst as Chapter 2 identifies much of the 
existing work focuses on the US example, the statistical basis for such claims is also clearly 
apparent in the UK according to Government figures; ‘…dedicated spending on 
counterterrorism, intelligence, and resilience (…) steadily increased from £923 million in 
2001-2002 to £2.5 billion in 2007-2008 and will increase to £3.5bn by 2010/11’20. Given 
this budgetary context, the implications of such significant increases in non-military CT 
spending after 9/11 have often been read in a certain way. Critics have questioned the 
desirability of such expenditure and warned against what they see as the propensity to 
towards ‘threat inflation’ in this sector21; some explicitly argue that the interests 
traditionally associated with the MIC, or what amounts to an SIC, have begun to exert 
themselves negatively in the CT field.22 Reflecting the growing prominence of this 
argument, the UK Government’s independent reviewer of CT legislation recently issued a 
                                                                                                                                                                   
17
 Exceptions providing support for the MIC are John Stanley Baumgartner, The Lonely Warriors: 
Case for the Military-Industrial Complex (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1970) and Charles J. Dunlap 
Jr., ‘The Military-Industrial Complex’, Daedalus, Vol.140:3 (2011). 
18
 One recent exception argues that ‘…the suggestion that there is something sinister here is 
unfounded’. Nathan E. Busch and Austen D. Givens, The Business of Counterterrorism: Public-Private 
Partnerships in Homeland Security (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2014), p.32 
19
 Section 1.3 analyses existing literature covering this trend.  
20
 Cited in John Mueller and Mark G Stewart, Terror, Security and Money: balancing the risks, 
benefits, and costs of Homeland Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.87 
21
 See especially John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate 
National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006); John Mueller and 
Mark G. Stewart, ‘The Terrorism Delusion’, International Security, Vol.37:1 (2012), pp.81-110; Steve 
Hewitt, The British War on Terror (London: Continuum, 2008), p.4; and Simon Palombi, ‘Foreign 
Fighters and Threat Magnification’, Chatham House Expert Comment, 12 August 2014, Via: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/15511 (accessed 10.11.14). 
22





warning over the existence of ‘vested interests’ in the CT field, arguing that expenditure 
must remain appropriate within this sector.23 
Whilst no serious analyst would question the need for a proportionate policy 
response to terrorism, it can also be observed that the tone of criticism levelled towards 
the so-called SIC has rarely been dispassionate. In his dedicated account on the emergence 
of the SIC in the US and the UK, for example, Hughes adopts an accusatory attitude 
towards the interests which he considers have coalesced around, and have profited from, 
the new context:  
…governments on both sides of the Atlantic created a well funded and well 
connected industrial lobby with a financial interest in extending and 
prolonging the war on terror. (…) Security firms could encourage the 
government to take military action simply by being there; the existence of 
companies who could help extend military action or increase ‘homeland 
security’ could seduce the British and US governments into more 
militaristic and authoritarian policies simply by presenting them as 
options.24 
Whilst allegations using sweeping statements of this sort might be expected of 
investigative journalists and commentators, it is surprising that such arguments have been 
allowed to persist for so long unchallenged - or not been subjected to serious academic 
inquiry - crucially because they are lazy interpretations of the complexities at play. 
Against this backdrop, this thesis reassesses how to conceptualise the public-
private (and wider associated) interaction that has been fostered, or that has arisen, in 
response to the contemporary terrorism threat to the UK after 9/11. The dissertation will 
demonstrate - through the examination of selected case studies and by drawing on original 
interviews and other data arising from the UK CT sector - that whilst some of the dynamics 
                                                          
23
 The significance of this point is noted in Simon Palombi, ‘Foreign Fighters’. For the original 
warning, see David Anderson, ‘The Terrorism Acts in 2012: Report of the Independent Reviewer on 
the operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006’, July 2013, Via: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243472/9780108
512629.pdf (accessed 10.11.14), p.42  
24





associated with the MIC clearly do now exist in the non-military CT arena, there are some 
other defining, differentiating and more nuanced characteristics which define public-
private cooperation in the non-military security field. Whilst (like its MIC predecessor) the 
‘industrial-complex’ in the CT sector is shown to encompass (or draw the attention of) a 
wide network of interested parties working closely together - people operating within 
government and non-government entities including private companies, research 
institutions, parliamentarians, first responders, the media, and other civil society 
organisations - the character of the system of public-private interaction in the non-military 
security arena is more disaggregated and significantly less coordinated than is evident in 
the defence sector. Data from original interviews will show that the UK’s CT sector is 
characterised by a very broad set of actors and, in contrast to defence, possesses an 
almost incalculably larger set of purchasers of capability from both government and the 
private sector. The thesis contributes to a better understanding of this landscape and 
presents a picture of often chaotic public-private interaction on CT issues. In so doing, 
questions are raised over whether an SIC of a corrosive or damaging nature (i.e. in the 
same sense as the MIC has most often been presented) has actually emerged in the UK. 
The dissertation concludes that whilst Eisenhower’s ‘warning’25 should continue to 
be heeded in the modern security context, the SIC label has been used too simplistically to 
date; its usefulness in describing the system of public-private cooperation (and the actors 
engaged in it) has not been properly debated or understood by the scholarly community. 
Through its micro-level examination of selected CT-related contracts and other areas of 
concern associated with the SIC, the dissertation will present a more balanced, hitherto 
largely unseen view of how public-private cooperation really operates in the UK’s non-
military CT sector. This new analysis can be seen to challenge critics and in particular their 
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existing understandings of ‘the SIC’ profoundly; as such, the thesis makes a timely and 
original contribution to the field of security studies. 
1.2 Justification for research into ‘the SIC’ 
It is worth briefly emphasising why this research has been conducted. This thesis is 
important because, as in the US until recently26, the volume and quality of scholarly 
investigation into the character and impact of ‘the SIC’ in the UK has been notable by its 
almost complete absence; rigorous academic debate or analysis on the SIC has simply not 
yet materialised. Whilst (as noted above) some academic work has begun to explore the 
evolution of the MIC at the conceptual level27, not a single attempt at systematic empirical 
analysis grounded in existing theory on the MIC has been conducted to test the 
appropriateness of the application of the SIC theory in the non-military UK security 
context.28 This major research gap has arisen because, in short, authors who have referred 
or alluded to the existence of ‘the SIC’ have often done so without empirical support to 
their assertions.29 This has led to a situation where conceptualisations of the SIC have been 
made on the basis of limited or anecdotal evidence; they have also (through their similar 
terminology) inherited negative perceptions associated from the MIC that are largely 
untested in the new context. This thesis will demonstrate this is misleading and that it is 
incorrect to portray ‘the SIC’ in exactly the same terms and terminology as its predecessor 
and namesake; the MIC. 
This is not to seek to dismiss concerns that have been raised around the trend 
towards greater levels of public-private security cooperation; only to suggest that 
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characterisations of ‘the SIC’ have not yet been properly tested. The main reason for 
undertaking this dissertation, therefore, has been to address the current shortage of 
research and analysis on the scope of public-private interaction supporting UK national 
security, and the lack of balanced debate over the appropriateness of private sector 
involvement in this sector.30 If there are now extensive interactions between the 
Government and the private sector in non-military aspects of UK national security strategy, 
as this thesis illustrates, it is fitting that the origins, characteristics and consequences of 
such cooperation be properly analysed. There should be improved scrutiny of private 
companies’ activities in the sector.  
There are two other main reasons why this research is justified. Firstly, as ‘national 
security’ comprises a significant proportion of the UK Government’s overall budget31, the 
size, effectiveness and appropriateness of expenditure in this field - including but 
extending beyond the defence sector - deserves to be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. 
Whilst one study has (briefly) addressed this directly32, and the size of the domestic UK 
security market has been illustrated33, a lack of scrutiny exists on the size, allocation and 
appropriateness of UK national security expenditure outside military issues, including in 
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the CT field.34 This thesis’s micro-level examination of UK CT expenditure and contracts in 
itself constitutes a significant new contribution to the field. 
Secondly, on the basis of the available literature and interviews conducted for this 
thesis there is evidently a lack of awareness and informed discussion at the policy level 
about the aggregated totality of the roles that ‘industry’ plays (or could play) in CT today, 
and a shortage of creative thinking on how such contributions could be managed better. 
This thesis argues that only after substantive new analysis has been completed can a 
proper debate begin around whether the existing ‘terms of engagement’35 for public-
private security cooperation are effective and appropriate; there is currently a shortage of  
‘joined-up’ thinking in this area that could help to realise meaningful policy-making 
improvements. This thesis seeks to provide a basis for future discussions; it is hoped that 
its analysis and conclusions will help to encourage an improvement in the level of policy 
focus and research attention given to the private sector’s involvement in UK national 
security strategy. 
1.3 Contextualisation of the thesis within existing academic literature and debates 
Literature and debates on the privatisation of security 
In addition to the extensive existing academic literature covering the origins, 
character and operation of the MIC (covered in Chapter 2), the role that industry (or the 
private sector more generally) plays in contemporary national security strategy has also 
attracted significant scholarly scrutiny and policy attention. When considering the 
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‘privatisation of security’36, it is often asserted - whether within Government, industry or 
academia - that States depend on companies to fulfil their military and security 
objectives.37 This argument appears within the UK Government’s defence policy 
documentation, for example, and especially in the large body of scholarship on private 
companies’ support of Western armed forces in recent overseas conflicts; the 
contributions of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in supporting recent UK 
military deployments have attracted particular academic scrutiny38, for example, as have 
the governance frameworks for their involvement.39 Such is the extensive use of 
companies in the security arena today that their involvement has even been described as 
‘ubiquitous’40. 
There has been notable additional coverage of more traditional industrial aspects 
of the British Government’s defence policy and posture41, the economic factors potentially 
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accounting for rising costs within the defence budget42, and the extent to which 
outsourcing now exists as a core and indelible characteristic of British defence policy.43 
Therefore, alongside significant recent scholarly and policy interest in the activities of 
PMSCs, the role played by traditional defence suppliers (often referred to collectively as 
the ‘defence industrial base’ (DIB)) has remained under close scrutiny.44 Perhaps owing to 
the dominance of the US Government’s defence expenditure45, and especially since 9/11 
and the subsequent military interventions conducted in the name of the ‘War on Terror’, 
analysis of the character, scope and implications of such corporate involvement in 
contemporary security has often concentrated on the North American experience.46 
Some theoretical work has attempted to question, characterise or explain the 
causes of such extensive levels of corporate involvement in security.47 The more 
convincing, evidence-based explanations have included, for example, Singer’s idea that 
many national militaries down-sized following the end of the Cold War - for him, ‘[t]he end 
of the Cold War produced a vacuum in the market of security’48 - and the wider historical 
fact that national defence industries in the US and the UK were privatised during the 1980s 
and 1990s. At a broader theoretical level, international relations scholars and political 
economists have advanced the now widely-accepted, almost clichéd idea that, following 
the Cold War, the nature of the State system has undergone a significant transformation 
                                                          
42
 David Kirkpatrick, ‘Trends in the costs of weapon systems and the consequences’, Defence and 
Peace Economics, Vol.15:3 (2004), pp.259-273  
43
 Krahmann argues that ‘[t]he UK has been one of the first countries to privatise and outsource 
significant proportions of its national defence establishment[.]’ Krahmann, States, Citizens, p.84 
44
 See Henrik Heidenkamp, John Louth and Trevor Taylor, ‘The Defence Industrial Ecosystem: 
Delivering Security in an Uncertain World’, RUSI Whitehall Report 2-11, June 2011, Via: 
http://www.rusi.org/publications/whitehallreports/ref:O4E03231821048/ (accessed 20.02.11) 
45
 Jacques Gansler, Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First-Century Defense Industry (London: 
MIT Press, 2011), p.20 
46
 Widely-cited US treatments include Singer, Corporate Warriors; Stanger, One Nation Under 
Contract; and Dana Priest and William Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American 
Security State (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2011) 
47
 See, for example, Patricia Owens, ‘Distinctions, distinctions: ‘public’ and ‘private’ force?’, 
International Affairs, Vol. 84:5 (2008), pp.977-990; and Lucia Zedner, Security (Oxford: Routledge, 
2009). 
48





within the context of a rapidly changing global environment.49 As a result of new trends 
including increasing globalisation and rapid technological innovation - trends which some 
argue have reduced the ability of the classical Westphalian ‘nation state’ to exert influence 
and power globally50 - it follows that Governments have sought to make increasing use of 
‘non-state actors’ such as the private sector to fulfil their responsibilities, both within and 
beyond the national security sector.51  
Whilst such trends and their potential implications have generated considerable 
scholarly attention in respect of the defence sector, there has been comparatively little 
dedicated theoretical and empirical scrutiny of - and public debate around - the origins, 
characteristics and consequences of the private sector’s involvement within the non-
military aspects of the UK’s national security strategy.52 With the exception of some limited 
interest in the private sector’s involvement in CT53, scholarly attention in this field has 
remained largely focused on the PMSC sector or more traditional defence-industrial issues. 
This lack of scrutiny on privatisation within non-military security sectors is reflected at the 
highest policy levels; the Government’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 
almost completely declined, for example, to contemplate how companies other than the 
DIB are involved in security.54 As Abrahamsen and Williams have lamented in a separate 
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context, we could say that there is almost an ‘invisibility of security privatization’55 in the 
non-military UK security field. 
This imbalanced, defence-focussed character of UK scholarly inquiry into (and 
policy focus on56) the ‘privatisation of security’ can be quite easily explained. In short, 
whilst (as shown below) contemporary definitions of ‘national security’ have changed 
considerably in incorporating non-military security issues, this important shift has only 
occurred quite recently. Whereas in the 20th Century a primary characteristic of any State’s 
national security approach has been in deterring and/or responding to inter-state threats 
by military means, the security environment has now fundamentally altered.57 The UK 
Government’s 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) explicitly recognised this, expressing 
the four top contemporary risks to UK security: international terrorism, hostile attacks 
upon UK cyber space, a major accident or natural hazard and an international military 
crisis.58 The under-appreciated implication of this assessment is that many of the country’s 
most pressing security challenges require non-military security responses that often 
necessarily incorporate the support of many different companies. In short, as Edwards has 
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expertly highlighted, any country’s military capacity in this context must be seen as only 
one element of its overall national security capability.59 
This is not to suggest that the private sector’s involvement in non-military security 
issues has been completely overlooked  by scholars; the ‘mushrooming of private security 
industries’60 across Europe has been documented in this context, for example, and other 
core texts covering the private sector’s involvement in national security (including CT) are 
also available61. However, analysis of security privatisation in the non-military security field 
tends to less structured and/or has not yet considered the potentially larger implications of 
the private sector’s involvement.62 Whilst the involvement of companies in the policing63, 
intelligence64 and cyber security65 sectors has attracted scrutiny, such research has 
generally been conducted on a sector-specific basis. In another context, the UK 
Government’s interactions with the private sector in protecting the country’s critical 
infrastructure have been expertly documented66, but this form of cooperation is not 
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routinely connected with other fields of non-military security privatisation.67 In short, there 
is a ‘neglect of the breadth of security privatization.’68 
Finally, at the theoretical level, some of the most prominent recent philosophical 
thought on the interaction between the State and the market on security issues has gained 
considerable prominence. Amongst the most hotly-contested offerings in this space is 
Professor Philip Bobbitt’s theory on the emergence of what he has called the ‘market 
state’69. For Bobbitt, a transition of the ‘constitutional order’ is underway whereby the 
ability of the State to achieve its objectives is no longer drawn from its ‘national’ character, 
but derives largely from (and is deeply engrained in) the market economy. One of the 
implications of this is that, for underlying structural reasons, governments now have no 
option but to engage with companies. Under contemporary circumstances, he argues; 
‘…governments will have to learn how to select and work with private sector collaborators, 
partly because the latter own most of the critical infrastructure that we must make less 
vulnerable’.70 With this statement, Bobbitt appears to have been ahead of his time in 
identifying the deep significance of private sector’s present day role in security.  
Whilst Bobbitt’s controversial ideas have received criticism71, he raises important 
questions about the potential strategic implications for CT and ‘wider security’ of the 
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confluence of the ‘market’ and the ‘state’ in what he convincingly argues is a significantly 
altered international system. In short, the controversial proposition he puts forward - a 
proposition nevertheless also advanced by other scholars72 - is that the Governments must 
now cooperate with companies on non-military security issues such as CT.  
Literature and debates on the meaning of ‘National Security’ 
If there is, as this thesis will argue, a need to widen ‘the empirical lens to include non-
militarized forms of private security’73, then it is important to consider what is meant by 
‘security’ in the first instance. Unfortunately ‘national security’ is not straightforward to 
define74, as it is considered by many leading scholars to be a subjective75 or contested76 
concept. In the political press, accusations abound that the term ‘national security’ has 
been abused; Jenkins, for example, has criticised the approach of UK ‘securocrats’ for 
considering ‘security’ wrongly as something more than ‘the integrity of the British state or 
its institutions.’77 By contrast, other authors argue that not enough has been (or is being) 
done to ensure the UK’s ‘national security’; concerns are frequently articulated about the 
state of ‘the UK’s role in the world’ and the fact that the defence budget has been 
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dangerously underfunded in recent decades, for example.78 This lack of consensus around 
how ‘national security’ should be invoked and delivered reflects how there is disagreement 
over how it should be conceptualised. 
Public polling data also indicates the subjective nature of ‘national security’. In 
their research on public attitudes, for example, Allouche and Lind present the ‘evolution of 
public perception according to opinion polls on the perception of most worrying topics in 
1997, 2003 and 2007.’79 They show that the proportion of people considering ‘crime and 
violence’ as the most worrying issue steadily reduced from 68% in 1997, to 50% in 2003, 
down to 51% in 2007.80 Terrorism, on the other hand, rose overall as an issue that the 
public most worried about during this period - from 21% in 2007 up to 42% in 2003, 
subsiding again to 33% in 2007.81 This exemplifies both how security is difficult to define 
and how perceptions on the main threats can vary over time. 
Useful attempts at a definition of ‘national security’ have been made, however. 
Within one of the most-widely cited works on this subject, Buzan et. al. compare what they 
see as the two main approaches in Security: A New Framework for Analysis; ‘the new one 
of the wideners and the old military and state centred view of the traditionalists.’82 
Scholars associated with the latter, they argue, ‘equate security with military issues and 
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the use of force’83; traditional interpretations of security are thus primarily associated with 
the risk of external invasion or other military threats, whereas in more recent decades 
scholars have encouraged the adoption of a broader perspective to the study of security 
issues.84 This thesis adopts this latter interpretation of ‘security’ because - at the risk of 
repetition - the scholarly community has not yet given the private sector’s involvement in 
the non-military security context the attention it deserves. 
Whilst debates over the meaning of ‘security’ can generate more questions than 
answers, Ken Booth, David Omand and Julian Richards offer particularly useful definitions 
of the concept as they highlight certain, general characteristics which can be accepted. The 
former has argued, for example, that there exists ‘a consensus on the standard definition 
of security - to do with being or feeling safe from threats and danger[.]’85 Similarly, Omand 
offers a definition86:  
…national security today should be defined as a state of trust on the part of the 
citizen that the risks to everyday life, whether from man-made threats or 
impersonal hazards, are being adequately managed to the extent that there is 
confidence that normal life can continue.  
Such sensible interpretations illustrate how the concept of security cannot therefore be 
restricted - both in theory and in practice - to military issues; this was made very clear in a 
contemporary setting on 9/11. Furthermore, as Richards proposes ‘that “national security” 
is defined as a particular articulation of security priorities and concerns put forward by the 
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political leaders of a state, at a given time in its history’87, so any dissertation addressing 
contemporary security strategy (including the private sector’s involvement therein) must 
recognise how these ‘articulations’ vary over time.  
One recognised feature of evolving thinking on ‘national security’ is what has been 
referred to as the ‘blurring’ of defence and security issues. Omand has outlined this trend, 
arguing that by 9/11 the UK’s approach was ‘…blurring the previous boundaries between 
the overseas and domestic theatres and broadening thinking about risks to include hazards 
as well as threats.’88 Similarly, Edmunds has described the ‘conceptual desegregation of 
defence within UK security as a whole’89 and, more recently, Phillips notes that ‘the blurred 
(if not false) distinction between home and abroad’ was one of the two key drivers behind 
the rationale to widen the planned Defence Review to include security issues after the 
2010 General Election.90 The argument put forward by these and other such prominent 
thinkers91 - that defence and security issues are increasingly connected within any 
country’s overall conceptualisation of ‘national security’ - is extremely compelling; there 
has even been a precedent for considering industry’s involvement in this context.92 This 
thesis agrees that security has ‘broadened’ in this way; as such, it is deemed important 
that the private sector’s involvement is properly understood in this wider context. 
Understanding how ‘national security’ is now routinely considered broadly is 
especially relevant to this thesis’ core interest - i.e. analysing how and why companies are 
                                                          
87
 Julian Richards, A Guide to National Security: Threats, Responses, and Strategies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p.17 
88
 Omand, Securing the State, p.9 
89
 Timothy Edmunds, ‘The defence dilemma in Britain’, International Affairs, Vol.86:2 (2010), p.390 
90
 Mark Phillips, ‘Policy-Making in Defence and Security: Lessons from the Strategic Defence and 
Security Review’, RUSI Journal, Vol.157:1 (2012), p.28 
91
 See also Edwards, National Security and Jonathan Shaw, Britain in a Perilous World: The Strategic 
Defence and Security Review We Need (London: Haus Publishing, 2014) 
92
 European Commission, ‘Study on the industrial implications in Europe of the blurring of dividing 







involved in CT - because it is from the Government’s definition of ‘national security’ that 
strategic, operational and investment decisions are made in the security sector. Whilst 
their respective security policies and practices have varied, both the New Labour 
Governments after 1997 and the Conservative-Liberal Democratic Coalition Government 
which succeeded them both placed a significant emphasis on addressing non-military 
security risks. According to the current Government, for example, the UK faces a wide 
variety of challenges that extend beyond potential military threats; as stated above, its 
2010 NSS expresses a tiered list of risks to UK security and the ‘tier one’ category (i.e. the 
most serious risks) includes international terrorism, hostile attacks upon UK cyber space, a 
major accident or natural hazard and an international military crisis.93 In practical policy 
terms, this means that the responses to three of the four principal risks to the UK’s 
national security are now ‘owned’ by departments other than the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD).94 This thesis is an investigation into such wider security machinery; it recognises 
that the MoD has also developed interactions with the private sector on non-traditional 
security issues, but focuses on the under-researched public-private cooperation that has 
been fostered in the CT sector by non-military security departments such as the Home 
Office.  
Two final points can be made about scholarly discussions on ‘national security’ in 
so far as they relate to this thesis. Firstly, it should be stressed that the debates over the 
meaning of ‘national security’ rightly show no sign of being ‘resolved’; in short, the concept 
is likely to continue to be viewed in a variety of ways95, and a vigorous debate is likely to 
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continue to take place around the effectiveness of the UK Government’s national security 
machinery and its ability to conduct ‘strategy’.96 This thesis seeks to contribute to this field 
of scholarship in so far as the private sector is involved in UK national security strategy; this 
topic has unfortunately rarely featured in discussions on strategy-making to date.  
Secondly, this study is constrained by length and so choices have been made in 
framing which aspects of the private sector’s involvement in ‘national security’ are 
analysed. As noted above, many scholars have convincingly argued that it is no longer 
sufficient to solely address the military aspects of security in implementing UK national 
security strategy97; the author strongly agrees with this assessment. This thesis does not 
seek to dismiss the importance of defence issues98, but argues that new research is needed 
on other important aspects of security privatisation.  
1.4 A reassessment of the UK ‘security-industrial complex’   
More academic research is needed, therefore, on the private sector’s involvement 
in contemporary UK national security strategy beyond the defence sector. Whilst it has 
been argued that an emerging ‘SIC’ has exerted a negative influence in the ‘domestic 
security’ arena99, no academic work has yet systematically considered the characteristics 
and the consequences of the extensive range of public-private security interactions that 
have been fostered by UK national security-related departments outside the military 
arena. Whilst some theoretical work has been completed (or is emerging) on the evolution 
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of the MIC and/or ‘the SIC’ concept100, the problem is that, prior to this thesis, detailed 
analytical work had not been completed on the structure and operation of public-private 
cooperation in the non-military context. Whilst Dunne and Sköns have suggested that that 
the MIC has evolved in the new security environment, for example, they decline to 
investigate its dynamics in detail.101 As argued in Chapter 2, Hughes’ fierce critique of the 
SIC appears more concerned with presenting the system as a conspiracy than with actually 
analysing its complexity. This thesis seeks to offer a fuller, more balanced analysis of the 
origins, characteristics and consequences of the private sector’s role in contemporary UK 
national security strategy.  
The thesis will demonstrate that, as security risks have ‘broadened’ away from 
military issues102, so a system of extensive public-private security interaction has emerged 
in the CT aspects of the UK’s national security strategy. As a result of multiple new 
interactions - some of which are detailed for the first time - the dissertation argues with 
specific reference to the UK Government’s CT Strategy known as ‘CONTEST’ that an 
‘industrial complex’ of a different variety to the MIC has emerged in the CT sector. In short, 
the ‘British military-industrial complex’103 can be seen to have evolved in the sense that 
some of its dynamics also now exist in the context of the responses established to tackle 
various non-military, contemporary security risks. However, as Section 1.1 introduced, the 
character of the aggregation of the public-private interactions in CT differs from the 
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defence-orientated and now arguably outdated concept (introduced in the following 
chapter) known as the MIC.104 
The thesis will show that there are some distinct origins, characteristics and 
consequences of the private sector’s involvement in the non-military aspects of national 
security that deserve to be understood. Crucially, the UK Government and its associated 
agencies are not solely concerned with engaging commercial suppliers of products and 
services as they interact with the private sector on CT issues; engagement with this part of 
‘industry’ is a (if not the) defining feature of most existing theoretical work on the MIC. 
Whilst recognising that some traditional defence and security sector suppliers have played 
a role in CONTEST, this thesis shows that in the post 9/11 security context the UK 
Government has also developed relationships with both private operators of security and a 
wide range of other business sectors. Furthermore, whereas ‘the term “military-industrial 
complex” is almost always used as a pejorative’105, this thesis strives for neutrality in 
examining the proposition that the private sector’s involvement within CT Strategy might 
now properly be considered as a necessary element of UK national security strategy. It has 
already been found that the use of contractors by governments in support of military 
operations is now widespread106; this thesis examines the UK Government’s use of 
companies in CT to reassess the dynamics of corporate involvement in this field. 
The UK has been selected as the sole country case study for this thesis because, 
despite the apparently extensive level of privatisation within the country’s national 
security strategy, the actual or potential impact that any public-private interactions have 
had upon its non-military elements has not hitherto generated significant research. This 
contrasts with the US experience where there is already serious scholarly interest in 
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companies’ involvement in contemporary security fields such as ‘homeland security’, cyber 
security and emergency preparedness, for example.107 
Alternative approaches were considered before choosing the UK as the focus for 
this thesis. Firstly, the development of a comparative study - either a US-UK study, or one 
including other European case studies - was considered. Whilst future research along such 
lines might offer utility in further analysing the factors which account for public-private 
security cooperation in the non-military arena, the approach was not selected because 
room is needed to allow for a thorough investigation into the many, currently under-
researched CT sub-sectors in the UK. Furthermore, this thesis is concerned with the 
question of whether the expressed system of public-private interaction has impacted upon 
security policy or expenditure, as traditional MIC theories assert, rather than on the 
question of how those influences may vary from country to country. A single country case 
study allows for a more considered analysis of the extent to which any ‘industrial-complex’ 
in the CT sector has had any such impact.  
1.5 Research Questions 
Given the ease with which existing accounts on the private sector’s involvement in 
contemporary UK national security have presented the MIC as having made a simple linear 
transfer into the non-military aspects of UK national security strategy108, it was tempting to 
seek to examine theories on ‘the SIC’ against a testable hypothesis. However, as 
hypothesising solely on the existence of the MIC (and thus any supposed successor) is 
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recognised to present a number of methodological challenges109 - and was in any event 
also judged not to provoke sufficient examination into the characteristics and potential 
policy consequences of any such system - an alternative type of inquiry has been pursued. 
Whilst existing theoretical work on the MIC informs the analysis, the central, guiding 
research question that removes assumptions on whether the MIC has ‘transferred’ into the 
CT sector, and which seeks to examine the character of any ‘industrial-complex’ in this 
sector between 2002 and 2014 on its own terms, is therefore as follows:  
 What are the origins, characteristics and consequences of the private sector’s 
involvement in the (non-military) CT aspects of UK national security strategy? 
Three more specific, supporting questions inform the analysis of the system under 
examination: 
 Is the character of ‘industry engagement’ in the UK’s CT sector comparable with 
‘defence’? 
 Has any industrial-complex in the UK’s CT sector exerted any ‘unwarranted 
influence’? 
 What are the consequences of any such system for researchers and practitioners? 
Thus, this thesis examines the origins, character and consequences of the private sector’s 
involvement in an individual sector (CT) of the non-military aspects of contemporary UK 
national security strategy. In so doing, it considers the extent to which the dynamics 
traditionally associated with the MIC - dynamics which have often been subjected to 
considerable criticism - exist in the non-military security arena. It develops a new 
approach, backed by micro-level empirical analysis of recent non-military, CT-related 
security contracts and other public-private dynamics in the UK, to cast new light on the 
private sector’s involvement in contemporary national security. What has been labelled as 
‘the SIC’ is reassessed, and in so doing the analysis offers new insights into why and how 
companies have become so involved in CT. Finally, the thesis contributes a new framework 
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for analysing public-private cooperation in the security environment, as well as offering 
recommendations on how collaboration might be developed in this sector.   
1.6 The scope of the thesis: public-private interactions in the UK’s CT Strategy 
(‘CONTEST’) 
Given the challenges already identified around defining ‘national security’, it is important 
to clarify which parts of the UK Government’s security agenda (and areas of public-private 
interaction) the thesis will focus upon. It is worth stressing that it would not be possible in 
the space available to properly analyse in detail every public-private interaction that has 
emerged in all fields of contemporary national security strategy; that is not the purpose of 
this research. Instead, the aim is to develop an approach that allows for investigation into a 
specific area of the private sector’s involvement in the (under-researched) non-military 
aspects of the UK’s national security strategy that might have wider application. This 
section justifies the selection of the private sector’s involvement in CT as the focus of the 
research, placing it in the context of existing work in this field. 
This thesis analyses some of the main public-private interactions to have emerged 
within the UK Government’s CT strategy known as ‘CONTEST’ between 2002 and 2014.110 
Before embarking upon this work, it is important to recognise that the UK Government’s 
CT policy framework underwent a radical upheaval throughout the 2000s. Most notably, a 
brand new overarching CT strategy was created and developed considerably during this 
time; this was in large part in response to the Al-Qaeda (AQ) related terrorist threat that 
had existed for some time, but that only really entered the public’s consciousness on 9/11. 
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The architect of the new strategy, David Omand, has recalled how he ‘launched work’ on 
what he called ‘CONTEST’ (an acronym he reveals was drawn from; COuNter-TErrorism 
STrategy) in November 2002.111 He explains how the new approach would be structured 
under the so-called ‘four Ps’: 
By 2003, the UK government had its counter-terrorist strategy, CONTEST, 
with four strategic campaigns: Pursue (near term) and Prevent (longer 
term to reduce the likelihood of terrorist attack; Protect to reduce the 
vulnerability of the public and of national infrastructure to attack; and 
Prepare to reduce the impact and duration of disruption from attacks 
should they take place, integrating all the work done on civil contingencies 
and ensuring that the arrangements are well exercised.112 
Alongside the establishment and development of CONTEST, the Government introduced 
(after the attacks on London on 7 July 2005 (7/7)) a significant change to the machinery of 
Government in the CT sector; Hennessy identifies that by 2007 the role of the Home 
Secretary had been strengthened considerably and that ‘a new Office for Security and 
Counter-Terrorism [OSCT] inside the Home Office would take over all responsibility for 
CONTEST from the Cabinet Office.’113 As this thesis shows, private sector engagement has 
become a growing priority for the OSCT. 
A full analysis of the aims, objectives and effectiveness of all aspects of CONTEST 
throughout its lifecycle is outside the scope of this thesis - its focus is restricted to 
analysing the private sector’s involvement therein - but two of its main aspects help to set 
the scene for this thesis’s analysis. Firstly, whilst the strategy was revolutionary it has been 
noted that, unlike in the US, it was never the intention of CONTEST to completely eradicate 
the risk of terrorism114; this might run contrary to the thinking of critics who believe that 
‘the SIC’ has used the terrorist threat to justify the introduction of any or all unnecessary 
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CT measures. In short, its approach has consistently been ‘…to reduce the risk to the UK 
and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and 
with confidence.’115 Secondly, CONTEST’s emphasis on achieving effective coordination 
across all the various UK government departments, agencies and other actors involved in 
countering terrorism has been rightly heralded as a major aspect of its effectiveness116; 
supporting this, the strategy has been in place for over 10 years and the Government’s 
independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has observed that its ‘four p’s’ 
‘categorisation functions well’117. In short, any contemporary CT-focussed thesis must 
understand that CONTEST introduced a fundamentally new, often welcomed approach to 
UK CT policy, and that this was driven largely in response to AQ-related terrorism arising 
from 9/11. It was in this context specifically that arguments purporting to the emergence 
of ‘a SIC’ arose; hence why this thesis covers the years 2002-2014. 
Whilst terrorism is only one of the contemporary security risks facing the UK, its 
selection as the main focus for this thesis is justified for four main reasons. Firstly, 
terrorism has been the highest priority UK security threat since 9/11; the UK has been ‘a 
prime Al-Qaeda target’118 and the British Security Service’s (MI5) website has stated that 
AQ ‘…presents the single greatest threat to the UK.’119 It is considered important, 
therefore, to consider how the Government has interacted with private companies in 
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managing this threat, especially in view of (as the thesis shows) the substantial investment 
it has made in the field. Secondly, the UK Government’s response to terrorism has drawn 
on the resources and capabilities of a wide variety of departments and agencies during the 
period under investigation; research on CT therefore allows for analysis of public-private 
security interaction beyond the defence arena. Thirdly, surveys suggest that terrorism has 
been the security issue attracting the most UK public interest from 9/11 to the present 
day; a 2011 Chatham House-You Gov survey found, for example, that the public continued 
to consider international terrorism as ‘the overriding threat.’120 Analysis of the private 
sector’s involvement in addressing terrorism has simply not reflected this high level of UK 
public concern about the problem, reinforcing the idea that a major research ‘gap’ exists in 
this area. Finally, as the thesis shows, the private sector’s involvement in CONTEST has 
been widespread, yet, notwithstanding some short scholarly contributions on this 
subject121, the significance of its interactions with the Government in this field has rarely 
been addressed.  
Three main additional factors contributed to CT being chosen ahead of other non-
military areas of contemporary security strategy also involving the private sector. Firstly, as 
suggested in Section 1.3 the private sector’s support of the military aspects of UK security 
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policy has already attracted (and continues to receive) extensive academic coverage; it is 
judged that whilst a dedicated reassessment of the MIC could be timely, an investigation 
into the character of the private sector’s involvement in the defence sector would add 
relatively limited value in an already crowded field. Secondly, the UK Government’s 
engagement of the private sector on what it calls other ‘wider security’122 issues attracting 
significant investment - including, perhaps most notably, around the current major policy 
focus on cyber security - is only at an early stage of development. Indeed, a view existed 
amongst the majority of those practitioners interviewed for this thesis that the level of 
public-private interdependence in the cyber arena is perhaps more significant than in any 
other area of contemporary UK national security strategy. Such was the rapidly-evolving 
character of the UK Government’s strategies on cyber security and other non-military 
security issues at the time of writing that it was judged that - unlike in the case of CT 
between 2002-2014 - it would be premature to accumulate and examine data in such 
fields. Reliable material on the full scope of public-private engagement in this sector is not 
yet available, and time is needed to see how contracts issued in this sector will play out 
over the course of their lifecycle. Finally, it is noticeable that despite the private sector’s 
extensive involvement in CONTEST, its potential impact upon UK CT policy (or related 
investment decisions) has attracted almost no serious academic contemplation to date.123 
This ongoing gap in analysis, well over a decade after 9/11, allows the researcher to make a 
significant new contribution through the use of new, under researched case studies. 
Before outlining this thesis’s analytical approach, it is customary for any CT-related 
dissertation to recognise that debates are ongoing around what actually constitutes 
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‘terrorism’; this is relevant for this dissertation because how, otherwise, can the character 
of the private sector’s role in CT be properly considered if we do not sufficiently 
understand the difficulties of defining terrorism is in the first place? The challenges 
associated with this endeavour have been well documented in many leading accounts in 
the field, including Schmid and Jongman’s major work; Political Terrorism. In the interests 
of space, their masterful (albeit rather lengthy) definition is not reproduced here; even the 
authors concede when presenting their end product that ‘[s]ome will find this too complex 
a definition, with too many elements included’124. However, comparing other prominent 
definitions neatly illustrates the difficulties identified by Schmid and Jongman. In Inside 
Terrorism, for example, Hoffman devotes a chapter to the question of ‘defining terrorism’, 
concluding: 
We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate 
creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence 
in the pursuit of political change.125 
Wilkinson adopts a different emphasis in Terrorism Versus Democracy: 
Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service 
political ends. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a 
wider target group than the immediate victims of the violence, as well as 
to coerce a target to acceding to the terrorists’ aims.126  
Here, two of terrorism studies’ most prominent scholars vary in how they characterize 
terrorism; they differ in terms of the rigidity with which they see such acts as always 
necessarily ‘political’. Other leading academics have recognised the problem. Richards has 
recently published a comprehensive discussion of the challenges associated with defining 
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terrorism127, for example, and, summarizing the situation, Gearson has argued that ‘there 
remains no agreed definition’128 of terrorism and that ‘[t]he question of what is (and what 
is not) terrorism has, for many, disappeared down an academic dead end’129. Horgan has 
also neatly observed that ‘[w]hile terrorism is an accepted concept, it remains unclear and 
inconsistent.’130 
It seems clear, therefore, that there is little prospect of a singular definition of 
terrorism ever being agreed upon; Andrew Silke recently summed up well in concluding 
that the definition of terrorism has ‘never been resolved’ and that ‘it never will be’.131 
Whilst as Richards argues engaging in this definitional debate does have utility at the policy 
level132, an important point to acknowledge is that this lack of agreement poses challenges 
for any terrorism-related study seeking to justify the inclusion of certain case studies 
within its scope. Nevertheless, in the interests of clarity (and despite any possible 
limitations and dangers of doing so) this thesis adopts an institutional understanding of 
terrorism (and CT); it focuses on the UK Government’s understanding of the threat of 
terrorism since 9/11, and on the public-private interactions that have been fostered in this 
context. Against this background, the thesis’ framework for analysis can be presented. 
1.7 Framework for analysis 
Existing approaches 
Several theoretical frameworks or approaches already exist for analysing private 
actors’ involvement in the provision of security. In the field of sociology, for example, 
                                                          
127
 Anthony Richards, ‘Conceptualizing Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.37:3 (2014), 
pp.213-236  
128
 John Gearson, ‘The Nature of Modern Terrorism’ in Lawrence Freedman (Ed.), Superterrorism: 
Policy Responses (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2002), p.8 
129
 Ibid.  
130
 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (Oxford: Routledge, 2005), p.22 
131
 Andrew Silke, ‘The Golden Age? Assessing the State of Terrorism Studies’, Keynote Speech at 7
th
 









Wood and Dupont have put forward a ‘nodal governance’ approach for the study of power 
that ‘can be public, private, hybrid or yet uncategorized.’133 Given the range of private 
actors that are involved in CONTEST, the manner in which the approach encourages ‘[a] 
comprehensive empirical ‘mapping’ of existing governance nodes and networks within 
specific sites’134 as one of its primary methodological attributes is an attitude that has been 
adopted in this thesis. Similarly, Krahmann is also a recognised leading contemporary 
theorist who has charted the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ in security. She 
identifies a ‘greater role for private actors’135 in security and characterises governance as 
‘the fragmentation of political authority among a diversity of public and private actors 
across levels of analysis.’136 Her argument that ‘governance denotes the non-hierarchical 
co-ordination of social relations and the fragmented provision of public services by a 
multitude of public and private actors’137 is an appreciation that will also be applied in this 
thesis. Finally, Abrahamsen and Williams offer the concept of ‘global security assemblages’ 
to characterise the structure of contemporary security policy relationships; these are 
‘transnational structures and networks in which a range of different actors and 
normativities interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices and 
forms of deterritorialized security governance.’138 Whilst in its theoretical outlook this 
thesis declines to differentiate between ‘domestic’ and ‘transnational’ entities, the 
recognised possibility that multiple actors (including the private sector) can cooperate in 
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groupings of security provision is applied in this study on the CT aspects of UK national 
security. 
A nuanced approach 
Despite these important contributions, it is judged that an even more nuanced 
approach is needed to analyse the origins, character and consequences of any ‘industrial-
complex’ operating in non-military fields of national security such as CT. Whilst some 
research on military issues has shown how threat perceptions and economic 
considerations have affected the levels of (and account for changes in) defence 
expenditure139 - and, separately, analysis has suggested that industry often underestimates 
(or that there exists a ‘conspiracy of optimism’ around) the ‘true’ cost of programmes at 
the bidding stage of UK military acquisitions140 - the extent to which such (or similar) 
dynamics exist and/or bear influence upon CONTEST has not previously received 
systematic empirical analysis. Furthermore, an unjustifiably narrow attitude currently 
exists around how research should be pursued in respect of public-private cooperation on 
security issues; there is currently an over-emphasis on inquiry into the PMSC sector and 
even leading security scholars who encourage a broader perspective argue, for example, 
that ‘little is gained by broad-brush analyses that treat all forms of security privatization as 
the same.’141 Whilst this argument has merit in the sense that the private sector’s 
involvement in some non-military aspects of national security differ to defence, the 
framework for this thesis is established in the belief that from a policy perspective there is 
much to be gained by striving to look more holistically at security privatisation across 
national security strategy. For the sake of effective strategy-making, policymakers and 
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outside observers should be able to consider and assess the potential implications of the 
totality of these extensive (not to mention potentially interdependent) public-private 
security relationships; both within and beyond the defence sector.  
Bespoke design elements  
A first key characteristic of this thesis’ analytical approach, therefore, is that it 
seeks to include all those parts of the ‘private sector’ that interact with the Government on 
selected CT issues. Unlike the MIC - which as Chapter 2 explains is generally characterised 
as a three-way system comprising the Executive, the Legislature and the DIB - the thesis 
agrees with other authors who argue that the private sector plays a ‘multiplicity of roles’142 
in UK national security, and that these extend beyond the supply contributions of the 
‘security industry’. The framework therefore seeks to build on the pioneering work of 
Omand to examine how in selected CT sub-sectors the UK Government has directly 
engaged, or has an interest in interacting with three main categories of private companies 
in relation to national security strategy143: 1) Interactions (including contracts) with 
security suppliers (of all sizes) on non-military capacity and capability issues (‘Private 
Suppliers’); 2) Interactions with the private organisations responsible for (or with a direct 
interest in) operational security delivery in the UK (‘Private Operators’) - a category which 
includes those private sector organisations comprising the critical national infrastructure 
(CNI); and 3) Interactions with wider business sectors on various corporate security and 
resilience matters (‘Wider Business’). Recognising that the remit (or business objectives) of 
some companies’ operations may extend to more than one of these categories, and that 
the commercial motivations within or between them may vary; the involvement of actors 
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falling within each of these three groupings is examined within each field of CONTEST 
under investigation.144   
The second main design element of this thesis’ organising framework is that, 
having selected them according to the rationale listed in Section 1.8, the empirical sections 
covered in Chapters 3-5 are deliberately organised thematically to allow for detailed 
analysis of three CT sub-sectors. In addition to allowing room for detailed contextual 
analysis to be completed on each of the three selected sub-sectors (Emergency 
Preparedness, Border Security and Olympic Security), this decision was also taken with the 
intention that the approach might be adapted for future research into the private sector’s 
role in mitigating other security risks (such as, for example, cyber security or serious 
organised crime). At one level, therefore, it is unimportant which specific thematic security 
issue is selected for investigation at the empirical level; this thesis has selected terrorism 
(and the response to it) for the reasons articulated in Section 1.6.  
The final main aspect of the design of this thesis’ framework is that - in addition to 
examining (as Section 1.8 explains) the main strategic interface between Government and 
industry on CT issues after 9/11 (‘RISC’) and a number of other cross-cutting ‘issues of 
concern’ across the CT sector - the public-private dynamics which emerged around a 
selection of large, CT-related public sector security contracts are analysed within each of 
the three selected CT sub-sectors; this allows for substantive new analysis to be completed 
in a similar manner to the way in which government-industrial dynamics around defence 
contracts have previously been examined.145  
By developing and utilising a framework that analyses the origins, characteristics 
and consequences of the private sector’s involvement in selected areas of CT, this thesis 
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casts new light on an important area and also offers an approach that can be adopted for 
the study of other contemporary security issues. It is easy to say that the private sector is 
involved in many other diverse aspects of security strategy; its involvement has recently 
been shown to include, for example, the supply of intelligence-related services146, the 
provision of support to humanitarian organisations147, and in anti-terrorist financing.148 
However, the priority now must be to address the fact that the precise character of the 
roles, motivations and any impact that private interests (and/or any broader coalition) 
have exerted in these fields is under-researched.  
After conducting its empirical analysis of companies’ involvement within CONTEST, 
the thesis concludes with a summary of the origins, characteristics and consequences of 
the ‘industrial-complex’ operating within the UK CT sector. The thesis will demonstrate 
that an ‘industrial-complex’ of a different character to the MIC exists in the CT aspects of 
UK national security strategy; what has happened since 9/11 is thus not simply a linear 
transfer of the MIC into the non-military security arena. This perspective suggests that the 
use of the term ‘the SIC’ may be unsustainable and presents significant implications of 
policymakers and the research community.  
1.8 Structure of the thesis and case study selection 
Having presented the thesis’ argument, conceptual framework, case study selection and 
methodology in this introduction, the remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: 
The British Military-Industrial Complex and its Evolution  
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Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the theoretical underpinnings of the MIC; 
introducing the reader to the origins of the concept and analysing both its relevance and 
evolution in a UK context. It considers the similarities, differences and potential overlap 
between the British MIC and its US counterpart, before further highlighting differing 
attitudes towards - and the difficulties associated with defining - the concept in a 
contemporary setting.  
Empirical Analysis of Three CT Policy Fields  
Chapters 3-5 analyse the private sector’s involvement in three selected sub-sectors of 
CONTEST. Empirical analysis on public-private interactions is conducted as follows: Firstly, 
the governance arrangements for the approach in each area is presented, including an 
outline of the roles of the main ‘actors’ involved in the strategy; secondly, a ‘snapshot’ is 
provided of the main elements of the UK’s strategic approach in each area since 9/11; 
third, the thesis presents an indication of the levels of expenditure that have been 
allocated during the period under study; fourth, empirical analysis is conducted in the spirit 
of a ‘map-making enterprise’149 on the interactions that have arisen between the 
Government and ‘private suppliers’, ‘private operators’ and ‘wider business’ - as stated 
above, particular attention is given to the dynamics which have emerged around amongst 
three of the most valuable identified CT-related security contracts150; finally, analysis is 
conducted on the character and potential impact of the ‘industrial-complex’ in each area. 
There are five main reasons for the selection of the three specific CT policy areas 
(Emergency Preparedness, Border Security and Olympic Security) within which analysis of 
major CT-related contracts and other public-private interactions is conducted: 
 All three areas have been routinely addressed as core aspects of CONTEST; 
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 All three areas have been routinely addressed as core aspects of the CT research 
agenda; 
 Each area received significant new levels of monetary/financial investment after 
9/11; 
 Three of the largest post-9/11 CT-related public sector contracts were let in these 
fields; and 
 Each area includes the three main types of public-private interaction identified in 
this thesis.  
1. Core CONTEST themes 
The UK Government’s policy documentation clearly shows that the three selected themes 
were quickly established (and have routinely featured) as core elements of CONTEST. For 
example, the first published version (2006) of CONTEST explicitly includes ‘border security’ 
as one of the ‘range of issues’ within the PROTECT strand of the strategy, stating the 
following priority: 
Strengthening border security – so that terrorists and those who inspire 
them can be prevented from travelling here and we can get better 
intelligence about suspects who travel, including improving our identity 
management, for example by use of biometrics[.]151 
The same iteration of CONTEST is equally transparent about its emphasis on ‘emergency 
preparedness’; a ‘text box’ spreading across three pages detailed the work being 
undertaken to ‘build resilience across all parts of the United Kingdom.’152  
The inclusion of ‘Olympic Security’ within a CT-focused study might at first seem to 
be a rather tenuous selection. Whilst it is apparent that Olympic Security comprises more 
issues than CT, it can be observed that from as early as 2004 the responsibility for the 
security governance aspects of the project lay firmly within the purview of the Home 
Office, and that CT was always a core, if not primary aspect of the planning. That the OSCT 
was formally tasked with overseeing the security strategy for London 2012 in 2008 
confirms its relevance for this thesis. 
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2. Core CT Research Themes 
Respected scholarly material validates the relevance of the three selected sub-sectors as 
core CT themes; each has regularly appeared in leading terrorism journals.153 A separate 
useful indication that they are core aspects of the CT research agenda is to be found in the 
work of leading figures in the field. Paul Wilkinson’s 2007-edited, policy-orientated 
volume, Homeland Security in the UK, for example, places a significant emphasis on 
emergency preparedness issues; the subtitle of the work is ‘Future Preparedness for 
Terrorist Attack since 9/11’ and two sections of this major work are concerned with 
emergency preparedness and response respectively154. Separately, a group of prominent 
UK terrorism researchers have recently compiled a respected volume on ‘Terrorism and 
the Olympics’155; this established ‘major event security’ as a core aspect of terrorism 
research.  
3. Transparent, additional CT Expenditure 
In its consideration of the ‘SIC’ concept, this thesis examines the private sector’s 
involvement in CT through an analysis of three sub-sectors that have received sizable 
amounts of new public expenditure after 9/11. The fourth reason that the three themes 
have been selected, therefore, is because (as Chapters 3-5 show) these aspects of 
CONTEST have all attracted substantial levels of financial investment from the public 
sector. The selection of CT themes which can demonstrate large amounts of new 
investment is an important consideration for any thesis considering whether the 
commercial interests of companies (and/or any wider coalition of interests) have affected 
policy or expenditure. 
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It was also judged in selecting these themes that access to financial data in these 
sectors, whilst sensitive, would be considerably less impenetrable than other areas of CT 
attracting new investment after 9/11 such as, for example, intelligence and cyber 
security.156  
4. Large, accessible non-military contracts 
The fourth main reason for choosing the three selected themes is because they have each 
exhibited examples of some of the largest, non-military (i.e. non-MoD), CT-justified 
security contracts to be let in the sector after 9/11. As already suggested, the purported 
existence of disproportionate levels of expenditure is an important characteristic of the 
MIC in the eyes of critics, and indeed those who have been concerned that its dynamics 
have transferred into the non-military security sector. Whilst this thesis does not draw the 
same conclusions as such authors, it chooses to engage on the same issues; in other words, 
it judges that it is helpful to examine the public-private dynamics around some of the 
largest public sector contracts to be let in the sector.  
In considering this aspect of case study selection, confidence was needed that data 
pertaining to the contracts would be available. It is understandable that some UK security 
contracts are of such a sensitive nature that budgetary and contract information is not 
easily accessible; it might also be inappropriate to analyse and/or publish any such details. 
The FiReControl, e-Borders, and London 2012 G4S contracts - identified within the 
‘Emerging Preparedness’, ‘Border Security’ and ‘Olympic Security’ themes respectively - 
                                                          
156
 Data pertaining to contracts let by the UK intelligence agencies is restricted, for example, as 
evidenced by the redactions of all budgetary/cost figures relating to sensitive programmes within 
the annual reports of the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee. See, for example, 
Intelligence and Security Committee, ‘Annual Report 2010-2011’, July 2011, cm8114, Via: 





were all selected on the basis that, in contrast to some more sensitive contracts157, data 
was known to be available in the public domain.  
In selecting non-military CT contracts for examination, consideration was also 
given to whether their associated costs had grown substantially during their lifetime (i.e. in 
line with MIC theory which purports to its ability/desire to inflate costs); as illustrated 
below, this clearly occurred in all three cases. Each contract therefore provided the 
opportunity to examine in the security sector the potential causes of such rising 
expenditure. 
5. Three private dimensions 
The final reason for choosing the three selected CT themes is that they each 
appeared to exhibit all three types of public-private interaction that it is argued help to 
characterize the operation of the UK’s non-military security sector. As argued by the 
author in a similar way elsewhere158, the ‘security industry’ in the UK (in contrast to the 
defence sector) should be seen to comprise a wide range of technology providers and 
other contractors (‘Suppliers’) operating alongside a variety or other private sector actors 
such as infrastructure companies (‘Private Operators’) and other sectors of the economy 
(‘Wider Business’); all of which play important roles in the non-military security arena. The 
empirical chapters which follow seek to explore these interactions within each theme.159  
Empirical Analysis of Strategic Engagement (RISC) 
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Chapter 6 analyses the origins of the main current mechanism of strategic engagement 
created between the UK Government and the security industry on CT issues after 9/11 - 
the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers’ Community (RISC) - analysing its 
development and leading practitioners’ perceptions of its utility and effectiveness to date. 
Analysis of RISC was judged to be necessary because, prior to this thesis, no research had 
been conducted previously on the origins, role and potential impact of this main strategic 
channel of communication between UK Government and industry on CT issues. By 
analysing the historical foundations and activity of RISC within a dedicated, bespoke 
chapter - an analysis that is conducted in a similar manner to that recently completed on 
strategic Government-industry engagement in the military arena160 - the thesis addresses a 
research gap on strategic-level public-private interaction in CONTEST. 
Empirical Analysis of Three Areas of Concern 
Chapter 7 analyses three additional areas of concern in the CT arena that have been 
traditionally associated with the MIC and the SIC, and which either ‘cross-cut’ or have 
developed outside the three selected policy areas: the employment movement dynamics 
associated with the ‘revolving door’; economic considerations relating to UK CT Strategy 
(including the operation of the security procurement system); and CT-related security 
exports. Research on these topics is justified because, firstly, whilst the implications of the 
movement of officials between Government and the private sector have been considered 
in a US Homeland Security context161- what has been labelled the ‘Revolving Door’162 
dynamic - these are under-examined in respect to CONTEST. Secondly, evidence is 
provided on how job creation and wider economic considerations have (or have not) 
featured in the UK’s non-military CT field generally, and in the context of the three 
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selected CT-related contracts in particular; this helps to establish whether the dynamics 
associated with the MIC have ‘transferred’ into the security sector. Finally, it has recently 
become increasingly apparent that the UK Government’s engagement with industry on CT-
related security exports is growing as a political priority; this dynamic has been considered 
in research conducted in the defence sector163, but not yet substantially in the equally 
sensitive non-military aspects of UK security policy.  
Conclusion 
The conclusion presents the thesis’s final assessment of the origins, characteristics and 
consequences of the ‘industrial-complex’ within the CT aspects of the UK’s national 
security strategy. It presents the rationale for public-private cooperation in the post 9/11 
period, and summarizes how the involvement of the private sector has impacted on 
CONTEST in several respects. Overall, the dissertation found little evidence that any 
significant ‘unwarranted influence’ has been exerted on policy development or specific 
investment decisions. Some final observations are offered on the system’s consequences 
for policymakers, researchers, political accountability, and what the ‘industrial-complex’ in 
the CT sector might say about the proposition that a wider ‘SIC’ is operating across UK 
national security strategy more broadly.  
It is against this backdrop that the framework for the completion of this thesis 
(together with its selected case studies) can be visualised, as per Figure 1 below. 
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1.9 Potential limitations arising from case study selection 
Several CT themes are not addressed for reasons of space, and also because they included 
few examples of such varied, multi-dimensional public-private interaction. The author 
declined, for example, to include (amongst others) ‘CT Policing’ as one of the thematic 
chapters; whilst there was substantial additional public sector expenditure in this area 
after 9/11, this theme did not appear to exhibit many of the sorts of relationship with 
companies that are relevant to this thesis. Similarly, the field of ‘Aviation Security’, whilst 
enormously important, was also not chosen on the grounds that the Government is not a 
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substantial purchaser in this sector - rather it is the policy lead and regulator. Indeed, it 
was not possible to identify a significant public sector contract in the UK aviation security 
sector that would allow for examination of such public-private dynamics.  
Whilst the fact that not all of the public-private sector dynamics in CT are the 
same, or indeed covered, might present limitations in the sense that this thesis is not fully 
representative of the entire sector - thus potentially complicating the overall argument 
that something resembling an ‘industrial complex’ exists across the CT sector - the 
dissertation nevertheless makes an original contribution through  analyses in the available 
space of an under-researched selection of case studies, and opts simply to recognise that 
diversity is clearly evident. It deliberately focuses on those important parts of the sector 
where both the public and private sectors are substantial purchasers, and where other 
business sectors are also clearly engaged. In recognizing at the outset that the State is not 
a major purchaser in some areas of CT, one can already begin to see how a problem exists 
with the apparently seductive idea that the MIC has simply linearly transferred into the 
non-military aspects of national security creating an SIC.  
1.10 Sources and methodology  
The thesis analyses a wide range of primary and secondary sources including academic and 
journalistic literature, think tank reports and journals, conference programmes and 
speeches, company press releases, media reports, Parliamentary reports, meeting 
minutes, employment advertisements and trade publications. All of these sources are 
valuable in revealing the multitude and character of the public-private interactions that 
exist in the UK’s CT sector.  
Owing to the existing shortage of data on the operation (and attitudes pertaining 





the defence sector, it was decided that the generation and analysis of additional primary 
material should be an essential component of the research. In addition to analysis of 
relevant, publicly-available Government and private sector speeches, documentation and 
websites, the thesis’ methodology incorporated as a primary data collection mechanism a 
programme of 26 semi-structured, in-depth elite interviews with leading figures in the UK 
security sector (listed in Appendix A). As outlined in Appendix B, potential interviewees 
were invited to participate after they were identified - on the basis of their biographical 
data - as experts on, and/or seen to be directly engaged in, the areas of public-private CT 
cooperation under examination in this thesis.  
The thesis followed the elite interviewing approach introduced by Lewis Anthony 
Dexter165 and the purpose of conducting an interview programme was twofold. Firstly, it 
provided a useful mechanism through which additional areas of public-private cooperation 
in the CT sector could be identified and analysed. Secondly, the interview programme 
generated in a project-oriented, semi-structured manner a selection of hitherto unheard 
leading figures’ views on the character, effectiveness and consequences of the public-
private interactions that have arisen in (and beyond) the CT arena.166 Interviews were 
sought and arranged with individuals from the following constituent groups: 
 Current/former Government policymakers/officials involved in CT/national security 
strategy; 
 Current/former senior industrialists involved in CT/national security strategy; 
 Current/former senior trade association figures operating in CT/national security 
sector; and 
 Prominent academic experts on the private sector’s involvement in CT/national 
security strategy. 
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The interview programme received ethical approval from King’s College London’s War 
Studies Group Research Ethics Panel167 and was justified because, as argued from the 
outset, the quantity and quality of primary research material arising from the field was 
lacking prior to this thesis. In addition, whilst after 9/11 there was (and continues to be) 
considerable criticism of ‘the SIC’, no academic dissertation has (to the researcher’s 
knowledge) hitherto sought to provide balance through incorporating the attitudes of 
leading figures from within government and industry on the character and impact of the 
public-private relationships that exist in the UK’s CT arena, alongside external analysis and 
comment. 
In short, an additional research mechanism was needed which could take account 
of the nuances of, and attitudes within, the CT aspects of national security strategy, and 
which could generate primary research material in a timely manner; other methodological 
approaches (such as written surveys or questionnaires) were rejected as they were 
considered likely to have simply not captured the philosophical considerations that the 
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Chapter 2: The MIC and its evolution in a UK context 
Introduction  
This chapter introduces existing theory on, and the characteristics of, the ‘classic’ MIC, 
outlining how the theoretical proposition of this thesis - the emergence of a different 
‘industrial-complex’ in the UK CT sector - relates to this concept but possesses a different 
set of overall characteristics. To explore these dynamics, the chapter introduces the 
differing historical conceptual treatments of the MIC, presenting it as a contested concept 
and arguing that it should not be considered as a solely US phenomenon; a ‘British MIC’ 
has existed (and evolved) in the UK defence sector. The final section recalls how the UK 
Government has broadened its approach to national security in recent decades, arguing 
that it has sought to engage with a wide range of industry actors on various emerging non-
military security issues such as CT. The chapter concludes with further context and a 
presentation of this thesis’s argument that some but not all of the dynamics traditionally 
associated with the MIC are present within the contemporary CT arena. 
2.1 Introducing the ‘MIC’ - concept and theory 
The idea of the existence of a self-serving, potentially sinister ‘MIC’ has become deeply 
engrained in the popular imagination. US President Eisenhower’s farewell address in 1961 
is widely cited as the origin of this infamous phenomenon and its implicitly dangerous 
connotations; more often than not the concept is seen as at worst ‘a self-conscious 
conspiracy acting mainly in its own self-interest’1 or, at best, as ‘a network of public and 
private forces that combine a profit motive with the planning and implementation of 
strategic policy.’2 Unquestionably, Eisenhower’s remarks have been (and continue to be) 
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taken as a dire warning over the potential dangers he saw arising in the early 1960s. His 
concerns are expressed in perhaps the most widely-cited passage of his original speech: 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-
industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of power exists 
and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination 
endanger our liberties or democratic processes.3 
These remarks, whilst quite general in nature, have invited powerful ideas to be formed 
around how there is great potential for power to be abused in the national security arena. 
But whether the MIC (or any potential successor, like ‘the SIC’) should be understood this 
way or ‘…not best understood as a conspiracy, but as a subtle interplay of interests and 
perceptions’4, what did Eisenhower mean by the phrase? An analysis of the history of the 
MIC and the theories associated with the concept illustrates how elusive it has become to 
reach a singular, agreed definition. 
Whilst the expression, ‘the MIC’, was coined historically only recently, it is 
important to recognise that the idea of necessary interaction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
enterprise in the pursuit of military or wider strategic objectives has long existed; Parrott 
has documented, for example, ‘the centrality of mercenaries (…) in early modern armies’5 
and the rarity of States to become directly involved in the production of military goods in 
Europe at that time.6 Recognition of the existence of these dynamics has also been noted 
in accounts of national security-related public-private coordination in pre-Cold War US 
history; one recent work has documented how during the First World War, for example, a 
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‘War Industries Board’ was created ‘to resolve how to harness together industry and the 
military to ensure that the United States was mobilized[.]’7 
Whilst the MIC expression was coined in (and is arguably still most associated with) 
the US experience, the existence of military-industrial coordination has not only been 
considered in this context; according to Roland, ‘military-industrial complexes have been 
sighted on every continent and as far back in history as the Middle Ages.’8 For example, the 
dynamics of the Russian MIC during the Soviet era have been documented9 and, when 
considering the UK policy implications of the Defence Industry’s post-Cold War position, 
Latham explains that from the late 1940s various ‘Governments (…) were dependent on 
their national industries for delivering the means of providing military power.’10 For this 
thesis, therefore, we should be sceptical of any effort to deny the existence of ‘the MIC’ 
outside the US - the need for military-industrial coordination in other contexts (including 
the UK) has often been recognised. 
The ‘requirement’ for armaments - and in particular the development of a 
dedicated industry for their manufacture - appears, however, to have not been universally 
accepted (or desired) by everyone at all times in the UK. Another former US President, 
John F. Kennedy, suggested, for example, that in the run-up to the Second World War 
there was an absence of a ‘lobby for armaments’ in the UK and that ‘England’s’ lack of 
preparedness, and thus failure to deter Nazi aggression, can in part be explained by the 
Englishman’s natural psychological reluctance to rearm.11 This is notwithstanding differing 
levels of support in the literature around the legitimacy of industry’s role in national 
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security, as discussed in Section 2.4, and however pronounced disagreements may be over 
any nation’s industrial capacity for conflict at any given time.12 
Indeed, more generally, it has been argued that Eisenhower’s 1961 speech which 
famously introduced the MIC concept was not necessarily designed as a critique of the 
emergence of an arms industry per se; on the contrary, it can be suggested that he saw the 
development of national industries in this sector as an important consideration. In his 
unusually robust defence of the MIC, Baumgartner makes this argument by presenting 
what he argues is a ‘rarely noted passage’ of the speech: 
But we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense. (…) We 
have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast 
proportions.13 
He is not alone. Dunlap has similarly identified that Eisenhower ‘appreciated the need for a 
powerful military buttressed by a strong and creative industrial infrastructure’14 and 
another leading commentator has noted that the President’s speech was ‘arguably neutral’ 
regarding any potential impact of the system.15 Whilst he warned of its potential effects, it 
seems that Eisenhower understood that there was a requirement for an arms industry. It is 
arguably the same outlook that witnessed the ‘defence industry’ being seen in the Cold 
War era as an important contributor towards a country’s strategic posture or, as Hayward 
puts it, ‘an element of national sovereignty.’16 
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If it is widely (if not universally) acknowledged, then, that an industrial base has 
been needed to supply capabilities to the Armed Forces at certain points in history, why 
did Eisenhower’s address achieve such durable resonance? In short, it was arguably the 
strength of his warning about the potential dangers arising from the amalgamation of the 
different parts of the ‘complex’ he envisaged - rather than necessarily the effect or 
orientation of each of them in turn - that subsequently so stirred up the popular 
imagination. Famously, it was Eisenhower’s identification of the risk of an emerging system 
of aligned interests exerting ‘unwarranted influence’ that was his speech’s main legacy; 
this was the true danger that was identified in what has been identified as the first 
reference to the MIC.17 The image of an unaccountable and ‘cosy’ military-industrial 
coalition comprising politicians, bureaucrats and industrialists able to dictate policy and/or 
spending has persisted ever since.  
If these are the origins and popular perceptions of the ‘MIC’, what are its precise 
characteristics? In short, there are differing views; some even suggest that ‘there is no 
clear theoretical conceptualisation of the MIC.’18 Several definitions have been attempted, 
however; Pursell argues, for example, that ‘[t]he key to understanding the complex is to 
see it as a system.’19 Seen in this way, the most effective way of understanding the MIC 
could be to identify the full range of actors that interact with each other. That being said, 
existing definitions also tend to incorporate, or allude to, the motivations of the purported 
system. Citing Pilisuk and Hayden, Pursell explains:  
The military-industrial complex can be defined as ‘an informal and 
changing coalition of groups with vested psychological, moral, and 
material interests in the continuous development and maintenance of high 
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levels of weaponry, in preservation of colonial markets and in military-
strategic conceptions of international affairs.20 
As discussed below, disagreement persists around the true motivations of any such 
system, and whether it could ever beneficial to society; this type of research, whilst 
understandable, blinkers debate on the character of the system and does not help in 
providing clarity that the MIC may be most usefully considered as a set of military-
industrial interactions (whatever their impact).  
Providing further clarity, Slater and Nardin have helpfully explained that ‘…[i]n 
most of the literature, the concept of a military-industrial complex functions as both a 
description and an explanation (or theory) of what is being described.’21 This is important 
to understand because whilst it has often been presented as a conspiracy, the MIC concept 
is in fact multidimensional. It can be suggested from the outset, therefore, that ‘the MIC’ 
has emerged (and remains) as much a (contested) theory on the potential effects of the 
system of military-industrial interaction as it is a (generally negative) description of the 
actual system of interaction between its constituent parts.22  
2.2 Origins of the MIC Concept 
Before examining whether it is appropriate to apply the same ‘industrial-complex’ type 
terminology to the CT sector, it is important to properly contextualise the origins of 
Eisenhower’s ‘warning’23 and in particular to note the concerns that were being expressed 
at the time about the state of US politics, the structure of the country’s national 
leadership, and how these related to the military sector. Against the grain of most 
accounts on ‘the MIC’, Moskos, Jr. argues that discussions on the MIC should start with C. 
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Wright-Mills’ major 1956 work, The Power Elite24; Rosen has also argued that such was the 
similarity in outlook that Eisenhower ‘legitimized’ Mills’ theory.25  
Even a cursory examination of Mills’s ‘Power Elite thesis’ shows that Eisenhower 
was not the first person to write on, or warn about, the potential dangers of converging 
military-industrial interests. Indeed, it was Mills who is credited with highlighting ‘the often 
uneasy coincidence of economic, military, and political power’26 and by clarifying the risks 
it posed: ‘[W]hen political institutions and economic opportunities are at once 
concentrated and linked, then public office can be used for private gain.’27 However, as 
Roland correctly argues, unlike later criticisms of the MIC it was not Mills’ belief that ‘this 
power elite operates conspiratorially to subvert the will of the people.’28 Whilst famously 
recognizing ‘that power (…) was concentrated in the hands of a few hundred government 
officials, corporate executives, and military officers’29, Mills’ argument was that the most 
substantial potential danger was ‘that the elites developed among themselves a shared 
worldview that bred consensus among them on the fundamental policies guiding American 
life.’30 In Mills’ account, therefore, it was not that the US had become victim to a sinister 
conspiracy - he actually argued to the contrary31 - but that it was because ‘never before 
have the means of power been so enormous (…) that makes our situation so precarious.’32 
Whilst for Mills both military and business leaders were now able to exert more ‘power’ 
than ever before, there was no naivety in his account that it would have to lie somewhere; 
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 Mills argues that ‘The rise of the elite (…) was not and could not have been caused by a plot[.]’ 
Mills, The Power Elite, p.293 
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the concern lay more around the consolidated character and unprecedented level of 
influence handed to the new governing elite. 
Mills and Eisenhower clearly shared a similar world view. Whilst several 
differences in their approaches have been expertly highlighted33, neither of their 
conceptualisations of the ‘Power Elite’ and ‘the MIC’ was conceived of as necessarily being 
a conspiracy; both were seen as wider systems of elite relationships comprising individuals 
from Government, industry and beyond. Furthermore, their joint concern was primarily 
over the potentially negative political or economic effects that might result from 
converging (especially public-private) interests - not necessarily each individual part of the 
system per se. Therefore, at the risk of repetition, whilst the presence of ‘industry’ within 
‘the MIC’ must be viewed as a component of the potentially dangerous system, its 
presence should be considered as just that; one category of participant within a wider 
system of military-industrial interaction. This is important to understand because even 
notable scholars sometimes incorrectly use ‘the MIC’ and the ‘defence industrial base’ 
interchangeably34; this fails to identify ‘industry’ as just one component of the MIC. It is 
therefore the potential impact of the ‘confluence’35 of public-private interests that 
Eisenhower and Mills - and indeed this thesis - are concerned with.  
At the risk of over-simplification, therefore, we can conceptualise Mills and 
Eisenhower’s general understanding of the MIC as the (potentially damaging) three-
cornered system of interaction within the defence arena of the political establishment, the 
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military and industry; an alliance focused on certain shared security and economic 
priorities. The system has been described by Adams as the ‘iron triangle’36 of US defence 
politics and can be represented in the UK context as follows:  







Establishing this as our core understanding of the MIC, considerations for this thesis (as 
introduced in Chapter 1) are whether it is appropriate to apply the same concept to the UK 
political system, and whether the same or similar purported ‘MIC’ dynamics exist in the 
non-military CT arena.  
Whatever the precise membership of the MIC37 - or any modern-day version of it - 
debate over whether any converging interests within such a system should ever exert any 
political and/or economic influence would be triggered by the most powerful man in the 
world; just five years after Mills’ major work, the US President would declare his now oft-
repeated warning. It would be impossible in the available space to sufficiently record the 
frequency with which this expression has subsequently been invoked by various competing 
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parties. It is helpful for this thesis, therefore, that on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of 
Eisenhower’s speech, in January 201138, several important ‘retrospectives’ offered new 
analysis on the meaning, significance and long-term impact of his remarks. Amongst them, 
Dunlap has neatly summarised the popular image and allegedly negative impact of the MIC 
triggered by the speech:  
When President Eisenhower uttered this warning in his farewell address, 
he forever fixed in the public mind the idea – in its most histrionic 
manifestation – of an ever-present menace posed by grasping arms 
merchants in league with war-mongering generals. This cabal, so the 
theory goes, lurks in the shadows waiting for an unguarded moment in 
which to subvert the American way of life for its own venal purposes.39 
Ledbetter’s work, Unwarranted Influence, has similarly argued that ‘[t]he case against the 
MIC is an indictment with multiple counts, to which any given critic may subscribe to 
varying degrees.’40 The ‘charges’ are worth noting and variously suggest that the MIC41: 
‘…creates wasteful military spending’; ‘…takes away from spending on social needs.’; 
‘…distorts the American economy.’; ‘…has institutionalized an outsized role for the military 
in American society’; ‘…creates and extends a culture of secrecy’; and ‘…leads to the 
suppression of individual liberty.’ Numerous other contemporary commentators have 
presented the MIC in negative light42; elsewhere, campaign groups oppose the interaction 
of governments and industry in the arms trade, regularly decrying the ‘pain and 
destruction it causes’.43  
As introduced in Section 1.1, similar charges have been levelled against the system 
of public-private cooperation in the CT sector; critics accuse the ‘SIC’ of incorporating 
similar, if not identical characteristics and flaws. Mainstream newspapers have also 
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presented the character of the post-9/11 security ‘market’ as displaying those dynamics 
which have been traditionally associated with defence; the Financial Times and Guardian 
newspapers, for example, have both presented in linear terms how after 9/11 companies 
re-focussed their strategies on the growing CT market.44 This type of analysis presents a 
serious problem, however, because, whilst such accounts are seductive in their simplicity, 
they decline to analyse the complexity of the private sector’s involvement in contemporary 
national security strategy. Poorly-informed journalists and busy scholars have not taken 
time to properly understand the new landscape, or plot out precisely how companies are 
now involved in areas of security such as CT. Before Section 2.4 addresses whether the 
‘MIC’ system has always been considered in negative light, the next section establishes the 
validity of applying the concept to the UK experience.  
2.3 An American expression? 
As the MIC - what Roland labels both a ‘lobby’ (for armaments) and a ‘trope’ (the 
expression generally used critically)45 - unquestionably originated in the US, it might seem 
that it is a uniquely American phenomenon. But this would be to underplay the extent to 
which the aforementioned public-private dynamics (and their potential impact) have also 
been considered in a UK military context. This section provides further background to 
illustrate how, alongside the American experience, something called a ‘British MIC’46 
certainly exists; it may differ from its American cousin but, as suggested above, military-
industrial coordination in the UK has had a long heritage built up over many centuries.  
Several distinct features of the US MIC thought of as a system can be considered 
when drawing comparisons with the UK example. Firstly, it is well documented that the US 
defence budget has for many decades (and in the period under examination) been 
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substantially larger than that of any other nation. According to SIPRI’s military expenditure 
database, for example, US military spending (in 2010 constant prices) rose from to 
$385.14bn in 2001 to 689.51bn in 201147; the UK’s military expenditure, by contrast, grew 
from $46bn in 2001 to $57.87bn in 2011.48 More broadly, The Economist recently 
highlighted the US’s current superiority in the military sector; it published data which 
showed that at nearly $700bn US ‘defence spending (…) is bigger than that of the next 17 
countries combined’49, including the UK. The US’s dominant position is not a recent 
phenomenon; Walker has shown that as a percentage of GDP the US defence budget 
‘ranged from a high of 15 percent in 1952 (during the Korean War) to a low of 3.7 percent 
in 2000[.]’50 By contrast, UK military expenditure accounted for 9% of GDP in 195351 and 
2.4% during the ‘relatively tranquil’ period of 2000.52 It is important to recognise that the 
MIC in the UK revolves around a considerably smaller allocation of budgetary resources for 
defence - both in actual terms and in comparative GDP scale. 
Secondly, the ‘dominance’ of one part of the MIC - the US defence industry - when 
compared to the UK’s military sector (and, for that matter, other internationally-domiciled 
national defence industries) has been widely acknowledged.53 Whilst the UK may continue 
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to act as a ‘home’ to at least one leading global defence company, BAE Systems54, and 
scholarly discussions over the ‘transnationalization of the arms industry’55 have raised (and 
continue to raise) questions over the extent to which defence industries should be 
considered ‘national’ entities56, few would dispute the emergence of what one scholar calls 
a ‘unipolar global defense industrial sector.’57 Certainly, US industrial dominance in 
defence can be further illustrated through analysis of data pertaining to the success58 it 
achieves in export markets. Although concerns have been expressed over the longevity of 
its superiority59, the US accounted for over 40% of the total arms deliveries worldwide 
between 1999 and 2006.60 Whilst for its size the UK has more than ‘pulled its weight’ in 
this area61, the idea that there is a ‘crisis in the European defense industrial base’62 - of 
which the UK sector is part63 - has gained considerable resonance. In short, American 
industrial dominance is generally still seen to remain ‘unassailable’64 in this sector. 
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Despite these differences, important similarities exist in so far as public-private 
interaction on military issues in the UK and the US can be contextualised, characterised 
and understood. Firstly, the US and UK Governments have shared a broadly similar view of 
the principal risks facing their respective countries’ national security during the past 
decade. Even a swift review of the UK Government’s strategic security documentation 
illustrates how, like the US, it views international terrorism as a principal threat to its 
national security.65 However differently the UK Government may have chosen to work with 
industry in response to these threats, its assessment of the security landscape (and 
therefore the context within which any MIC dynamics operated) closely reflected the US 
world view.  
Secondly, like the US military, the British Armed Forces became deeply engaged in 
military conflict against AQ after 9/11; it similarly remained on a permanent ‘war footing’ 
across many geographical locations during the 2000s.66 Of relevance to this thesis, this 
sustained and extensive use of the military has inevitably resulted in additional demand for 
new capabilities from industry. Whilst differences have existed in the character of the 
‘industrial strategy’ being pursued during the period - in contrast to the Labour Party under 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, the coalition Government formed in May 2010 stated its 
preference to procure military equipment ‘off the shelf’ rather than develop a ‘defence 
industrial strategy’67 - additional capability purchased by the MoD through ‘urgent 
operational requirements’ for Iraq and Afghanistan amounted to £3.6 billion since the 
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beginning of those operations.68 Since 9/11, therefore, the UK Government has, like the 
US, clearly used its Armed Forces as a significant component of the response to 
international terrorism. Accordingly, it has been highly active in the acquisition of 
additional military capabilities from industry, even if the size of its programme has been 
dwarfed by US capabilities.  
Thirdly, even during ‘peacetime’ the UK MoD has, like its American equivalent, 
long been ‘a major buyer of defence equipment and services[.]’69 Whilst the size of the UK 
defence equipment budget pales in comparison to the US, its equipment programme is 
hardly insignificant - and certainly not for the contractors which provide it with capability. 
For example, it was noted in 2009 that defence equipment acquisition accounted for 
‘[a]round 40% of the MoD’s total annual cash spend on defence, c. £12bn p.a.’70 Despite 
the weak state of the UK economy and the associated 7.5% cuts being made to the UK 
defence budget at the time of writing, the MoD announced in 2012 its intention to grow its 
equipment plan each year to total £159bn between 2012-2020.71 Furthermore, the 
requirement (as most parties see it) for the Government to routinely work with suppliers in 
the development and acquisition of new military capability has been articulated 
consistently by senior Government officials. The current Chief of Defence Materiel, 
Bernard Gray, for example, once stated in a report on defence acquisition that ‘the MoD 
does have a symbiotic relationship with the defence industry.’72 This mirrors the American 
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experience where the national DIB is routinely considered as an essential component of US 
military power. 
Fourth, from an academic perspective it is evident that it is not only the American 
MIC system that has received independent scrutiny; although on a lesser scale, what has 
been referred to as the ‘British MIC’ has also attracted dedicated literature.73 An 
introduction to the tone, character and content of this literature is provided below; suffice 
to say for this section’s purposes that the British MIC as defined in this thesis has, like in 
the US, been treated as a distinct topic worthy of scholarly consideration; even if this has 
mainly focused on defence procurement.74  
Finally, it is worth noting not only the similarities but also the direct overlap that 
exists between what might be considered as two separate American and British ‘MICs’. The 
increased integration of the global defence sector generally and the industrial supply chain 
in particular, as noted below, has meant that US-owned defence companies now operate 
widely in the UK. If the existence of a powerful American MIC is no longer disputed, and 
the industrial parts of that system also supply capability to the UK Government, what can 
be said about the impact of that system on the UK? Could it be said, for example, as Rosen 
has argued, that ‘[t]he result is a trend to the multinationalization of the military industrial-
complex’75? Consideration of such dynamics is crucial to take into account when studying 
the British MIC, or any variety of it. 
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Despite some differences in the context and character of the American and British 
MICs, this thesis argues that the similarities and overlap that exist between them justify 
the use of the same terminology. Naturally, this is not to say that the US and UK ‘MICs’ are 
identical, or indeed that they are able to exert equal influence on policy. In the final 
analysis, however, both countries clearly possess a network of public-private interaction 
that has been established to support, and which potentially impacts upon developments 
in, the military sector. As the next section shows, prevailing attitudes towards any MIC 
thought of as a system have been varied, but are frequently negative. 
2.4 A ‘pejorative’ term? Contrasting attitudes on the MIC 
How could it ever be beneficial that ‘[t]he military-industrial complex rationalizes high 
levels of military spending with an ideology of international conflict’76? Such concerns have 
been expressed regularly in analytical treatments on the MIC; as noted above, Ledbetter 
refers to its frequent use in the ‘pejorative’.77 Indeed, it can be noted that some 
fundamental objections have even been raised against the existence and/or development 
of any system of military-industrial interaction. One critic has argued, for example, that the 
MIC is ‘circumstantially unethical’78; another has castigated the PMSC sector, expressing 
deep concern around the use of such companies in the security field.79  
The impact of the MIC is a particularly worrisome state of affairs, it has been 
argued, because, as Rosen has summarised; ‘high levels of expenditure have given rise to 
powerful domestic groups within the major states who have vested interests in the 
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continuance of military spending and international conflict.’80 Gottlieb elaborates on the 
supposedly self-interested dynamics: 
The defense-industry culture, the fear of further job loss, the competition 
among the military services for the slice of the budget pie, and the 
eagerness of members of Congress to hold onto military contracts and 
facilities for their constituents - together these create a defense 
addiction.81 
It should be stressed that the political-economic aspects of this ‘culture’ are not limited to 
the US experience: the controversy which followed the downsizing of a UK military 
shipyard in November 2013 (resulting in the loss of over 1,000 jobs82), for example, is a 
recent instance of these dynamics existing in the UK. Related to these employment 
dynamics, the allegedly inappropriate impact of Government officials joining the defence-
related industries upon retirement83 - the so-called ‘revolving door’84 - is another avenue of 
MIC criticism.85  
The tendency of the MIC system (or its individual elements) to inflate or 
‘overblow’86 security threats - or, more recently, exert a ‘vested interest in maintaining and 
extending the military and security aspects of the ‘war on terror’’87 - has also been 
criticised. Whilst such reservations have been most frequently expressed about (and 
within) the US context, similar worries have emerged about how threats are articulated in 
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the UK.88 Against this backdrop, it has been noted that some have ‘found the complex even 
more sinister and dangerous than the simple lobby that Eisenhower had experienced.’89 By 
contrast, it can be observed that only a limited number of accounts explicitly conceptualise 
the MIC as representing a necessary system of military-industrial cooperation. 
Baumgartner is the most widely-cited early supporter of the MIC, arguing that its ‘defense, 
if it needs one, is its record: it performs.’90 More recently, Dunlap Jr. has also criticised 
accusations levelled against the MIC, arguing that ‘a robust “military-industrial complex” 
remains an essential element of a democracy facing diverse and existential threats in a 
dangerous world’91.  
Perhaps owing to the comparative scale of the US system, the British MIC has 
attracted a smaller volume of scholarly scrutiny. However, like in the US, there has also 
been criticism in the UK context of efforts to foster the economic aspects of military or 
security-industrial cooperation, or of the trend towards greater levels of privatisation 
within UK national security strategy. For example, Feuchtwanger argues that the 
assumption ‘that there is a substantial and indefinitely sustainable defence industry in this 
country [the UK] that requires preferential treatment, if not protection, is out of date’92, 
arguing forcefully that the UK’s  approach to defence industrial policy ‘should be rewritten 
to place less emphasis on creating and maintaining manufacturing jobs in the UK.’93 As 
introduced in Section 1.1., Hughes is even more damning in his criticism of the interests 
which he considers profit from insecurity in a contemporary CT context.94 Such criticism 
extends beyond the literary community and into the political sphere; the failure of G4S to 
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provide sufficient numbers of private security officers to protect the London 2012 Olympic 
Games - the circumstances around which are analysed in Chapter 5 - rekindled the debate, 
for example, over the extent to which private companies should ever be handed 
responsibility to fulfil important security tasks.95 
It can also be noted, however, that some literature pertaining to the British MIC 
makes the implicit assumption that military-industrial interaction is a necessary element of 
security strategy; as noted above, an important body of literature addresses UK defence 
procurement, for example, the great majority of which leaves unchallenged (or assumes) 
the need for public-private interaction. Furthermore, some accounts actually promote the 
need for a system of enhanced public-private cooperation in UK defence issues. A report 
analysing the characteristics of what is described as the ‘defence-industrial ecosystem’96 is 
a good example; it ‘conceptualises the spaces where the policy-maker, military operator, 
industrialist, employee, taxpayer, citizen, commentator and other stakeholders interact’97 
and makes the case for continued Government-industry collaboration. The next section 
details the main avenues of investigation into the British MIC. 
2.5 Coverage of the British MIC 
This thesis argues that whilst some of the public-private dynamics associated with the MIC 
have ‘transferred’ into the UK’s CT sector, there are important differences in terms of how 
the ‘new’ system operates and should be conceptualised. Before proving this proposition, 
and analysing its consequences, it is important to address whether something called the 
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‘British MIC’ has ever existed; the use of ‘industrial-complex’ terminology in depictions of 
the ‘SIC’ has, after all, been drawn from it directly.98  
It is argued here that a British MIC - viewed here as a system of public-private 
interaction on military issues - has very clearly existed historically in the UK defence sector 
and, considering the on-going public-private dynamics around the MoD’s sizable 
equipment programme, continues to do so today. For the avoidance of doubt, this analysis 
on the character of the ‘industrial-complex’ in the UK CT sector does not suggest that the 
British MIC has disappeared or has necessarily been superseded - the MoD still clearly 
interacts with industry - rather it makes the case that the private-public dynamics which 
now exist in such non-military security sectors as CT need to be considered in their own 
right, and that they differ quite considerably. The distinct characteristics of the MIC, and 
how have they been treated in scholarly debates, are examined below; this establishes a 
baseline understanding from which existing characterisations of ‘the SIC’ can be examined. 
Literary coverage of British military-industrial interaction (and the MIC more 
generally) echoes many US treatments - and in one case is compared to them directly.99 
However, it is fair to say that far fewer treatments exist of the British MIC as a distinctly 
national phenomenon.100 As introduced above, the British system has also attracted much 
less theoretical scrutiny; writing on UK arrangements, Edgerton explains that ‘Political 
science, strategic studies, and the like have been surprisingly silent on the subject, as have 
historians, including military historians.’101 Indeed, there was a ‘Post-war silence’102 in 
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scrutiny of the British MIC and analysis of the arms industry was ‘never particularly strong’ 
before its revival in the 1970s.103  
That being said, considerable scholarly attention has been afforded to the 
character of the interface between the UK Government and industry on military issues in 
three main areas. Firstly, the political-economy of warfare has been a major focus; 
Edgerton considers this ‘[p]robably the most important tradition of enquiry into the British 
military-industrial complex[.]’104 This ‘political economic approach’105 is less preoccupied 
with the implications of the MIC’s influence on strategic policy, therefore, and more an 
examination into the (often negative106) economic impact of defence expenditure.  The 
emphasis of this angle of inquiry is, in Dunne’s words, ‘to evaluate the effects of the 
changes in military expenditure on the economy’107, rather than necessarily to examine or 
measure any significant impact of the MIC on policy. Through its examination of three 
major CT-related public sector security contracts, and other wider areas of concern, this 
examines any economic impact of such public-private dynamics in the contemporary UK CT 
context. 
The management of defence procurement is a second major field of inquiry on the 
British MIC; it could even be argued that public-private interaction on defence 
procurement, rather than the MIC per se, is most frequently the lens through which UK 
military-industrial issues have been examined. Defence procurement literature (and, 
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indeed, wider policy discussions on this subject) generally focuses on how the MoD and 
industry interact, rather than on whether or not (or the extent to which) they should. A 
seemingly dry management issue invites fiercely contested debate which draws 
contributions from industry, academia, non-governmental organisations and even 
Government officials.108 Through its analysis of CT-related procurements, and non-military 
security acquisition more generally, this study contributes to this literature in the wider 
security field. 
A third area of literature relating to the British MIC is on the matter of ‘arms 
exports’. Here, the political significance of international military sales is addressed even in 
primarily economic-focused literature.109 In this area, the idea of a close (and potentially 
damaging) character of the military-industrial system is even more widely accepted; Smith 
and Smith argue, for example, that ‘[e]xporters and importers alike are locked into a 
system which each feeds off the other’110 leading to ‘a ceaseless search for new 
markets.’111 Chalmers et. al. have identified the ‘considerable ethical and political 
controversy’112 around defence exports, with Smith summarising that ‘…the arms trade 
does have an unsavoury reputation[.]’113 Within this body of literature, several accounts 
seek to explain why Governments support defence industries around this priority. Smith 
suggests, for example, that exporting countries like the UK ‘use arms exports to maintain 
their DIB in the face of fluctuating demand’114; Martin agrees that ‘exports can help 
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maintain a strong indigenous industrial base.’115 Furthermore, Chalmers highlights the 
‘constant pressure on Government’116 to maintain such a policy for industrial reasons, 
criticizing the endeavour as inefficient and as contributory to the ‘rapid militarization of 
the Third World.’117 A related debate examines the potential impacts of terminating a 
country’s pursuit of defence exports.118 Chapter 7 examines the extent to which these 
dynamics now appear in the CT field. 
Within all this literature, the character of the British MIC is only rarely explored at 
the theoretical level; the system of interaction is rarely analysed as a concept and 
questions over its membership and potential impact have not stimulated much scholarly 
debate. Indeed, ‘national’ economic and industrial considerations have often been seen as 
playing a fundamentally legitimate (if not ineffective) role in major procurement 
decisions119, and any influence exerted by the MIC is rarely considered significant; perhaps 
the comparable size of the British defence budget and associated industry has limited any 
feelings that the British MIC poses any actual danger. 
2.6 Changing character of the British MIC  
Whilst few conceptual accounts on the British MIC exist, there has been a growing 
appreciation that significant changes have recently been underway within the UK defence 
policy context, and Britain’s associated DIB. Firstly, the evolving character of the types of 
‘industrial’ capabilities that have increasingly been provided to (or in support of) the British 
military has been clearly recognised. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that the MoD is no 
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longer solely acquiring military equipment and hi-tech industrial capability for the Armed 
Forces; the provision of services by the private sector in overseas conflict has become an 
increasingly ‘ubiquitous’120 feature of British military capability. Indeed, Heidenkamp has 
recently concluded that ‘contractor support to operations (CSO) has become an essential 
component of the ability to both deploy and sustain the UK’s military instrument’121 and 
that this area of capability ‘accounted for at least 60 per cent of the UK’s overseas 
operational defence sustainment effort in 2010.’122 Whilst the use of contractors in support 
of military operations has had a long heritage, numerous scholars have documented the 
UK Government’s increasing use of PMSCs in recent decades.123 
Secondly, international trends have had a significant effect on the character of the 
UK’s DIB. As Mabee records in his comprehensive account of the effect of globalization on 
the arms industry, there was during the 1980s and 1990s ‘a trend in the arms industry to 
embrace a globalized model of industrial production’124 whereby major programmes would 
be developed across national boundaries. In short, this combined with related 
developments including ‘increased civilianization’125 and the arms industry ‘becoming 
increasingly led by firms’126 resulted in ‘the development of an increasingly globalized and 
transnationalized arms industry’127. Other authors have noted the considerable effects that 
globalisation has had on the UK defence sector; Taylor has also identified that ‘defence 
industries, traditionally organized on a national basis, are in various ways becoming more 
internationally-structured.’128 Furthermore, Markusen has charted in Foreign Policy the 
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fact that ‘Arms manufacturers are following the lead of their commercial counterparts and 
going global’129, advancing the need for regulation over what she labels a ‘transnational 
defense-industrial base’130. Hayward similarly noted the emergence of global supply chains 
in defence and that ‘[i]t is increasingly difficult to identify the precise national origins of 
components.’131  
It is now widely accepted, therefore, that the UK’s defence industrial sector has 
adopted an increasingly integrated, transnational character. In this context, questions have 
been raised around the extent to which this supply chain can be legitimately referred to as 
a ‘British industry’ as traditionally understood132; indeed, developments seem to suggest 
that it may be more appropriate to refer to the MIC as being ‘located in the UK’, rather 
than seeing them as ‘British’ per se. Whatever its precise character, the reality that the 
British MIC (and the defence industry within it) has undergone significant changes in recent 
decades has significant implications for how public-private cooperation should be properly 
understood in a contemporary setting. 
2.7 Towards a theory on the ‘industrial-complex’ in the CT sector, and beyond 
This thesis will argue that in the context of the changes that have occurred in the strategic 
security environment after 9/11 a system of public-private cooperation that looks different 
to the ‘MIC’ has emerged in the domestic UK CT sector, if not potentially also in other non-
military fields of national security strategy. As well as resetting the direction, priorities and 
spending associated with national security strategy, the UK Government’s appreciation of a 
wider risk environment has also resulted in a re-orientation of the way in which the State 
now interacts with ‘industry’ on security issues. Previously, the principal method of 
‘industrial engagement’ was thought of as the military sector interacting with the DIB 
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around the development of capability along the lines discussed above; in other words, the 
system labelled the MIC. This naturally remains an important aspect of UK security policy 
but, as indicated in Section 1.3, ‘private sector engagement’ extends beyond the military 
sector and includes a much broader spectrum of corporate actors.133 In short, as 
Governments have become increasingly aware of the wider strategic landscape and the 
need to develop capabilities in different areas of ‘national security’, so they have fostered 
new relationships with different corporate entities.  
Only a limited number of scholars have explored, as the author and others have 
done recently, the idea that the private sector now plays a ‘multiplicity’ of roles in the 
provision of UK national security.134 Against this backdrop, a better understanding is 
needed of what is meant by the ‘private security industry’ and of the different types of 
roles played by a ‘variety of private actors’135 in UK national security strategy. Whilst useful 
taxonomies of the private military services sector have been formulated since 9/11136, the 
scope of ‘the security industry’ in a modern day UK domestic context has hitherto received 
little attention in the literature. In fairness, the difficulty of defining what constitutes the 
‘security industry’ has been acknowledged137 and at least two authors have sought to 
address this issue by suggesting new research agendas for further study on this issue.138 A 
failure to do so to date may have arisen as a result of a lack of awareness around (and/or 
interest in) the full scope of companies’ involvement in this sector, but the larger problem 
may be that scrutiny of the private sector’s involvement in national security has continued 
to focus on defence matters. The ever-growing complexity of the landscape means that 
                                                          
133
 Rosemont, ‘Private security engagement’  
134
 See, for example, Neville-Jones and Fisher, ‘Homeland Security and the Role of Business’, p.170; 
Rosemont, ‘Private sector engagement’; and Rosemont, ‘Getting Down to Business’, p.81 
135
 Krahmann, ‘Conceptualizing Security Governance’ , p.11 
136
 See especially Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp.88-100 and Avant, The Market for Force, pp.16-22 
137
 Rosemont, ‘Private sector engagement’ 
138
 See especially Adam White, ‘The new political economy of private security’, Theoretical 





greater clarity is much needed on the character of the private sector’s involvement in the 
non-military aspects of security such as CT.   
At the risk of repetition, this thesis proposes that an ‘industrial-complex’ of a 
different character to the MIC now exists in the CT aspects of UK national security strategy, 
and potentially beyond, and that this has important implications for policymakers and the 
research community. This system has some similarities with, but substantially differs in 
character from, what has been described above as the MIC; in short, the system of public-
private interaction on defence issues whose effects have almost invariably been presented 
in negative terms. The analysis shows with specific reference to the CT sector that as 
security risks have evolved and ‘broadened’ away from military issues after 9/11, the 
Government has developed new security strategies (such as CONTEST) within which an 
extensive network of relationships has been formed with private sector actors, both within 
and outside the traditional defence sector.  As mentioned above, and previously (very 
briefly) suggested by Dunne and Sköns, the ‘British MIC’ has evolved in the sense that 
some of its dynamics operate beyond the defence sector and around other contemporary, 
non-military security issues.139 The problem is that, prior to this thesis, bold assertions had 
been made around the character of ‘the SIC’, but no one had actually examined the detail 
of the proposed changes now underway.  
It is against this backdrop that the dissertation examines at the micro level the 
origins, characteristics and consequences of various examples of public-private interaction 
in CONTEST; it examines three individual CT-related contracts and other public-private 
interactions which have caused concern after 9/11. Having done so, it proposes that, whilst 
some existing MIC theory still has utility in analysing trends and characteristics in and 
beyond the defence sector, it is not appropriate to simply conclude that its dynamics have 
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linearly transferred to the non-military security field. In short, on the basis of the evidence 
in the CT sector, the character of the private sector’s involvement in the non-military 
security field is considerably more complex; the apparent suggestion of critics that the 
negative dynamics associated with the MIC having merely transferred in to the 
contemporary UK CT arena is overly simplistic.  
Core argument 
Ultimately, the thesis will argue that any fleeting application of ‘industrial-
complex’-type terminology to the non-military arena of national security is likely to be an 
incomplete reading of the situation. Such applications have complicated matters because 
they invite the reader to (incorrectly) think that the dynamics of the non-military sector - 
the so-called ‘SIC’ - are exactly the same as the MIC; this thesis’s examination of the CT 
sector dispels this idea. Such terminology should therefore be used cautiously and, it is 
recommended, applied initially only on a sector-by-sector basis, having considered and 
analysed the data and evidence. 
As introduced in Chapter 1, the matter of theorising on the existence of the MIC - 
or, in this case, a structure of public-private coordination within the non-military CT 
aspects of contemporary security strategy - is troublesome in the sense that such an idea is 
not itself a hypothesis or statement which possesses a distinct and measurable output 
variable.140 It is for this reason that micro-level analysis will be completed which can 
analyse the character of the private sector’s involvement in the non-military aspects of 
security. Supporting the justifications for the research presented in Section 1.2, this author 
believes that whilst the main message of Eisenhower’s Farewell Address has been 
misinterpreted by some authors, his warning about the potential dangers posed by the 
emerging interests within what he then-called the MIC remain as true and important today 
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as ever. It is vital, therefore, to systematically examine whether a new ‘industrial-complex’ 
has emerged in the contemporary security arena, and consider whether any such system 
threatens to breach his principle that it should not exert ‘unwarranted influence’. 
Even if only some of the dynamics which have traditionally been associated with 
the MIC are found to have established themselves within the non-military security context, 
as this thesis asserts, it is vital that they are properly assessed and that an alert citizenry is 
in a position to understand and assess the consequences of such a system. In presenting 
the characteristics of a network of public-private cooperation in the CT sector, and 
analysing its impact, it can be hoped that policy-makers, scholars and the public more 
generally can be encouraged to engage in more informed discussions. An important debate 
could then follow on whether any ‘industrial-complex’ is operating more broadly than in 













Chapter 3: Emergency Preparedness 
Introduction 
Examples abound of the bravery of emergency service personnel, and of the general 
public, during, or in the immediate aftermath of, recent major terrorist atrocities. The 
celebrated image of US fire-fighters raising the Star-Spangled Banner upon the ruins of the 
World Trade Center after 9/11, for example, or of the young British man who was 
photographed carefully escorting the injured ‘woman in the mask’ away from a temporary 
emergency centre directly following 7/71, are particularly powerful examples. The security 
authorities would naturally aim to prevent such events from ever occurring; within the UK, 
the small number of ‘successful’ attacks that have actually taken place since 9/11 suggests 
that they have largely achieved this primary objective. In Securing Freedom, the former 
Director of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, reinforces this point: ‘…from 9/11 until I retired 
in 2007, we faced fifteen serious terrorist plots and many, many smaller ones.’2 
Notwithstanding the subsequent murder of Gunner Lee Rigby in May 2013, it is difficult to 
argue with her assessment that ‘[o]nly the four suicide bombers of 7/7 succeeded[.]’3 
Whilst the UK authorities should be proud about their record in preventing so 
many substantial plots, enormous efforts have been made to prepare for and respond to 
the occurrence of any such events. Indeed, whatever one’s attitude towards the 
proportionality of CONTEST, the authorities were clearly prudent after 9/11 to ‘prepare for 
the worst’ on the basis that it would be unlikely that all potential attacks could be 
successfully thwarted. One former head of London’s Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) 
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captured this when he ‘notoriously said to the media that it was a question of when, not 
if.’4   
The policies and procedures put in place to handle such incidents did not happen 
accidentally. Indeed, the manner in which the Government has worked (and continues to 
work) with partners ‘to prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies’5 - to quote 
the Cabinet Office’s longstanding aim for the UK’s national emergency management 
procedures - has long been recognised as an important aspect of CONTEST; one of its four 
guiding pillars, ‘Prepare’, is specifically concerned with how ‘to mitigate the impact of a 
terrorist attack.’6 The introduction of a new approach incorporating how to manage the 
consequences of an event in the new security environment is not limited to CT strategy; as 
London bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games, for example, it was even decided that 
planning for all types of emergencies - what the UK’s official ‘Bid Book’ called ‘consequence 
management’ - would comprise one of the ‘three key functions’ that would be delivered by 
those responsible for the Games’ security preparations.7  
Before analysing specific examples of corporate involvement in UK emergency 
preparedness, it is worth recalling that this thesis is concerned with examining the 
‘industrial-complex’ in the CT sector; it is relevant, therefore, to consider how terrorism 
itself has driven the structural reforms in this sector since 9/11. In a major 2004 speech, 
David Omand (then the UK’s Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet Office) 
explained that ‘it is terrorism that poses the major – although clearly not the only – risk to 
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the security of the UK’8, and that it was this threat ‘that drives most of the programmes of 
improvement we need’9.  Coaffee similarly highlights that 9/11 ‘significantly speeded up’ 
the process of emergency planning reform10; Richards has also noted that whilst the 
Government’s decision to establish a Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in 2001 was 
initially made ‘in response to the fuel protests, the foot and mouth disease outbreak, and 
flooding in 2000’11, this was ‘given a whole new impetus’12 following 9/11. A former 
Director of the CCS, Bruce Mann, has described the 9/11 attacks as a ‘further, substantial 
stimulus towards reform’13.  
It is clear, therefore, that terrorism was a significant driver in the development of 
the UK’s emergency preparedness activities after 9/11. In this context, the role that the 
private sector has played in UK emergency preparedness has received some analytical 
attention14, but, like with other security topics, any interest has tended to be ‘siloed’ or 
seen to be of secondary importance; limited to rather general statements around the 
importance of the activities of individual business sectors, or seen largely through a 
                                                          
8
 David Omand, ‘National Resilience Priorities for UK Government’, Speech given at RUSI at the 
launch of the Homeland Security and Resilience Department, 1 July 2004, Via: 
http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C40AB913E66BA2/ (accessed 19.07.13). This speech 
formed the basis of David Omand, ‘Emergency Planning, Security and Business Continuity’, RUSI 
Journal, Vol.149:4 (2004), pp.26-33 
9
 Ibid.  
10
 Jon Coaffee, ‘From Counterterrorism to Resilience’, The European Legacy, Vol.11:4 (2006), p.398 
11
 Anthony Richards, ‘The emergency response: Progress and problems’ in Wilkinson, Homeland 
Security in the UK, p.344 
12
 Ibid.   
13
 Bruce Mann, ‘The UK civil contingencies framework – building common endeavour’, in Paul 
Cornish (Ed.) Britain and Security (London: Smith Institute, 2007), Via: http://www.smith-
institute.org.uk/file/BritainandSecurity.pdf (accessed 29.07.13), p.46. There was recognition prior to 
9/11 that the UK Government’s national emergency management structures needed reform to be 
able to address all the relevant security risks facing modern society. See, for example, Geoff O’Brien 
and Paul Read, ‘Future UK emergency management: new wine, old skin?’, Disaster Prevention and 
Management, Vol.14:3 (2005), p.354 
14
 See especially Omand, Securing the State, pp.80-83. The author has also noted that ‘[f]rom an 
emergency preparedness perspective, (…) a thorough awareness of the extensive role played by the 
private sector has been developed; Veness (2003), Stewart (2005) and Gregory (2007), for example, 
have all articulated the requirement for business sectors of all varieties to work with Government to 





corporate security and resilience lens.15 In view of the potential sizeable effects of major 
emergencies on parts the UK business community, and the role many companies now play 
in their mitigation, a greater understanding is needed, drawn from a broader perspective, 
of the character of the public-private relationships in this sector. Before doing so, the next 
section details the structures developed by the UK Government to enhance emergency 
preparedness after 9/11, and the ways in which the role of the ‘private sector’ has been 
considered within that framework. 
3.1 Government policy approach and governance arrangements 
The UK Government’s policy framework for emergency preparedness underwent radical 
changes throughout the 2000s; a greater degree of central direction and a fuller 
appreciation of the wide variety of risks facing the UK characterized the reforms. On the 
former, the move towards ‘greater emphasis on cross-departmental and extra-
departmental coordination’16 has been expertly covered by Smith whilst, referring to the 
plans to establish the CCS at the start of the decade, Feakin summarises how ‘…[i]t became 
clear that the UK required a body with the authority to prepare, respond and recover from 
any kind of emergency, be it man made or natural.’17 Omand has similarly explained; 
‘Public protection (…) requires that there are effective emergency responses against the 
widest range of major threats and hazards.’18 Reflecting this, ‘there has been a broadening 
of the emergency planning agenda’19 in the UK after 9/11. In short, the revised framework 
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adopted an ‘all-hazards approach’20, or what has perhaps been more appropriately 
described as ‘multi-hazard management’21. The significance of the new approach should 
not be underestimated; the reforms introduced a completely new policy framework for 
handling UK emergencies. 
Supporting this radical new posture was the introduction of ‘national resilience’ as 
a central driving concept behind the UK’s post-9/11 emergency preparedness framework. 
The ‘interesting choice’22 of phraseology has received much analytical attention; O’Brien 
and Read, for example, have argued that resilience ‘…is increasingly used in the disaster 
management sphere and reflects a trend towards a holistic and proactive approach that 
has the community, and its ability to resist and recover, as its focus’23. Analysing policy 
developments in this field, Coaffee explains that ‘it is now common to talk of minimising 
the terrorist risk by developing resilience.’24 He continues: 
Post 9/11 metaphors of resilience have been used to describe how cities 
and nations attempt to “bounce-back” from disaster, and to describe the 
embedding of security and contingency features into planning systems.25 
In Securing the State, Omand presents an interpretation of ‘national resilience’ as 
‘…strengthening the overall ability of society to bounce back as quickly as practicable into 
the patterns of normal life after a major disruption.’26 An important feature of the UK’s 
recent approach to (and thus policy framework for) emergency preparedness, therefore, is 
that, despite enormous determination and every best effort being made to prevent any 
atrocities, it has never pretended to be able to completely remove the risk of something 
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untoward happening. In a separate article, Omand stresses the centrality of this idea 
within CONTEST: 
The CONTEST strategic aim reflects the risk management approach by having 
the objective ‘to reduce the risk’ from terrorism so that people can go about 
their normal business, freely (that is, without having to interfere with 
individual freedoms and liberties) and with confidence (that is, with people still 
travelling by air and on the underground, visitors coming to the UK, confidence 
in the markets and so on).27  
Different conceptualisations of ‘resilience’ may exist internationally, however the concept 
was cleverly chosen for the UK in view of the realistic (if not slightly pessimistic) 
assumption that, despite every best effort to prevent them, it would only be prudent to 
assume that some security events (such as terrorist attacks) would occur. CONTEST has 
always been clear in this context that capabilities would be developed to ‘deal with 
disaster’28, should ever it strike. 
What specific, practical policies did the UK Government pursue in this area after 
9/11, and how has the governance framework for UK emergency preparedness evolved? It 
is not a straightforward matter to generalise about the development of the character of 
what Gregory has called the ‘National governance structures to manage the response to 
terrorist threats and attacks’29, but reference to the Government’s own policy 
documentation and other material helps to identify the main elements of the approach. 
Importantly, it can be noted that despite the new reforms the manner of actually handling 
major emergencies has remained broadly similar for decades. As Hills put it: 
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…there has never been one man or one organization charged with 
managing the national response to disasters, and successive 
administrations have consistently maintained that control in such matters 
must be exercised locally: assistance may be needed from neighbouring 
areas and organizations, from the national government and from 
international organizations such as the EC [European Commission], but the 
responsibility to plan for and deal with a disaster has remained a local 
responsibility.30 
Whilst more central coordination, new statutory requirements and numerous central 
programmes were introduced after 9/11, as described below, O’Brien and Read’s 
argument is widely accepted: ‘the overall structure will remain largely the same; that is, 
government fulfilling the role of co-ordinator and offering guidance and with local agencies 
left to get on with the task.’31  
Smith concurs that ‘the guiding principles behind contingency planning remain 
largely unchanged.’32 Whilst he explains how after 9/11 there would be a greater 
requirement for ‘partnership bodies’ to deliver the response (i.e. rather than primarily 
‘empowering local authorities in emergency planning’33), there would be little overall 
change to the allocation of operational responsibilities following the reforms: ‘The centre 
may thus be seen as providing strategic advice and coordination on contingency planning 
while actual implementation is left to the localities.’34 The result, according to Hills, is that 
the ‘organizational arrangements for disaster response in the United Kingdom are 
extremely complex.’35 Immediately, the character of these arrangements appears very 
different to those within defence, or what is labelled the MIC; within the latter system, the 
MoD clearly possesses more streamlined control over policy, and indeed operational 
direction in the sector. 
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Considerable changes were made, however. As the legal cornerstone of the 
revised approach, a new statutory basis was established; ‘[t]he changes to the legislative 
base underpinning civil protection’ were ‘wholesale’36. The Government passed the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) and this ‘was the first wholesale revision of UK emergency 
legislation since the 1920s.’37 It was indeed hardly insignificant: Omand explained that 
‘[t]he Bill provides us with a complete modern legislative framework for dealing with civil 
contingencies replacing the present inadequate patchwork of historic law.’38 Under the 
CCA, which came into force in April 2005, a series of ‘functional and collaborative duties’ 
were placed upon ‘(“category 1”) responders at the core of emergency response (such as 
the emergency services and local authorities)’39; these included ‘risk assessment’, 
‘emergency planning’, ‘business continuity management’ and ‘information sharing’ 
amongst other activities.40 Thus a substantially revised set of official responsibilities was 
created. 
Significant changes to the machinery and operation of central Government were 
also made after 9/11; the establishment in 2001 of the CCS was a substantial decision that 
aimed to introduce greater coordination. Writing in 2007, Gregory explained how ‘[t]he 
principal objectives of the CCS are horizon scanning and overseeing the departmental 
responses to the threat assessments produced by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre’41, 
and how its additional responsibilities included ‘…policy development, ensuring that those 
responsible for crisis management and operational matters properly discharge their duties 
and promulgating doctrine, development of key skills and issue awareness through the 
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Emergency Planning College.’42 The current responsibilities of the CCS appear on a 
Government website; ‘[i]ts work concentrates on 4 main areas: risk assessment, 
preparation and planning, response and recovery, and building a resilient society.’43 As 
shown below, the CCS also interacts with the private sector in this context. 
Reflecting the Government’s responsibilities, several new public guidance 
documents on emergency preparedness were produced. Richards notes that an updated 
iteration of Dealing with Disasters was published in parallel to the production of the 
original Civil Contingencies Bill in 200344 and, according to a letter from the then head of 
CCS to colleagues, this document provided ‘the Government’s core guidance to emergency 
planners and local responders’ and reflected ‘the many changes that have taken place 
since the third edition was published by the Home Office in 1998.’45 Gregory also notes 
‘the issuing of two guidance documents by the Cabinet Office CCS: Emergency 
Preparedness and Emergency Response and Recovery.’46 Separately, Feakin has explained 
the significance of the introduction of a ‘National Risk Register’47 (NRR) which ‘…sets out 
the government assessment of the likelihood and potential impact of risks that will directly 
impact the UK.’48 Structural changes were therefore accompanied by a substantial 
proliferation of documentation aimed at all parties involved in UK emergency 
preparedness, including the public. 
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Several other efforts were made throughout the 2000s to either update previous 
guidance or develop new policy on UK emergency preparedness; the introduction of the 
Government’s Concept of Operations and the Strategic National Framework on Community 
Resilience were perhaps the most significant policy shifts. The first of these ‘sets out the 
flexible arrangements for coordinating the response to and recovery from emergencies 
within the UK’49; outlining in 80 pages the framework that central government will adopt in 
the event of an emergency.50 Amongst the most important functions this document 
performs is, firstly, to describe; 
…how the UK central government response will be organised, and the 
relationship between the central, regional and local tiers in England, as 
well as the relationship between the UK central government and the 
devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.51 
Secondly, the COP also outlines how emergencies will be handled at the political level, 
when appropriate, through a detailed section that outlines ‘The Role and Organisation of 
the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)’52. New resources were allocated to these 
structures, and a debate emerged around the effectiveness of them.53 
The role of non-governmental partners in emergency preparedness (including 
communities and the private sector) was also addressed in the new material. According to 
The Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience document, for example, 
‘…[t]he framework is intended to provide the national statement for how individual and 
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community resilience can work’54, and aims to act ‘as a set of guiding principles which 
encourage and enable people to take steps to be prepared for an emergency.’55 Alongside 
this document, the Cabinet Office recognised the benefit of even wider engagement, as its 
website almost patronisingly explains: ‘The wider UK society - public and private sector, 
communities and businesses - will find it useful to know how their work fits into a wider 
framework on resilience for their sector.’56 Closely connected to the work developed under 
the ‘community resilience’ label, the Government has developed a substantial suite of 
dedicated advisory material for the private sector. This includes the publication annually of 
‘Sector Resilience Plans’57, for example, and, more recently, the development of a 
‘Corporate Resilience Strategy’ designed ‘…to promote effective but inexpensive ways to 
enable SMEs to build resilience to all kinds of hazards and threats.’58 Such documents 
clearly illustrate the Government’s view of the important role played by the private sector 
in UK emergency preparedness.  
To support the emerging policy objectives, new programmes were developed by 
various agencies. Most significant amongst these, according to Richards, was the creation 
by CCS of a new ‘Capabilities Programme’. The current aim of the National Resilience 
Capabilities Programme is:  
…to increase the capability of the United Kingdom to respond to and 
recover from civil emergencies. It does this by building capability to deal 
with the consequences that are common to most types of emergency, 
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regardless of whether those emergencies are caused by accidents, natural 
hazards or man-made threats.59 
Capabilities within this programme varied and included ‘…a number of interdependent and 
interrelated factors including appropriate numbers and types of personnel, the right types 
of equipment and supplies, relevant and sufficient training and exercising, clear plans 
etc.’60 This included the procurement of new equipment for the emergency services  
through the ‘New Dimension’ programme; enhanced ‘Cabinet Office-approved emergency 
planning and crisis management training’61 also emerged as a core, centrally-driven 
capability through the (now privately-operated) Emergency Planning College. 
The Government has consistently recognised the private sector’s central role in 
ensuring UK national resilience; the original provisions of the CCA even stated that a 
number of private sector organisations would be designated as ‘Category 2’ responders – 
what Mann describes as ‘co-operating bodies’62 – thus encouraged to meet various 
requirements directly. In his dedicated chapter on this subject, Gregory highlights the 
categories succinctly: 
In part, this public-private sector inter-relationship in emergency response 
is reflected in the new civil contingencies legislation with its listing of 
Category One Responders – the public sector – and Category Two 
Responders – mainly those private sector bodies with critical national 
infrastructure responsibilities.63 
Mann’s account of the CCA also shows how the Government recognised the need to take 
account of the role of the private sector, and the tensions inherent in doing so: 
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As far as the business sector was concerned, policy making around the act 
had carefully to consider the impact of market pressures – whether 
positive, in providing firms that engage in relevant planning with a 
competitive edge, or negative, in placing burdens on firms that do so. It 
thus had to find the right balance between, on the one hand, placing 
preparedness duties in law on the business sector that mirror those placed 
on public-sector bodies, and, on the other, the strong desire to reduce the 
burden of regulation on business.64 
Private sector involvement in emergency preparedness is not limited to its statutory 
responsibilities. Whilst the involvement of the security suppliers’ community has not been 
well documented within this field, it is evident that this part of ‘industry’ has seen a clear 
role for itself in the UK; the full, unabbreviated name of the leading representative security 
industry alliance (examined in Chapter 6) is the ‘UK Security and Resilience Industry 
Suppliers’ Community’. Equally, it is apparent that at the strategic level the security 
industry is currently seeking to develop new, joint policy initiatives with government on 
both security and ‘resilience related’65 matters: whilst one industry executive stated that 
he had not ‘discerned that anyone or anywhere else had picked up the resilience mantle’66 
after Bruce Mann had left office, RISC’s interaction has developing more broadly than on 
CT issues through the recent development of a Security and Resilience Growth 
Partnership.67  
Prior to this thesis, no study had sought to examine in detail such a wide 
interpretation of the private sector’s involvement within UK emergency preparedness, let 
alone seek to assess its potential consequences. This chapter examines the character of 
the involvement, exploring the extent to which the dynamics of the MIC as historically 
understood may have transferred into the CT sector. Before conducting such analysis, an 
indication is provided of the levels of expenditure that have been allocated to the UK 
Government’s post 9/11 emergency preparedness priorities. 
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3.2 Security expenditure 
The complexity of the UK’s post-9/11 governance arrangements for emergency 
preparedness is now apparent. The combination of such a disaggregated structure with the 
fact that some budgetary material is of a security-sensitive nature makes it difficult to 
obtain a full picture of ‘resilience’ expenditure within the sector; the further complicating 
lack of coordination around the UK’s national security expenditure more broadly has also 
been covered in one high profile study.68 However, an indication can be provided of the 
size and growth of UK emergency preparedness budget. Whilst it would be futile to seek to 
establish a complete picture of post-9/11 UK resilience expenditure, a better 
understanding of UK resilience spending can be achieved through the analysis of official 
documents, parliamentary exchanges, and other scholarly literature.  
As this thesis is concerned with national security strategy, the investment that 
central UK Government has allocated towards meeting its emergency preparedness or 
‘resilience’ objectives is important to grasp. In response to a parliamentary question tabled 
in 2011 on the budget of the CCS since 2005, the Minister of the Cabinet Office, Francis 
Maude MP, replied that the budget ‘for each financial year between 2008-09 and 2011-12 
was/is’69: 
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CCS budgetary figures for the years 2001-2008 were not as readily available; however, the 
Cabinet Office’s Annual Reports and the UK Parliament’s ‘Hansard’ publication provide 
more detail on centrally-funded, post-9/11 UK resilience spending. Whilst the initial ‘start-
up’ funding apportioned to the CCS following its creation are not clear70, £53.4 million was 
allocated in 2002-03 towards the overall stated objective ‘[t]o co-ordinate security, 
intelligence and civil contingencies matters to protect the UK against disruptive 
challenges’71. An early official breakdown of the overall funding provided by the 
Government states that a smaller, specific figure of ‘£39.5 million was allocated to the CCS 
in February 2003, for example, including the £10 million administration and capital costs of 
the Secretariat, the £19 million Local Authority Grant and £10 million to the Met Office.’72 
Whilst figures are difficult to obtain, on the available information it seems that the costs 
for the CCS have remained broadly consistent - around £10m per annum - since 9/11. 
The CCS budget is not the only indicator of centrally-funded UK emergency 
preparedness expenditure, however, as records of Government grants issued to enhance 
regional capabilities indicate. A closer examination into the investment allocated to 
enhance London’s arrangements illustrates how funding has been made up of a mixture of 
contributions from both central and local Government. The ‘resilience’ page of the London 
Fire Brigade (LFB) states:  
In recent years, we have made substantial investment, supported by the 
government and the Mayor of London, in additional vehicles, equipment 
and training for our firefighters to manage major incidents.73 
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Reflecting this approach, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) has 
regularly received a ‘Fire and Rescue Service capital grant’ from the Department of 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG); this amounted to £2,195,000 in 2009/10 and 
£3,674,000 in 2010/1174, for example. Whilst it is important to recognise that this grant is 
both London-specific and has not solely been concerned with the development of 
capabilities relating to the preparation for (and management of) major terrorist 
emergencies - this allocation is for all aspects of the LFB’s operations - the accounts clearly 
illustrate the strong emphasis that the additional funding has placed on investing into the 
LFB’s capital programmes; these are marked against line items such as ‘Resilience’, 
accommodation for the ‘new dimensions programme’ and investment into the service’s 
‘control and communications project’75. Furthermore, the contribution that central 
Government has allocated to the LFB’s capital programmes reflects the decentralised 
character of the governance (and funding) framework for UK emergency preparedness; 
again, this contrasts with the defence sector where arrangements are more centralised. 
Funding was not solely allocated towards enhancing London’s resilience 
capabilities; several centrally-coordinated, national programmes were pursued after 9/11. 
Most notably, the ‘New Dimension’ programme was a DCLG flagship enterprise. A report 
completed in 2008 by the National Audit Office (NAO) explains the purpose of the scheme:  
…to rapidly, effectively and flexibly tackle the consequences of terrorist 
and other large-scale catastrophic incidents, such as flooding, by: providing 
appropriate specialist vehicles and equipment; funding training for 
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firefighters to use the new equipment; and supporting planning for 
deployment of the equipment in the case of an emergency.76 
Helpfully, the scope (and effectiveness) of the DCLG’s procurement activities under this 
programme have been analysed by the NAO - the acquired capabilities range from 73 
‘incident response units’ for mass decontamination through to training for 20 ‘Urban 
Search and Rescue teams’77. Even more usefully, the report also outlines how the DCLG: 
…has committed some £330 million to the programme: £190 million on 
vehicles and equipment, £85 million on training and crewing, and an 
estimated £55 million on programme administration[.]78 
Whilst in terms of its overall size New Dimension is smaller than many MoD procurement 
projects, it clearly constitutes one of the UK’s largest new, non-military CT equipment 
programmes after 9/11. That it is considered to have been both a necessary and a highly 
successful programme would seem to challenge some of the more strident accusations to 
have been levelled at ‘the SIC’. 
‘New Dimension’ was not the only CT-related procurement programme that had 
the aim of enhancing emergency preparedness after 9/11. As a separate NAO paper 
explains, the ‘Fire and Resilience Programme’ established within the department as a 
consequence of those events ‘comprises three separate but interdependent projects’79; 
the two others being Firelink (‘a £350 million project to upgrade each Fire and Rescue 
Service’s current main radio-communication system’80) and FiRecontrol (‘a £423 million 
project to provide a resilient network of nine regional control centres’81). As it was always 
intended that the information technology (IT) component of this latter project would 
                                                          
76
 National Audit Office, ‘New Dimension – Enhancing the Fire and Rescue Services’ capacity to 
respond to terrorist and other large-scale incidents’, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, HC 1050, Session 2007-2008, 31 October 2008, p.4 
77
 Ibid., p.5 
78
 Ibid., p.11 
79
 National Audit Office, ‘FiReControl Project’, Memorandum for the House of Commons 









constitute the largest single contract of any of these projects82, it is selected as the primary 
case study for further examination into the dynamics of the private sector’s involvement in 
this sub-sector (see Section 3.3).  
Whilst it is difficult to determine an exact overall figure for UK resilience spending 
after 9/11, the NAO found in 2010 that central government in the form of DCLG invested 
‘over £1 billion with the aim of improving their [local Fire and Rescue Authorities] capacity 
to respond to incidents including large-scale disasters caused by terrorists, accident or 
nature.’83 Therefore, as the basis for this chapter’s examination, a substantial amount of 
‘new’ public expenditure was allocated to this aspect of CT after 9/11; this can be said to 
be largely attributable to the Government’s increasing desire to address non-military 
security threats (such as terrorism) alongside classic ‘defence’ issues in the new context. In 
view of this sizable additional investment, the ways in which the private sector has been 
engaged in that endeavour warrant further attention.  
3.3 Public-private security interactions 
This section examines an extensive and varied network of public-private security 
interaction in the UK emergency preparedness sector, supporting the notion that an 
‘industrial-complex’ of a different character to the MIC exists in the CT aspects of UK 
national security strategy. After introducing more details on the involvement of security 
suppliers in this sector, the section analyses the dynamics that emerged between the 
public and private sectors in the FiReControl programme, and more broadly. 
Security Suppliers 
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In contrast to the other sub-sectors of CONTEST considered in this thesis, it is clear that, at 
least in its public pronouncements, the UK Government has seen a limited strategic role for 
the security suppliers’ community in helping it to fulfil its resilience objectives. Instead, it 
has focused on developing relationships with the ‘business community’ considered in the 
wider sense as being an operational actor that should prepare itself for significant 
emergencies. Whilst the need to harness technologies developed by the DIB for resilience 
purposes has been viewed as an ‘increasingly important’ aspect of the response84, the CCS 
does not appear to have resourced itself to embrace the same outlook. In reality, the 
emergence of a self-standing ‘resilience industry’ has not materialised; such a thing is 
rarely considered separately from the wider ‘security industry’85. 
This is not to suggest that suppliers have not seen a role for themselves in this sub-
sector of CONTEST; perhaps the most explicit ‘pitch’ in this respect is found in a chapter 
written by a (now former) Director of the security company, G4S. Ian Horseman-Sewell 
advocates the need for ‘partnership with the private sector’ to enhance UK resilience, 
claiming that: ‘…we have been seeking to lead a vibrant debate about increasing the role of 
the private security industry in planning for and responding to natural and man-made 
emergencies in the UK[.]’86 Promoting the idea that ‘[t]he private sector has specific 
‘resilience-building’ and ‘response’ capabilities to offer’87, Horseman-Sewell insists that 
‘the motivation for private security providers to plan for and handle disasters is not purely 
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profit’88. Without specifying details, he claims that ‘every year G4S provides ad hoc 
emergency support to governments around the world without charge.’89  
The validity of these claims are difficult to ascertain but, even if it is accepted that 
the profit motive is not the sole reason for companies seeking involvement in UK 
resilience, interviews confirmed that it is a strong (and not necessarily illegitimate) factor 
which drives companies’ involvement in the sector. When asked about the character of 
public-private security engagement generally, the Director for Security Industry 
Engagement at the Home Office responded: 
I think there are different motives and different objectives between the 
public and the private sectors. So in the public sector there’s a great deal 
of focus on the real mission to protect society, quite rightly so, and really 
to the exclusion of all else. (…) And I think if you then move over to the 
private sector - different motives. I mean we’re there for profit motives, 
shareholder value, those sorts of things. A little bit of a suspicion from the 
public sector that that’s their motive[.]90 
It would certainly be naïve to think that commercial suppliers are not interested in seeking 
profits. It is also apparent that, in addition to its consistently stated desire to work with the 
private sector on emergency preparedness issues, the Government has not been opposed 
to working with the suppliers’ community in this sector. It is apparent, for example, that in 
seeking to fulfil its objectives, the Government has awarded several sizeable contracts with 
suppliers in the ‘resilience’ space. One such example was the development of the 
FiReControl project from 2004; the public-private dynamics around the contract are now 
examined to examine the character of the ‘industrial-complex’ in this sector. 
Case Study: FiReControl 
DCLG’s FiReControl project consistently received media attention for all the wrong 
reasons. The title of one Daily Telegraph opinion piece - ‘FiReControl Project: silly name, 
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stupid idea – but you and I will pay for the fiasco’91 - sums it up aptly; the piece fiercely 
criticises the project, lamenting that no one had been held accountable for the failure 
described as both a ‘disaster’ and a ‘sorry saga.’92 The article is not the only such 
assessment; according to a recent ‘update report’ on FiReControl by the UK Parliament’s 
Committee on Public Accounts (PAC), the project ‘was one of the worst cases of project 
failure that the Committee had seen’93. It is certainly difficult to describe FiReControl as 
anything other than a monumental failure. After efforts had consistently been made to 
‘soldier on’ with the scheme, the main IT contract for the project was eventually cancelled 
in December 2010. Announcing that the Government was ‘calling time’ on the agreement 
with its prime contractor, Cassidian (formerly EADS Defence and Security, now Airbus 
Defence and Space), the then Fire Minister stated: ‘Following extensive discussion with 
Cassidian, we have jointly concluded, with regret, that the requirements of the project 
cannot be delivered to an acceptable timeframe.’94  
In monetary terms, the project was an unmitigated disaster. As the NAO made 
clear in its critical review of the project after its cancellation: ‘FiReControl will have wasted 
a minimum of £469 million[.]’95 Whilst fortunately the losses did not amount to the total 
cost of ‘£986 million over fifteen years’96 that had once been anticipated by the 
Parliamentary Communities and Local Government Committee (CLG), the loss of almost 
half a billion pounds was a very regrettable waste of taxpayers’ money. Indeed, such is the 
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high profile character of this significant debacle that FiReControl appeared as a case study 
in one recent account of UK Government blunders.97   
It was not only the commercial outcome of the project that received 
condemnation from critics; the failures it exhibited in the area of project management 
have also been highlighted. In one particularly damning statement made during an 
evidence session for a PAC inquiry into the project, one Committee member revealed that 
the UK-based Association for Project Management had indicated to him that it uses 
FiReControl ‘as a textbook example of how not to do a project.’98 Whatever budding 
project practitioners might learn as a result of the contract failure, it would be a stretch to 
suggest that FiReControl ever intended to serve such a potentially useful purpose.  
It would be equally misleading, however, to suggest that any or all of those 
individuals responsible for developing the scheme intended that such a large amount of 
taxpayers’ money would be wasted, however. Before analysing the dynamics, it is 
important to understand the basic concept, origins and rationale of the project. ‘What is 
FiReControl?’ is the question posed within an overview document published by the DCLG 
in 2009; the answer now is ‘not much’, but it was then argued: 
The FiReControl project will develop a network of nine, purpose-built 
Regional Control Centres (RCCs) to handle all emergency calls made to 
FRSs [Fire and Rescue Services], using a single national operating system.99 
In short, the pre-existing 49 control centres were to be replaced. The document continues: 
The RCCs will be fully interconnected. Control room operators will have 
world-class equipment and technology so, for example, when a call can not 
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be answered by one RCC it will be handed on, with the same information 
available at the next RCC.100 
This naturally invites the question as to why the Government sought to pursue this project; 
in short, differing views existed over the specific original aim(s) of FiReControl, not to 
mention the varying levels of support for it. It is clear from policy documentation and 
archive material, however, that the (then) Labour Government’s desire to seek to both 
improve efficiency and enhance UK ‘resilience’ in the context of the terrorism threat were 
major drivers for all the projects developed under its ‘Fire and Resilience Programme’.  
The Government’s 2003 White Paper, Our Fire and Rescue Service, captures the 
twin dynamic concisely. Outlining ‘the case for moving towards regional-scale control 
rooms’101 on the basis that the existing operation of control rooms at the local level ‘is 
inefficient’102, it also argued that ‘…[t]he events of 11 September 2001 have given further 
new impetus to the need to rationalise the way in which the fire service resources are 
used.’103 Indeed, the Government was clear that the events of 9/11, together with the 
emergence of other risks, meant the Fire Service’s capabilities had to be strengthened. In 
the document’s Foreword, the Deputy Prime Minister declared unambiguously; ‘That role 
involves tackling new threats which we are now facing, including terrorism, and threats 
such as flooding and other environmental disasters.’104 Together with New Dimension and 
Firelink, FiReControl would become one of New Labour’s flagship CT programmes in this 
context. 
It is the initiation of the project on the grounds that it sought to enhance UK 
resilience after 9/11 that makes it a relevant case study for this thesis. Indeed, in oral 
evidence to the CLG the former Fire Minister, Shahid Malik MP, contested the idea that 
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‘efficiency’ (i.e. monetary savings) was even the primary motivation behind FiReControl: 
‘As far as I am concerned, this project was never about cost. It was always about the 
national resilience that FiReControl would provide.’105 There should therefore be no doubt 
about the strength with which the ‘national resilience’ angle of the justification for the 
project gained resonance. The CLG reported its own understanding of the project’s aims: 
The Government’s main motivation behind the amalgamation of fire 
control centres is to increase “resilience” by enabling the FRS to handle 
large-scale incidents better, from environmental disaster to a terrorist 
attack.106 
This rationale is deployed in other project documentation. The Full Business Case for 
FiReControl, published in May 2009, stated: 
The main rationale for FiReControl is to strengthen resilience locally, 
regionally and nationally – giving the FRS improved call handling and 
mobilisation capability to respond to incidents of every size and type.107  
Terrorism might not have been the sole reason for the development of FiReControl, but 
the aim of improving national resilience in a world drastically re-shaped by 9/11 was clearly 
in the minds of those who developed the project. 
Against this backdrop, how was the private sector involved in the FiReControl 
project and what were the causes of its failure? Could it be argued, as some critics of ‘the 
SIC’ might have it, that a coalition of vested interests coalesced around the Government’s 
post 9/11, CT-related resilience priorities, somehow managing to increase Government 
expenditure in this area to the benefit of a powerful (and profitable) elite? A closer 
examination of the public-private interactions that existed around the IT aspects of the 
project paints a different understanding of the situation. 
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The circumstances surrounding the decision in December 2003 to proceed with 
FiReControl remain controversial; much has been said about the alleged priorities of senior 
Ministers at the time, and the resultant haste with which the Government decided to 
proceed. The NAO’s analysis on the failure of the project is particularly illuminating; it 
found that ‘neither the project plan nor the business case were finalised before the 
project’s approval.’108 It continued: 
A Gateway Review by the Office of Government Commerce in April 2004 
after the project had been approved found that the “extraordinarily fast 
pace” of the project was introducing new risks to the delivery of the 
project, and escalating those already identified.109 
According to this analysis, it would seem FiReControl was moving at such a fast pace - a 
pace set by political considerations - that it was almost inevitably set up to fail. 
It would be too simplistic to entirely blame any hurried desires of Ministers, 
however, as data arising from Parliament illustrates. The response of the Permanent 
Secretary of the DCLG to a member’s suggestion that the then Deputy Prime Minister was 
‘this out of control bull in a china shop going round telling you what to do’ suggests other 
factors contributed:  ‘It would be a convenient cop-out to say this was just down to 
Ministers’ enthusiasm.’110 Whilst they would have only been acting in their advisory 
capacity, senior civil servants clearly helped to make the case for the original investment 
decision (even if it has been suggested privately that, later, one official’s advice to 
Ministers to continue with FiReControl was not heeded.111) 
Other factors influenced the initiation of FiReControl directly; reports 
commissioned by the Government to a private consultancy actually helped to justify the 
project. As the Government outlines in the ‘Full Business Case’ for the project, 
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‘…[i]nvestment in Regional Control Centres (RCCs) is consistent with a wide range of 
departmental and governmental studies, policies and initiatives.’112 The seemingly pivotal 
contribution in this respect was a report completed in 2000 (later updated in 2003) by the 
company; Mott MacDonald. As FiReControl’s Business Case specifically states, these 
documents were relevant to the creation of FiReControl because they ‘[c]oncluded that 
vertical integration best meets the requirements of the FRS, and that regional scale fire 
and rescue emergency control centres would be optimal.’113 Thus, according to the 
Government, FiReControl specifically ‘Implements the recommendations of the MMD 
study in England.’114 From the outset of the project, therefore, the findings of at least one 
company clearly influenced the shape and direction of FiReControl.115 Furthermore, the 
Government made explicit use of the company’s recommendations in its 2003 White 
Paper116 - recommendations that helped it to justify (if only in its own mind) the 
FiReControl concept. That the 2003, updated version of Mott MacDonald’s report 
indicated a preference for the initiation of ‘…a national strategy to reduce the number of 
fire and rescue service control rooms by means of Fire-Fire amalgamation to form Regional 
controls matched to the Government Offices for the Regions’117 - instead of the previous 
suggestion to reduce control rooms from 49 to 21 as its earlier report recommended118 - is 
further evidence of how its findings were translated into policy. In short, at least one 
company helped to make the case for substantial reforms to the FRS’s control room 
arrangements and, in the process, helped to justify FiReControl.  
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What role was it envisaged ‘industry’ more broadly should play in the 
implementation of FiReControl? The Government clearly intended to use the private sector 
and this was evident in the case of the largest individual contract associated with the 
project - the (estimated) £200 million IT contract awarded to EADS in March 2007. As the 
NAO’s reporting on the project has indicated, the programme would include two main 
acquisition components; firstly, the delivery (and management) of the new 
accommodation that would be needed for the fire authorities and, secondly, the 
supporting IT contract itself.119 Whilst it is clear that through its financing under the 
Government’s ‘Private Finance Initiative’ the private sector would also be deeply involved 
in the first set of accommodation arrangements, this section now devotes its attention to 
the dynamics around the latter, larger single supply contract.  
Having issued a ‘call for interest’ for the IT aspects of FiReControl in the Official 
Journal of the European Union in May 2004, the DCLG then invited ‘three short-listed 
bidders for best and final offers’120, culminating in the appointment of EADS in 2007. The 
award of a large, CT-related contract to a company traditionally so closely associated with 
the defence sector might appear to perfectly reflect the criticism that has been levelled 
towards ‘the SIC’; after 9/11, the MIC has transferred into the CT sector. The award and 
structure of the contract certainly resembled similar defence projects in important 
respects. Firstly, it was clear that EADS was considered (and considered itself) as the ‘prime 
contractor’ for the integration of the IT aspects of the project, and responsible for 
managing the overall package in much the same way that it would have been familiar with 
in the defence sector - as the NAO put it; ‘EADS has subcontracted the majority of the work 
to third parties and its main role is to bring these packages together to form the overall 
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solution.’121 This was never going to be a straightforward task, however - the NAO’s 
detailed overview of EADS’s responsibilities clarifies that whilst it was an IT project it 
consisted of many diverse components122. Furthermore, it can be suggested that EADS’s 
previous experience in the defence sector led both the company and the Government into 
believing that it would be more than suitable for the task. Responding to questioning on 
the effectiveness of the management of the project, for example, one senior fire officer 
responded123: 
At the start of the project the contractors and everybody assumed it would 
not be complicated. They were a big defence contractor and this was only 
a little old fire service: “How hard can it be?”’ 
It would be ‘business as usual’ for EADS, apparently, and, like with its experience of 
handling contracts in the defence sector, the company would manage the contributions of 
a wider selection of companies to deliver the contract. Hughes usefully highlights the 
project’s diverse supply chain of ‘…seven subcontractors: Ericsson, Frequentis (UK), 
Hewlett-Packard, IMass, Innogisitic Software Multitone Electronics and Telent’124 - whilst 
challenges arising from the make-up of this supply chain would subsequently emerge 
(most notably Ericsson was replaced with Intergraph in December 2009), the management 
of such a structure would certainly not have seemed alien to a defence company of EADS’s 
experience.  
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A further similarity exists between FiReControl and other defence contracts; ‘rising 
costs’ is a recognised feature of Government defence projects - and literature of the MIC 
more broadly - and this was certainly a feature of FiReControl. An analysis of factors 
potentially accounting for rising costs in this case is provided below, suffice to note here 
that when the project was first approved (in 2004) it was estimated that it would cost £120 
million125; as we have already seen, the NAO considered that at least £469 million had 
been wasted by the FiReControl project upon its termination in 2010. Naturally, this invites 
the question as to whether a ‘conspiracy of optimism’ may have emerged in the same way 
that has been identified within the defence sector.126 Having considered the main features 
of the contract, and argued that FiReControl resembled similar contracts in the defence 
sector, we now turn to an examination of how these cost increases may have come about, 
and what accounted for the failure of the project. 
This thesis benefits from the prior completion of several credible studies covering 
‘why’ FiReControl failed so spectacularly; combining the explanations can only lead to the 
conclusion that any argument seeking to singularly implicate ‘the SIC’ for the difficulties 
would be over-simplistic. According to the PAC, FiReControl failed in large part as a result 
of a problem of governance, rather than as a result of any system pursuing its interests; it 
concluded that ‘[t]he project was flawed from the outset’127 and that the DCLG did not 
possess ‘sufficient mandatory powers (…) to impose a single, national approach on locally 
accountable Fire and Rescue Services who were reluctant to change the way they 
operated.’128 Indeed, the operation of this governance system has been described 
generously as ‘convoluted’129 and was clearly dysfunctional; the data suggests that the 
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Government declined to properly engage with the FRSs who were supposed to be the main 
beneficiaries or ‘customers’ of the project. As the NAO put it; ‘FiReControl was flawed from 
the outset because it did not have the support of the majority of those essential to its 
success – its users’.130 The PAC agreed, arguing that the Government actually ‘excluded 
them [the FRS] from decisions about the design of the regional control centres and the 
proposed IT solution, even though these decisions would leave local services with potential 
long-term costs and residual liabilities to which they had not agreed.’131 This is clearly a 
fundamental design issue that has nothing to do with the fact that companies such as EADS 
later became involved, irrespective of their own role and effectiveness in the project. 
Other factors contributed to the demise of FiReControl. The role of the leading 
workers’ union in the sector, for example, was seen as detrimental by one former EADS 
employee; Richard Fletcher suggested that the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) represented an 
‘enormous vested interest’ and that it ‘sought to undermine the scheme throughout the 
lifecycle of the project.132 Whatever level of influence the FBU exerted upon the decision to 
terminate the contract, there is no doubt of its overall position on FiReControl: it publicly 
called for the project to be cancelled133 and, following the publication of the NAO report, 
the organisation’s Secretary-General was quoted as saying that it had acted as ‘the lone 
voice highlighting soaring costs, incompetence and delays’134, lamenting that that ‘no one 
listened to what the professional firefighters and fire control staff were saying’135 
throughout the process. Whether any influence being exerted by a public sector union 
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could be any more preferable than that exerted by corporate entities will fall within the 
eye of the beholder. 
The explanations offered by officials for the decision to cancel FiReControl should 
also be taken into account; the oral evidence transcripts included within the PAC’s ‘update 
report’ on the project are particularly illuminating. Within them, DCLG’s Permanent 
Secretary argued: 
I think that it is right to say that one of the reasons why the project 
struggled was that it did not get buy in at the start, and that is what the 
NAO said, but it was not the reason why we terminated the contract. The 
reason we terminated it was because we had no confidence that we would 
get what we were seeking in a reasonable time scale; it is as simple as 
that.136  
For the Government, then, it was the problems it was experiencing with its suppliers in 
delivering the IT elements of the project that was the key issue; at face value, it seems to 
have been arguing that it was simply EADS’s performance that was the true cause of the 
problem. Whatever difficulties may have existed, however, we should only cautiously 
accept that this was the sole reason for the cancellation; it can be noted, for example, that 
civil servants have also been blamed for the fiasco.137 We could even suggest that the 
Government’s emphasis on the failure being a result of its contractor’s ‘inability to deliver’ 
suspiciously echoes its explanation of the problems associated with the e-Borders IT 
contract and the inability to provide sufficient numbers of private security officers in time 
for the London 2012 Olympics (examined in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively).  
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What of any validity in this case of a main charge labelled against ‘the SIC’; that 
‘cosy relationships’ would have existed around the IT contract and that its rising costs 
arose directly from the greedy, sinister or, at a minimum, commercially self-interested 
motivations of the contractor and/or any other parties involved in the project? There is 
certainly evidence that Government and industry collaborated closely together on the 
project at various stages, and that on occasion this may have exceeded the limits of what 
could be considered to be appropriate. For example, the NAO was extremely critical of the 
project’s ‘over-reliance on poorly managed consultants’138, highlighting the findings of an 
(unpublished) report by the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) that ‘consultants were 
found to hold a disproportionate (and accountability-free) amount of authority.’139 It is also 
striking that during one Parliamentary evidence session the Government and its main 
contractor, EADS, appeared on the same panel together when providing evidence on the 
circumstances surrounding the project’s problems.140 The session leaves the impression of 
the relationship being (at that stage) a very cordial affair, at least at the most senior level. 
At one stage, for example, the then Fire Minister, Shahid Malik, sitting alongside the CEO 
of EADS, summarised: 
I am not here to blame EADS. I think they were at fault quite a lot. We 
have been at fault as well. They are very trusted in government circles, 
with the multimillion pound projects that they have with government 
etc.141 
This appearance of a degree of ‘cosiness’ might hardly be comforting to the UK taxpayer, 
even if it could also be argued that at the senior level there was a realistic acceptance that 
there was a degree of interdependency between the public and private sectors in 
successfully delivering this project. 
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Whatever the shared understanding, it seems that deep tensions begin to emerge 
between the supplier and ‘end user’ in this case; in its landmark report on the project, the 
NAO even refers to ‘the absence of a partnership approach between EADS and the Fire and 
Rescue Services’142. EADS’s relationship with the Government also appeared increasingly 
strained, especially after the 2010 General Election. The NAO report identifies, for 
example, that the DCLG had been critical of EADS’s handling of the contract and that ‘there 
was an absence of cooperation to resolve the issues.’143 This is supported by a segment of 
an interview held with one industry executive on the causes of the Government’s decision 
to cancel the FiReControl in 2010: 
Who is accountable for closing the FiReControl? Bob Neill was the Fire 
Minister and the reason why he ended it was because the decision to end 
FiReControl was taken a year earlier, when the Conservatives secured the 
General Election. And they were ‘anti’ the FiReControl project because it 
was a Prescott regionalisation project; they disagree with regionalisation. 
The Fire Service, of course, were happy at any opportunity to remain in 
their personal fiefdoms. And to secure a cheap political victory at the 
expense of John Prescott they cancelled this programme.144  
Whether this explanation can be accepted at face value, there is also evidence that the 
technical requirements of the IT contract were over-specified and that, despite its ultimate 
cancellation, some companies involved in FiReControl still profited from FiReControl. A 
PAC report highlights, for example, that the DCLG had informed it that ‘the original 
contract was significantly over-specified and not appropriate to the needs of the 
country’145, inviting the question as to who was responsible for this situation developing. A 
closer examination of the oral evidence supporting the PAC’s conclusion does not 
necessarily confirm the existence of any foul play on the part of any ‘industrial-complex’, 
however. Instead, the strong suggestion is that FiReControl was designed in alignment with 
the then Government’s priority of regionalisation. When pressed on this matter in 
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Parliament, Sir Bob Kerslake clarified why the decision was taken to deliver a large-scale, 
national programme: 
I think it is two things. One is that it was based on a regional model, and 
the other was that it was, in my view, significantly over-specified for what 
we required by way of resilience. You didn’t require a system where you 
could, in any part of the country, provide the back-up to another part of 
the country in that way.146  
Whether anyone within Government or its main supplier - or indeed any potential 
combination thereof - sought to over-specify the project is not evident from the available 
material, and the impression left is one of a chaotic ‘muddling through’ rather than a 
conspiracy. In its careful examination into the potential causes of the associated over-
specification of the RCCs, for example, the CLG highlights the speed with which the 
procurement was developed, the lack of consultation around it, and the naivety of some of 
the Government’s assumptions as the main contributory factors, rather than any 
‘unwarranted influence’. It states: 
It could be argued that an over-specified project is preferable to an under-
specified project, especially where security is concerned. (…) The lack of 
consultation and collaboration on the project has resulted in buildings that 
have been designed without adequate consultation on specifications 
needed by those that will work in the buildings and by those who have 
statutory duties under the 2004 Fire and Rescue Services Act.147 
Factors other than the emergence of a malign confluence of interests have therefore been 
offered by independent authorities as contributing towards over-specification within 
FiReControl. If any ‘industrial-complex’ in the CT sector was in any way responsible for 
over-engineering the required capabilities that it was determined would be needed, it did 
well to conceal itself. Indeed, it seems that the CLG would also have had to have been 
involved in such a ‘conspiracy’.  
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It is also clear, however, that over the course of several investigations suggestions 
were made that inappropriate corporate influence was exerted on FiReControl, and that 
some companies profited from their involvement unduly. For example, the NAO explains 
how, following the decision to terminate FiReControl, ‘an amicable termination’ took place 
between EADS and the DCLG, resulting in a payment of £22.5m to the latter, meaning that 
‘the resulting overall net payment to EADS was £11.7m.’148 It is easy to see how outside 
observers might consider the character of the termination as being ‘amicable’ as 
inappropriate at worst, undesirable at best. 
Perhaps more concerning was the role played, and the monetary benefit received, 
by the consultancy companies who were involved in the project. The NAO has explained, 
for example, that ‘PA Consulting was contracted to provide consultancy services at a cost 
of £42 million to the end of March 2011’149; concerns were also expressed in Parliament 
about the nature of their involvement. The PAC Chairman observed on the company’s 
involvement: ‘Those of us who have wandered occasionally into this world would know it is 
in their interest to keep that consultancy going.’150 That a less-than-helpful approach was 
adopted by PA Consulting in respect of FiReControl was also suggested in interviews. One 
industry executive reflected: 
They were incentivised… PA were there to help manage the chaos. It was 
in their interest for there to be chaos.151 
Another interviewee developed this further; describing PA’s activities towards the end of 
the contract as ‘evil’ and alleging that the company was deliberately ‘creating work for 
themselves’.152 Whilst these are only two viewpoints, the perception that such influential 
corporate actors were acting so unhelpfully raises questions about the appropriate scope 
                                                          
148
 National Audit Office, ‘The failure of the FiReControl project’, p.32 
149
 Ibid., p.23 
150
 Committee of Public Accounts, ‘The failure of the FiReControl project’, Ev 7, p.23 
151
 Interview, Industry Executive 
152





and level of involvement of such companies in Government security contracts. 
Remarkably, the DCLG’s Permanent Secretary stated that the consultants were not merely 
advisers but in fact ‘a key part of the actual delivery team’153. The National Project Director 
for FiReControl, Roger Hargreaves, also publicly reflected on the appropriate boundaries; ‘I 
think we over-relied on consultants.’154  
For the avoidance of doubt, no evidence has been found that PA Consulting or any 
other company was responsible for any specific inappropriate (not to mention illegal or 
corrupt) behaviour. The concluding chapter addresses the appropriateness of companies 
being involved in security projects; before then, we can safely conclude that even if the 
available evidence does not suggest that any specific untoward influence was exerted upon 
FiReControl, it was an alarming feature of this case that some companies could secure 
multi-million pound returns from a public sector security contract that was not delivered. 
Whilst other contracts and strategic interactions with the private sector in the UK 
emergency preparedness sector have been more successful155, there is no doubt that the 
case of FiReControl was an extremely regrettable episode that exhibited several worrying 
dynamics.   
Private Operators 
The private sector’s involvement in resilience is not limited to industry’s (non)provision of 
CT-related contracts; the Government’s interactions with private sector operators on CT-
related emergency preparedness issues is an issue which has greatly risen in prominence 
since 9/11. Indeed, there is now widespread recognition that much of the UK’s critical 
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infrastructure - 85% according to one reliable source156 - is actually owned and operated by 
the private sector, and thus the country’s security and resilience depends on corporate 
entities. To ensure that such companies develop appropriate levels of preparedness 
around their installations and/or systems, the UK Government’s Centre for the Protection 
of National Infrastructure (CPNI) has identified nine sectors upon which it considers UK 
daily life depends157, establishing mechanisms of engagement around them. Omand has 
analysed in depth the quality and effectiveness of the public-private mechanisms that have 
been put in place in the UK context. He highlighted when in Government: 
Within each of these sectors a dialogue is now under way with the industry 
or sector bodies, companies or trade associations to discuss vulnerabilities, 
resilience, and protective security issues.158  
Whilst the details of such dialogue are rarely published for security reasons, it is clear that 
the establishment of such practical fora as ‘information exchanges’159, as the CPNI calls 
them, are vital for ensuring  security through sustained public-private sector cooperation. 
The complexity arising from the fact that business considerations are a constant feature of 
the CT agenda should not be underestimated - indeed, Omand was a pioneer in identifying 
the need for ‘the commercial competitive pressures on the Boardrooms that now control 
most of our national critical infrastructure’160 to be taken into account in security policy. It 
is thus now widely acknowledged that public-private cooperation on CNI protection is thus 
not only desirable, but essential. Asked for an updated view of the effectiveness of such 
interaction for this thesis, David Omand was positive about the progress that had been 
made:  
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And I think in the UK I’m reasonably upbeat about that (…) I mean there 
may be practical difficulties and it all takes a long time – in some cases it 
hasn’t yet reached the stage of the regulator having legal responsibilities 
for security as well as safety – but you can see the direction of travel.161 
It is clearly apparent that from 9/11 until the present day an enormous amount of practical 
work of an operational nature has been pursued between the State and companies 
comprising the nine sectors of the CNI. The aim of this section is not to highlight each and 
every public-private interaction to be developed under the auspices of this priority - 
revealing such details would be inappropriate - rather, it serves to highlight the operational 
responsibilities that the private sector ‘owns’ in the non-military security context. The 
noteworthy characteristic here is the direct, operational role that is ‘owned’ by companies; 
this starkly contrasts with industry’s role within the defence sector. The idea that the MIC 
has linearly transferred to the CT sector is thus questionable. 
The Government has developed a series of other non-contractual interactions of 
an operational nature with the private sector to strengthen UK emergency preparedness. 
Perhaps the most prominent amongst these has been the steps taken to engage with the 
manpower-related or guarding sub-sector of the wider ‘security industry’. Should the 
relevance of this part of the industry to CONTEST be doubted, there has long been 
recognition of the potential for this substantial resource to help to supplement public 
sector capability in policing162; Gregory also identifies ‘The private sector’s role as a 
potential contributor of human resources to the counter-terrorism response’163. This 
certainly reflects the outlook of the UK’s most senior security authorities; a former UK 
Government Minister for Security, for example, explained to a luncheon of the British 
Security Industry Association (BSIA) trade association: 
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Because there is no doubt whatsoever in my mind - if we are to excise this 
cancer of violent extremism, everyone, all of us in the UK, have to work 
together. And that means involving industry fully, involving our scientists, 
involving technology, involving all our people actually.164  
Interestingly, the Minister also thanked the BSIA during the course of his speech for 
developing its own document, CONTEST and the Private Security Industry, which enables its 
member companies to demonstrate their support for the strategy.165 This Ministerial 
desire and endorsement for close cooperation with this part of the private sector has 
increasingly permeated both industry’s and the Home Office’s outlook, with specific 
initiatives developed with this attitude in mind. One interviewee recalled, for example, 
that during Lord West’s tenure at the Home Office, the OSCT organised an ‘industry day’ at 
the Emmanuel Centre opposite the Department’s headquarters in Marsham Street, 
designed to be open to the 200,000 members of the manpower-orientated part of the 
sector.166 
Finally, any full discussion on the private sector’s increasing operational 
involvement in UK emergency preparedness should note that growing attention - both 
policy and scholarly - is being paid to the question of how the public and private sectors 
interact on cyber-related ‘resilience’ issues. A recent, thought-provoking examination of 
this important issue was included within a pioneering article by Herrington and Aldrich, 
and it can be hoped that it provokes further discussion. The article’s recognition that 
‘growing public-private partnerships’ in this sector are making the governance of cyber 
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security ‘more complex’167 is worthy of profound reflection, as is their argument - closely 
connected to the themes explored in this thesis - around who might be to blame if (when?) 
disaster strikes in the context of greater private sector involvement in security matters: 
When the digital tsunami occurs, citizens will hold government to account 
for the failure of an infrastructure they no longer own and control – and 
which ministers do not fully understand.168 
This assertion should provoke deep questions of policymakers regarding the desirability, 
inevitability and consequences of private entities now possessing operational ‘national 
security’ responsibilities. Whatever assessments are made in response to such soul-
searching, the end result is clear; the private sector’s operational involvement in UK 
emergency preparedness is undeniably extensive.  
Wider Business  
In addition to the supply and operational interactions analysed above, it is evident that, 
even before 9/11, the UK Government increasingly sought to involve the wider business 
community in achieving stronger UK emergency preparedness against the backdrop of 
terrorism; whether through guidance or other new mechanisms of engagement. For 
example, the Home Office’s Communications Department’s 1999 guidance document titled 
Business as Usual: Maximising business resilience to terrorist bombings169 outlined the 
following ‘purpose’: ‘…to show what can be done to help businesses affected by major 
terrorist bombings in urban areas recover as quickly and effectively as possible.’170 This was 
not an isolated initiative; a separate booklet titled How Resilient is your Business to 
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Disaster171 was first developed in the mid-1990s by the Home Office in collaboration with 
the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). The Foreword of its first published version - co-
signed by the then Home Secretary and the Director General of the CBI - stated that the 
guidelines contained within it ‘apply equally to the public or private sector’ and that, 
notably; ‘Big or small, private or public sector, the message is the same for all 
organisations.’172 
This emphasis on encouraging the private sector to take responsibility for its own 
preparedness increased rapidly after 9/11. Amongst some of the most important recent 
initiatives have been the ‘tools’ that have been produced and disseminated by the CPNI 
and the National Counter Terrorism Police Office (NaCTSO); indeed, both organisations 
have seen ‘working with the private sector’ as a core (if not fundamental) aspect of their 
remits. In the case of the CPNI, Herrington and Aldrich neatly summarise (albeit in a ‘cyber’ 
context) that ‘[j]ust like everyone else it cannot superintend the UK infrastructure but it 
does enjoy close relationships with the backbone providers’173. Regarding NaCTSO, the 
former head of the organisation has articulated the attitude of the organisation; outlining 
the importance that he considers business must play in its own protection, and the 
projects that were established by the organisation under his leadership (such as ‘Project 
ARGUS’ and a ‘Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool’) to help them to do so.174 In addition, 
both organisations have in recent years produced a substantial suite of written guidance 
material designed either for specific sectors or more general application. NaCTSO’s website 
explains that each of its guides - these range from the protection of stadia to hotels and 
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restaurants - ‘provides protective security advice to those who own, operate, manage or 
work in environments that are vulnerable to acts of terrorism.’175 
Additional dimensions of ‘wider business’ public-private interaction on CT-related 
emergency preparedness issues have been identified. Gregory’s chapter on this subject is 
the most comprehensive to date; indeed, he was the first to properly recognise the ‘wide 
spectrum of roles’176 now conducted by the private sector in this aspect of CT and, perhaps 
even more importantly, the crucial point that ‘these public-private sector relationships are 
both complex and diverse in character’177. For the present purposes, we can recall his 
analysis of two particularly innovative public-private interactions; firstly, the way in which 
after 9/11 individual police forces’ Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) were 
increasingly required ‘to reach out to the wider business and industrial environment’178 
and, secondly, the development of ‘Project Unicorn’. This latter scheme was devised by the 
MPS to ‘address the question of how the private sector could help the police.’179 According 
to Gregory, the project ‘reflected upon what kind of ‘drivers’ might help to shape a deeper 
partnership between the wider business community and government agencies’180. 
Whilst this chapter has been concerned with examining the Government’s 
interactions with corporate, profit-making entities within the CT space, as seen above, the 
importance of the potential role played by private citizens and non-profitmaking 
organisations in relation to UK emergency preparedness should not be overlooked; some 
might even consider them part of what is considered the ‘private sector’. Certainly, the UK 
Government has regularly seen value in communicating directly to the public in this area 
after 9/11; its decision in 2004 to issue a ‘preparing for emergencies’ booklet to every 
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household in the country181 serves as an excellent (if not slightly ridiculed) example, as 
does its more recent work with other external organisations to publish a ‘Business 
Continuity for Dummies’ guide for small and medium-sized businesses.182 
Perhaps more importantly, there has been a growing appreciation that 
‘community resilience’ should be an essential part of the response; the Cabinet Office has 
developed a significant programme of work around this policy and its website helpfully 
clarifies its understanding of the concept: ‘Community Resilience is about communities 
using local resources and knowledge to help themselves during an emergency in a way that 
complements the local emergency services.’183 In addition to the Government placing an 
emphasis on encouraging communities to ‘help themselves’ in responding to emergencies, 
it equally recognises the role that non-governmental organisations and charities can play in 
supporting them. For Edwards, the voluntary sector is a particularly important player as it 
plays ‘four distinct roles’ in supporting the authorities with emergency preparedness:  
‘communications, search and rescue, social and psychological aftercare, and welfare and 
medical support.’184 Whilst outside the scope of this thesis, there could be benefit in 
examining the role and influence that such actors may exert within, and upon, the UK’s 
national security strategy (or any of its component parts). 
3.4 Character and impact of the ‘industrial-complex’ in Emergency Preparedness 
This chapter has not sought to examine the dynamics around all of the contracts or public-
private interactions that have emerged in the UK’s emergency preparedness landscape. It 
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has, however, clearly illustrated the extensiveness, breadth and variety of private sector 
involvement in this area of CONTEST since 9/11. It proved the involvement of suppliers, 
operators and wider business sectors in this space - and showed that the Government and 
its agencies have actively sought to engage these communities. The second section of the 
chapter illustrated how substantial additional investment (over £1bn) was allocated to UK 
emergency preparedness after 9/11 in accordance with the theory under examination. 
For the reasons explained in Chapter 1, the chapter examined in particular the 
public-private dynamics which emerged around a large, non-military, CT-related UK 
security contract; FiReControl. Prior to its cancellation, this IT contract was shown to have 
been operated by a traditional defence company, EADS, and to have suffered from many 
of the same problems (such as rising costs and over-specification) that have traditionally 
been associated with high profile acquisition failures in the military sector; and the MIC 
more generally. Furthermore, the analysis revealed the significant involvement of other 
profit-making commercial consultancies - in particular Mott MacDonald and PA 
consultancy - who received substantial remuneration despite the failure of the project. All 
these insights suggest that the suppliers’ community traditionally associated with the MIC 
has transferred into the non-military, CT-related emergency preparedness aspects of the 
UK national security.  
Any idea that any untoward dynamics arising from an SIC (such as threat inflation 
or over-specification) may have operated in the context of this specific contract is, 
however, less clear. Whilst it has been shown that the prime contractor for the IT contract, 
EADS, ultimately received a net profit of £11.7m185 for its involvement in FiReControl, there 
is no doubt that, from a financial perspective, the company would have benefited more 
significantly had the project not been cancelled. The question of why the Government 
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chose to cancel the scheme, if it was somehow in a ‘cosy alliance’ with the company, also 
arises. The causes of the failure have been extensively scrutinized and several official 
reviews have provided multiple credible explanations for the failure. None of these has 
suggested that an SIC along the lines presented by critics was accountable; the main failure 
of FiReControl has been repeatedly identified as a failure of engagement between the 
Government and the Fire Services.  
Perhaps more worrying, however, is the finding that one of the consultancy 
companies most deeply involved in the project, PA Consulting, generated substantial 
profits from its participation in the failed project. Worse still, it is doubtful whether the 
level of the company’s involvement was scoped, discharged or overseen appropriately. The 
longer-term adverse reputational damage that PA Consulting may have suffered as a result 
of the national media coverage following the project’s cancellation does not necessarily 
mean that its level of involvement in and impact upon the project should not have been a 
matter for concern. This conclusion resonates worryingly with O’Reilly’s assertion that 
something we might call ‘state-corporate symbiosis’186 has arisen in areas of what he calls 
the ‘transnational security consultancy industry’; the potential consequences of this level 
of involvement are revisited in the final chapter.  
Notwithstanding this worrying suggestion, on the basis of the available evidence - 
including detailed evidence provided to Parliament and interviews conducted for this study 
- it cannot be concluded that an organised conspiracy along the lines suggested by critics 
was evident in either the case of FiReControl, or the UK’s emergency preparedness sector 
more broadly; the former project appears to have been much more disorganised, rushed 
and ill-thought through than could validate such a theory. Any suggestion that the vested 
interests arising from something resembling an ‘SIC’ system were the sole or primary 
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reason for the growth in the level of funding for FiReControl’s IT contract - and indeed that 
any such dynamics were the sole cause for the overall project failure - are cautiously 
rejected as a result of the multiple additional explanations that can be, and have been 
offered to explain what might rightly be described as ‘yet another fiasco’. 
Finally, the latter sections of the chapter revealed a wide range of additional 
public-private interactions existing within the ‘operational’ and ‘wider business’ categories 
proposed within this thesis. The diversity of these roles stands in stark contrast to how 
‘industry’ has been traditionally involved in the defence sector - and indeed how it has 
been conceptualised as a singular corner of the MIC - thus questioning the suitability of 




















Chapter 4: Border Security 
Introduction   
CT objectives have featured prominently within the UK’s Government’s border security 
strategy since 9/11. The first published version of CONTEST, for example, immediately 
identifies the following priority as one of the ‘range of issues’ of utmost importance: 
Strengthening border security - so that terrorists and those who inspire 
them can be prevented from travelling here and we can get better 
intelligence about suspects who travel, including improving our identity 
management, for example by use of biometrics[.]1 
This focus has regularly featured in CONTEST subsequently; the document’s March 2009 
iteration clarifies that ‘[p]rotecting our borders has been a key part of this workstream’2 
and, when considering ‘future challenges’, states that ‘The UK border will remain critical to 
our security.’3 In addition to introducing enhanced arrangements for physical security and 
policing at the border, the Government has prioritized the use of new technology such as 
biometrics and enhanced radiological detection capabilities to enhance UK border security. 
As Section 4.2 outlines, significant levels of new financial investment have been allocated 
in this sector. Border security, like other areas of contemporary national security strategy, 
warrants further scrutiny. 
This chapter is not the first analysis of companies’ involvement in border security; 
the desirability of its role in developing technological solutions in this sector has previously 
been questioned within the academic community. According to Amoore, for example, the 
use of algorithms for border control and other applications ‘produces a screened 
geography of suspicion’4 and ‘the feigned impression of an open world[.]’5 In a critical 
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article of the ‘homeland securitization of the war on terror’6, the trend towards the 
increasing use of military capabilities in the border security sector is not viewed positively: 
Here we see the targeting of markets and neighbourhoods by military 
hardware segueing into the targeting of people at border crossings and in 
the spaces of the airport.7 
Journalistic coverage has been even more critical. In support of his damning thesis on the 
emergence of the SIC, Hughes has identified the role that the US-owned company 
Raytheon has played in the UK Government’s border security strategy through the e-
borders scheme analysed in this chapter. For him, it is highly undesirable that the company 
‘worked hard to build more business in the “war on terror”’8 after 9/11; he attacks the 
Government for ‘being ready to be wooed by Raytheon, ignoring its murky past.’9 In border 
security, as in other areas of CT after 9/11, the so-called SIC is characterized by ‘a mixture 
of the sinister and the incompetent.’10 
If criticism has been directed towards security suppliers’ allegedly detrimental 
impact on the UK’s border security strategy after 9/11, the wider private sector’s 
involvement in this sector has surprisingly not attracted much scrutiny. Whilst Gregory’s 
major 2009 paper on UK border security recognises the ‘major role in border controls’11 
played by private operators within the transport sector (such as airports and airlines), for 
example, even his analysis on this aspect is limited to only a few paragraphs, and not in any 
depth around whether an SIC-type system has emerged; it is perhaps symptomatic of the 
fact that the business aspects of security are often presented as a secondary matter that a 
scholar who has covered the importance of the private sector’s contribution to CT 
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elsewhere12 declines to elaborate on this matter. Prior to this chapter, there has been a 
lack of research on the private sector’s involvement in contemporary UK border security. 
This chapter shows through its examination into the UK’s ‘e-Borders’ (i.e. 
‘electronic borders’) programme that the public-private interactions that exist around the 
UK’s border security strategy include, but are not limited to, those relating to the suppliers 
of technological or manpower-related capabilities. Border security, like other sub-sectors 
of CT, exhibits a multitude of public-private dynamics, the combination of which demand 
further analysis and scrutiny. Before examining the origins, characteristics and 
consequences of these relationships in more detail, the chapter introduces the policy and 
governance context for post-9/11 UK border security. 
4.1 Government policy approach and government arrangements 
Like the policy and governance arrangements presented in the previous chapter, the 
development of (and reform to) the UK’s border security arrangements after 9/11 were 
characterized by considerable complexity and significant change. Whilst this thesis is not 
concerned with any deeper causal factors for such changes outside its main focus on ‘the 
SIC’, it is important to briefly outline the broader context for the inquiry into how the 
private sector is involved in border security. 
Perhaps contrary to some perceptions, the Government’s aim to improve UK 
border security after 9/11 was not solely justified upon the basis of CT, as its policy 
documentation at the time (and coverage of it) makes clear. Makarenko has examined the 
connections made between asylum, immigration and security in the Government’s 2002 
White Paper, Secure Borders, and the ‘unprecedented debates’ that were emerging more 
widely around them; her analysis shows that, in addition to CT, the UK’s emerging border 
security strategy was also concerned with ‘reducing illegal people-trafficking’ and ‘to 
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prevent war criminals from entering the UK’.13 Furthermore, the Government’s five year 
strategy published in 2005, Controlling our Borders, addresses how it intended to ensure 
‘secure borders’ from the perspective of managing asylum and immigration, as the 
document’s subheading makes clear.14 Even where the document addresses ‘harder’ 
security issues, it is as much concerned with ‘tackling organised crime’, for example, as it is 
with terrorism. Indeed, the strategy clearly recognises the multi-faceted character of how 
border control would be managed; it expresses a clear desire ‘to implement a fully 
integrated control’15.  
It can be argued that as a result of 7/7 and the subsequent change in Home 
Secretary (from Charles Clarke to John Reid in May 2006), the Immigration and Nationality 
Directorate’s (IND) new White Paper of July 2006 placed a much greater emphasis on CT. 
That being said, the multi-dimensional character of what the Government sought to 
achieve through this border security strategy continued to be stressed; the Foreword to 
the document stated the rationale for the Government’s planned reforms to UK border 
management: 
Above all, we need a system which protects the security of this country, 
prevents abuse of our laws, is fair to lawful migrants and the British public, 
and in which people have confidence.16 
Examining the extent to which the Government’s multiple strategic objectives for border 
security helped or hindered its efforts to achieve its reforms is less important at this stage 
than recognizing how its overall approach for border security after 9/11 became both 
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broad in scope and connected to a wide range of contentious political issues. Like other 
sub-sectors of UK national security strategy, border security is characterized by complexity 
and relates to multiple policy objectives. 
If it would be wrong to characterize the Government’s emerging border security 
policy agenda as being solely concerned with CT, it would equally be misguided to deny the 
prominence with which it became a major driver for some of the UK’s border security 
reforms and projects after 9/11. At the legislative level, for example, a wide range of new 
domestic and European Union (EU) measures relating to cross-border transportation 
activity would be developed; controversial new international agreements were signed 
between the US and the EU, for example, on sharing passenger data information prior to 
travel. 
To deliver operational security objectives, some new technology-based border 
security programmes were initiated by the UK Government and reflect the growing 
emphasis on CT. For example, the creation of ‘Programme Cyclamen’ - a scheme 
introduced in 2002 ‘to deter or detect the illicit importation of radiological materials into 
the UK that could be used for terrorist purposes’17 - was developed within the bounds of 
CONTEST. Similarly, whilst it boasted application to wider priorities including immigration 
and efforts to tackle organised crime, the introduction of the UK’s e-Borders programme 
was (as shown below) mainly justified and developed on CT grounds. By contrast, some 
new border security programmes after 9/11 had nothing whatsoever to do with CT; it 
would be a stretch, for example, to claim that the introduction of a ‘points based system’ 
to manage the influx of skilled economic migrants was CT-related. The idea that the 
introduction of a proposed National Identity Card could ever be genuinely considered as a 
‘border security’ measure - a proposal that nevertheless at one stage was explicitly 
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connected to the UK’s border security arrangements18 - should also be treated with 
caution; the flexibility with which the Government sought to justify the scheme has already 
rightly been considered with scepticism.19 
Whatever exact proportion of the UK’s post-9/11 border security initiatives were 
CT-focused, an important point for this thesis is that much of the additional ‘border 
security’ investment after 9/11 - investment which would underpin the involvement of 
private security suppliers and other corporate entities - was primarily driven, and 
specifically justified by, the ‘new’ terrorism context. As this study seeks to cast new light on 
the origins, characteristics and the consequences of the private sector’s involvement in CT, 
the private sector’s involvement in post-9/11 UK border security is long overdue for further 
examination. 
If the UK’s border security policy priorities were extremely varied after 9/11, the 
character of the governance arrangements established to oversee them reflected the 
complexity in two main respects. Firstly, as micro-level examination of the e-Borders 
programme below shows, it is apparent that, like other sub-sectors of CT, the UK’s strategy 
for border security involves a multitude of both public and private sector entities. 
Regarding the first category, the Cabinet Office’s 2007 Review into the UK’s border 
arrangements is particularly revealing of the large number of  ‘relevant government 
organisations’ that are involved; this includes (amongst others) the Border and 
Immigration Agency, UKVisas, HM Revenue and Customs, and the Police.20 Secondly, whilst 
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the Home Office consistently ‘owned’ the overall policy lead in Government for border 
security after 9/11, like with ‘emergency preparedness’ there were also several important  
machinery of Government changes in this sector. The purpose of this section is not to 
examine these at length, but to highlight the level of flux in the system that provides 
essential context for analysis of the public-private dynamics therein.  
Most notable amongst the policy-level governance changes during this period were 
the transition of the Home Office’s IND into a new Border and Immigration Agency (BIA) in 
2007; the merger of the BIA and UKVisas into a single UK Border Agency (UKBA) in 2008; 
and, most recently, the split of the UKBA into ‘two separate operational units’ (UK Visas 
and Immigration, and Immigration Enforcement) in April 2013.21 Furthermore, new 
operational border security structures were also introduced to implement the 
Government’s new projects in this sector; the creation in January 2005 of the ‘Joint Border 
Operations Centre’ at Heathrow Airport to implement the pilot project for the e-Borders 
programme - the predecessor agency of the ‘National Border Targeting Centre’ 
organization that was itself only opened in March 201022 - was amongst the most 
substantial of these. Alongside these major, border security-specific governance changes, 
the dispersal after the 2010 General Election of the responsibilities of the UK’s 
Transportation Security and Contingencies Directorate known as ‘TRANSEC’ within the 
Department of Transport - both within the DFT and outside to the Civil Aviation Authority - 
was another major change. In short, whilst the volume of reform being made to UK border 
security was perhaps unsurprising in view of the highly politicized nature of this sector, the 
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governance of UK border security policy in the decade after 7/7 was characterized less by 
consolidation than change. 
One aspect of the Government’s border security approach has remained fairly 
consistent, however; its attitude towards working with the private sector to implement its 
objectives. At the policy level, there has been constant recognition, across political parties, 
of the need to cooperate closely with industry in this area. For example, the Foreword to 
the (then) New Labour Government’s border security strategy document, Securing the UK 
Border, could not have been clearer that the approach ‘requires co-ordinated support of 
government, international partners and industry to succeed.’23 Furthermore, whilst as this 
chapter shows the coalition Government elected in 2010 would take a quite different 
approach towards its suppliers, it also arguably equally looked upon ‘working with the 
private sector’ as an indispensable part of the strategy. As the Conservative Minister for 
Immigration outlined in March 2012, for example: 
Over the coming years we will work hard with European partners, carriers 
and trade groups to further extend e-borders coverage to provide a 
genuinely secure, fluid and complete e-border for the United Kingdom.24 
The need to involve the private sector in UK border security after 9/11 thus appears to 
have received a cross-party consensus, reflecting Gregory’s important (if not rather 
generalized) observation that border security ‘involves a mix of individual, public sector 
and private sector responsibilities.’25 As in the other sub-sectors of CONTEST, therefore, 
the governance arrangements for post-9/11 UK border security management have 
incorporated a diverse range of public-private interactions, at multiple levels. Analysis of 
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the origins and characteristics of such extensive corporate involvement is offered below; 
before then, an indication of expenditure in this sector is provided.  
4.2 Security Expenditure  
The frequency of the Governmental re-organizations indicated above presents challenges 
for measuring expenditure levels in ‘border security’ accurately; material contained within 
official documents nevertheless suggests that UK border security spending grew 
significantly after 9/11. Whilst no single, comprehensive or even consistent source of data 
covering a breakdown of all contemporary border security spending is available, this 
section illustrates both that a greater level of resources was allocated to UK border 
management throughout the 2000s, and that much of the ‘spike’ in additional overall CT 
spending after 9/11 can actually be attributed to this sector. 
To re-cap on the overall, direct impact of 9/11 on UK CT spending, the Government’s 2004 
‘pre-budget report’ states the change in priorities:  
Since 11 September 2001, the Government has given increased priority to 
improving the UK’s ability to respond to the terrorist threat. In total, 
annual spending on counterterrorism and resilience across departments 
will be over £2 billion in 2007-08, compared with £1.5 billion in 2004-05 
and less than £1 billion before 11 September 2001.26 
Whilst for operational reasons the exact breakdown of any funding devoted to border 
security initiatives after 9/11 may never be published, separate figures indicate how 
additional resources were allocated to border security. The full business case for the e-
borders project includes a number of pertinent figures as it explains the economic impact 
of 9/11 and 7/7, for example; the document explains that the aviation security measures 
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which followed the attack had been estimated at costing ‘upwards of $41bn’27 and that, in 
the UK, changes in the airport security regime ‘required the airport operator BAA to invest 
£7m in additional X-ray machines and metal detectors and to employ an additional 500 
security staff at an annual cost of £16m.’28  
Reinforcing the upward trajectory of these figures, a speech delivered by the 
author in 2009 provides a useful indication of the rising cost of aviation security measures 
after 9/11.29 It outlines how one airline operator, Virgin Atlantic, stated in response to a 
Parliamentary inquiry on transport security that following 9/11 European airlines and 
airports were paying out ‘€3 billion for additional anti-terrorist security measures imposed 
by EU governments’30. British Airways also stated in a written memorandum for the same 
inquiry that it was spending in excess of £100 million per annum on aviation security 
provision.31 The author also noted the following statistic: 
The European Commission recently quoted ACI-Europe figures which 
suggest that security costs now represent up to 35% of overall airport 
operating costs instead of 5% to 8% prior to the events of September 
2001.32  
Whilst these figures are obviously not comprehensive, they clearly illustrate the ‘direction 
of travel’ in the absence of available or comprehensive official statistics.  
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There is further evidence that post-9/11 UK Government spending on border 
management grew considerably; statistics on spending prior to 9/11 were made available 
in a 2001 report of the Parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) on ‘Border 
Control’. Located in the seventh annex of the document, the Government provided a 
breakdown of the funding that was allocated towards the UK Immigration Service (the 
operational arm of the then IND); this remained fairly consistent at between £86.1m and 
£99.65m in 1995-96 and 1999-00 respectively.33 In its 2005 report on the management of 
the UK’s Asylum Process, by contrast, the NAO outlined the 2003-04 budget of the IND, 
stating that ‘the Directorate spent £1.89 billion on its immigration and nationality 
operations’ in that year.34 By 2008-09 the annual budget of the (now renamed) UK Border 
Agency had grown to an even more striking £2.44bn.35 Expenditure on border security 
would only seem to begin to subside in real terms following the 2010 General Election; this 
reflected the coalition Government’s priority of reducing the public sector deficit, from 
which the Home Office would not be exempt. The UKBA’s most recent business plan 
explained that it ‘will be reducing the cost to the taxpayer (…) by up to 23 per cent over the 
next four years.’36 
A substantial proportion of the rising costs associated with border security is 
accounted for by the larger number of public officials employed to work on border and 
immigration, but several high profile border security projects also accounted for the 
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additional expenditure. For example, Programme Cyclamen - the project designed to 
screen material entering the UK border for illicit radiological substances - constituted a 
£100million, ten-year contract between the Home Office and the Serco Group.37 Even 
more significantly, the Government committed £1.3bn of public money over ten years 
towards the implementation of its high profile e-Borders programme. Whilst even this 
sizeable new programme pales in comparison to many contracts let by the MoD in the 
defence sector, this section has shown a general trend towards increasing levels of public 
sector expenditure on UK border security since 9/11. To explore the origins, character and 
the potential consequences of the public-private dynamics that have emerged in this 
context, the chapter turns to an examination of the e-Borders IT project - a project which 
prior to its cancellation represented the Home Office’s largest single procurement by a 
considerable margin.38  
4.3 Public-private security interactions 
As the involvement of the ‘wider business’ category of private sector entities introduced in 
Chapter 1 was found to be limited within the UK border security arena, this section has 
selected to focus its micro-level analysis on the ‘supply’ and ‘operational’ public-private 
dynamics which arose in the context of the Home Office’s largest single CT-related security 
contract after 9/11. The section supports the main argument of this thesis; the e-Borders IT 
contract proves that whilst existing presentations of ‘the SIC’ may be seductive, they do 
not fully explain the complexity of the public-private dynamics at play; the private sector’s 
involvement in within the ‘wider security’ arena is more complex than has hitherto been 
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understood. Furthermore, the serious (and costly) difficulties that arose with the contract 
resemble something much more like a blunder than a conspiracy of the type often 
presented as being associated with ‘the SIC’. 
Part of the reason for this complexity may be the dependence that Government 
has on the private sector to deliver the security technology it needs. As noted above, 
technology has become increasingly relied upon in the UK Government’s border security 
strategy; this attitude is captured from the outset of its 2007 White Paper, Securing the UK 
Border. Having recognised (and criticized) the limits of the ‘twentieth century concept’ of ‘a 
single, staffed physical frontier, where travellers show paper-based identity documents’, 
the document states the following vision: 
We believe a new doctrine is demanded, where controls begin off-shore 
and where we use information, intelligence and identity systems to allow 
scrutiny at key checkpoints on the journey to and from the UK.39 
Whilst the use of hi-tech systems for border security has not been universally embraced40, 
it is now in large part the private sector, not Government, who develops the security 
capabilities used in this sector. This was apparent in the most complex UK border security 
project ever to be developed by the UK Government. 
Case Study: e-Borders 
No serious appraisal of the Home Office’s ‘e-Borders’ programme would claim that it 
resembled anything like a model of best practice in project management. On the contrary, 
unflattering depictions of the project have appeared regularly; one IT industry media 
commentator has referred to the scheme as ‘a public policy failing reminiscent of Margaret 
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Thatcher’s poll tax’41, for example, whilst the Parliamentary committee responsible for its 
oversight, the HASC, has described e-Borders as a ‘lamentable saga’.42 
Several headline points indicate why the project has been, and continues to be 
viewed so negatively. In August 2014, after almost four years of a behind-closed-doors 
arbitration procedure between the UK Home Office and its prime contractor Raytheon 
Systems (following the former’s sacking of the company in 2010), the Government’s 
decision was judged to be illegal and so ordered to pay £224m to the company.43 In the 
meantime, as a result of the contract termination, the UK’s border security strategy 
currently relies on technology that was developed a decade ago for the pilot project 
(‘Semaphore’) pre-dating e-Borders. Whilst a report by the UK’s independent chief 
inspector of borders and immigration has recognised that e-Borders had delivered 
‘significant benefits for the police’44 - thus suggesting that the ferocity of the criticism 
levelled against the project may be over-exaggerated - the implementation of the flagship 
post-9/11 border security programme was beset by difficulties, as the remainder of this 
chapter shows. Before exploring the origins and characteristics of e-Borders, and any role 
that ‘an SIC’ may have played in its instigation and demise, an analysis is presented of the 
context and original purpose of the now much-maligned programme. 
It is noteworthy that, shortly prior to 9/11, the HASC lamented the lack of ‘a single 
computer system’ across different border security agencies. One section of a HASC report 
devoted to ‘Information Technology’ recommended: 
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The lack of sufficient information and communications technology in the 
Immigration Service should be addressed urgently. The under-investment 
in such technology has undoubtedly caused difficulties in maintaining 
effective border controls.45 
Whilst in its response at that time the Government did not appear to believe that 
wholesale reform or the development of a specific new programme such as e-Borders 
would be needed, it explicitly recognised ‘the need for effective use of information and 
communication technology in the Immigration Service’46. As shown below, the e-Borders 
Business Case would invoke in its justification for the project the need for greater 
integration amongst border agencies, and in particular their handling of intelligence 
information, though an advanced IT solution. Before then, we can say that, prior to 9/11, 
an argument was already emerging that new technological solutions would be needed to 
manage the UK border more effectively.  
That CT was used as a specific justification for the development of the e-Borders 
programme is clear, however. Amoore has correctly contextualized the development of 
the programme within the context of the ‘War on Terror’47, and, more recently, Dibb et al. 
have argued in their valuable research on the effect of the project on the aviation sector 
that e-Borders should itself be seen as a ‘counter-terrorism initiative’48. Considering e-
Borders as being intimately connected to the CT agenda is supported by data arising from 
interviews and the Government’s own business case for e-Borders. According to a former 
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Raytheon employee involved in the company’s bid to manage the programme, e-Borders 
was ‘a fairly pivotal, large scale national security programme.’49 Brading continued: 
And it was touted very much as national security. It wasn’t about human 
immigration, organised crime really. It was really focused on CONTEST.50 
The stated purpose and objectives of the programme within the Full Business Case for e-
Borders supports this notion; whilst it also aimed to realize other benefits such as greater 
efficiency and integration amongst immigration agencies, it was principally designed for, 
and driven in substantial part by, the need to fulfil the Government’s CT objectives. Indeed, 
the document includes multiple references to the programme’s direct, central connection 
to CONTEST; its introduction explicitly states that ‘[e]ffective border security is critical to 
the counter-terrorism effort.’51 Furthermore, the listed advantage of e-Borders given most 
prominence in the presentation of a ‘benefits’ section within the Business Case is ‘national 
security’. Paragraph 2.4.3.2 of the document states: 
e-Borders will improve security by providing the security and intelligence 
agencies with the ability to identify, track and analyse the activities of 
potential terrorists and other national security targets across the border, 
prevent them travelling, or intervening where appropriate.52 
A further indication of e-Borders’s CT-focus is found within the ‘economic appraisal’ 
contained in the Business Case. Whilst alongside the growing emphasis within the research 
community on the need to apply cost-benefit analysis methodology to CT spending53 there 
has been a greater emphasis in Government to ensure that any new procurement 
programmes achieve ‘value for money’, any potential economic benefits to be had from e-
Borders obviously took on a secondary importance. The document actually even declined 
to complete a ‘quantification in monetary terms of as many of the costs and benefits as 
feasible’, arguing: 
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In this case, however, given that the key benefits relate to enhancing 
national security and operational effectiveness, it is not possible to 
quantify a financial value for these directly[.]54  
Whilst a brief, broad estimation of the costs of e-Borders was made within the document, 
these would increase dramatically over the course of the project’s lifecycle. Whether the 
absence of earlier, more detailed thinking on the realistic costs of e-Borders contributed to 
the failure of the contract - or whether they may have been the result of more complex 
factors and/or potentially dubious motivations - are important considerations. 
If the renewed focus on CT informed e-Borders’ development, and helps to explain 
its justification, what comprised the programme’s main elements? Helpfully, its technical 
components have been outlined within several documents covering the project; its basic 
motivation was, in the words of the independent reviewer of UK border security, to 
develop ‘…a programme of work designed to deliver a modernized immigration control 
that would be more effective, efficient and secure.’55 To achieve this, the purpose of the 
programme was, according to the HASC: 
The e-Borders programme provides for electronic collection and analysis of 
information on all passengers entering or leaving the UK from carriers 
(including airlines, ferries and rail companies).56 
According to the Government’s March 2007 White Paper, Securing the UK Border, the 
aspiration was to establish a ‘new offshore border control’ through technological means57. 
The following procedures would enable this: 
The process will involve carriers sending us passport data prior to travel, 
both inbound and outbound. The data will be analysed (…) and alerts will 
be issued to the partner agencies on individuals of interest.58 
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In effect, the Government planned to introduce a system capable of collecting a large 
amount of passenger data, in advance of their journeys to and from the UK, sourced via 
third-party transport operators who would be required to provide it, and subject such data 
to analysis and comparison with various security-related databases. A briefing paper by the 
UK Parliament’s Research Library neatly summarizes how the data would be handled:  
Once a passenger checks in, their data will be sent electronically to an e-
Borders operations centre and will be compared to information held on 
databases there. Decisions will be made against determined criteria and, if 
necessary, the carrier (the airline, for example) will be alerted that some 
kind of intervention is needed.59 
In such a way the UK Government would be able to ‘export the border’, at least in theory, a 
proposition the 2009 report by John Vine on e-Borders would later examine. 
According to the original proposal, the timescale for delivery would be aggressive; 
e-Borders’ Business Case included a ‘Delivery timeline’ which stated that 95% of 
international passenger and crew details would be collected and checked by December 
2010, and that ‘Full Operating Capability’ would be reached by March 2014.60 
Unfortunately, the proposed timescale suffered from considerable delays and became 
increasingly politicized. In October 2013, for example, a significant controversy emerged 
around the failure to implement e-Borders fully; the Government was criticized when the 
Vine Report reported that only 65% of total passenger movements into the UK were 
actually being covered. This resulted in the then Immigration Minister seeking to reassure 
the public, explaining on BBC television that ‘…everybody that turns up in Britain is of 
course checked at the border.’61 In the Government’s attempts to contain the political fall-
out of the delays in the programme, the fact that one of the main aims of the e-Borders 
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programme was to ‘export the border’ seemed to have been at least temporarily 
forgotten. 
It is worth briefly comparing and contrasting several additional key characteristics 
of e-Borders with the previous chapter’s FiReControl case study, lest it appear that the 
thesis is covering identical ground. Firstly, it can be observed that, in addition to their CT 
justifications, both programmes incorporated significant IT components for which, in both 
cases, the Government decided to appoint an industrial ‘prime contractor’ to deliver the 
work. Secondly, it was shown how the (estimated and actual) costs of FiReControl grew 
substantially over the lifecycle of the project; the same can be said of e-Borders. The 
original Business Case’s only attempt at a financial assessment estimated that ‘…the net 
additional cost to Government of e-Borders in the region of £382m’62 whereas, in the 
event, the cost breakdown for e-Borders within the period 2007/08 to 2013/14 alone was 
£472m.63 That the Government stated that it anticipated the programme to cost an 
additional £655m between 2015/16 and 2021/2264, and the HASC has referred to e-
Borders as having lifetime costs of £1.3bn65, might lead us to naturally question how and 
why the original assessment was determined. Finally, whilst the FiReControl project was 
scrapped in its entirely, and at least some parts of e-Borders continue to be pursued at the 
time of writing (albeit under a different name), both contracts were cancelled by the 
coalition Government not long after its formation in 2010. The previous chapter explored 
its perceived motivations for doing so with FiReControl; with regards to e-Borders, the 
Government similarly announced on 22 July 2010 that contract was terminated because 
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‘…the Home Secretary has no confidence in the prime supplier of the e-borders contract, 
Raytheon, which since July 2009 has been in breach of contract.’66 
The two projects differed in important respects, however, and a failure to take 
these into account might create the mistaken impression that the problems they 
encountered were identical. Firstly, whilst FiReControl and e-Borders were both 
undeniably UK ‘security’ programmes, it should be noted that their ‘host’ Government 
departments were different ones entirely; DCLG was responsible for the former, whilst it 
was the Home Office (and in particular the UKBA within its purview) that developed e-
Borders. The consequences of what many interviewees described as a ‘diverse’ security 
sector are revisited in later chapters; suffice to say here that, unlike in defence, these 
examples illustrate how no single ministry has been responsible for all CT-related public 
sector procurement projects after 9/11. Secondly, whereas in the case of FiReControl the 
business case and the decision to proceed with the project were allowed to develop out of 
sequence, the programme management and ‘sign-off’ for e-Borders was much more 
orderly; crucially, the Business Case for the project was completed before any contracts 
were issued. Furthermore, prior to the appointment of Raytheon Systems in December 
200767, it has been revealed that no less than five official OGC ‘Gateway Reviews’ were 
completed.68 It was notwithstanding the adoption of this more sensible approach to 
managing major public sector projects that considerable difficulties emerged. Finally, in so 
far as delivering the projects was concerned, each consisted of a very different set of 
(public and private sector) stakeholders. Whilst in both cases the Government engaged a 
private company to supply the IT components of the project - and both were well known 
companies possessing a longstanding record of operating in defence - they relied on very 
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different external actors for their successful implementation. In the case of FiReControl, 
serious difficulties emerged as a result of the main ‘end user’ constituency not being 
sufficiently engaged in the project. In the case of e-Borders, by contrast, it would be 
private companies - transport operators such as airlines and ferry companies - upon whom 
the Government would rely for interacting with its prime contractor, and indeed 
programme delivery. This crucial difference reflects the varying character and operation of 
the different sub-sectors that comprise the CT sector; these important differences do not 
exist to the same extent within the military sector, thus reinforcing the notion that the 
character of the ‘industrial complex’ in the CT aspects of UK national security strategy is of 
a very different order. 
A deeper examination into the development of e-Borders and its difficulties helps 
to reveal the character of the sector’s public-private dynamics, and their impact. 
Notwithstanding the publication of the Government’s account of the proceedings relating 
to the concluded arbitration process69, however, there remains a degree of secrecy around 
the dispute that took place between the Home Office and Raytheon, presenting challenges 
for analysis. Nevertheless, this thesis has benefitted from the recent publication of several 
reports on e-Borders, and conversations with interviewees who were willing to provide 
data under the condition of anonymity.   
On the surface, Raytheon was sacked as the prime contractor for e-Borders 
because it was considered by the Government to be in ‘breach of contract’; a written 
statement by the then Minister for Immigration detailed the position: 
Over recent weeks we have been examining the progress of the [e-
Borders] programme and it has been extremely disappointing. While some 
elements have been delivered, they have not been delivered on time. 
Delivery on the next critical parts of the programme are already running at 
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least 12 months late. On top of this there remain risks of further delays, 
and there is no confidence in the current prime contractor – Raytheon 
Systems Limited – being able to address this situation.70 
Against this backdrop, the Government held that it was because ‘the supplier's 
performance to date has not been compliant with their contractual obligations’71 that it 
was relieved of its duties; implicit in this position is the suggestion that no other factors 
played a significant part. Clearly, the court disagreed with this particular viewpoint in its 
August 2014 ruling. 
Several additional issues appear to have contributed to e-Borders’ delivery 
problems, despite the Government’s insistence that its former prime contractor was to 
blame. Most significantly, a substantial legal question arose around the extent to which the 
Home Office was actually ever authorized to collect data on passengers travelling to and 
from the UK within the EU; a serious doubt emerged in 2009 that e-Borders actually 
violated EU rules.72 The fact that consideration of the implications of the EU’s underlying 
principle of free movement was overlooked by those in Government responsible for 
designing the project was noted in the Vine Report: 
A significant barrier to the achievement of the e-Borders data collection 
targets was the view taken by the European Commission that it was 
incompatible with EU free movement rights to impose a mandatory 
requirement on EEA nationals and family members to provide passenger 
data to e-Borders in advance of travel.73 
The Vine Report was not alone in criticizing the failure to identify the risks associated with 
the scheme’s compatibility with EU rules on free movement and wider data protection 
procedures; the HASC concluded earlier that the e-Borders programme ‘is (…) likely to be 
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illegal under the EU Treaty.’74 Additionally, one commentator pondered; ‘…how did anyone 
ever think e-Borders within Europe would be acceptable or legal?’75 The author would then 
question the commercial suppliers’ role in this major oversight:  
…we deserve to know if anyone in Trusted Borders, the commercial 
consortium contracted to implement the scheme, at a cost of £1.2bn, 
sounded a warning. (…) These firms were specifically charged to “work as 
an open, honest and collaborative team”. Did none of this open honesty 
involve pointing out that e-Borders within Europe risked being unworkable 
and illegal?76 
Whilst Cross poses an interesting question, the problem with this argument is that it 
overlooks how the e-Borders Full Business Case correctly placed a strong emphasis on the 
role that Government, not the supplier, would have to play as an ‘Intelligent customer’77. 
Whilst it would clearly have an operational impact, the matter of weighing up the effects of 
EU legislation on any major UK programme such as e-Borders must be seen as 
fundamentally a policy consideration. In this case, the Business Case did not include such 
an assessment at the same time as arguing that one of the responsibilities of the 
Government would be to ‘Provide overall strategy formulation, policy and standard-setting 
to the Service Provider.’78 Furthermore, it is important to ask - in the context of this thesis’s 
interest in the potential impact of ‘the SIC’ on national security strategy - whether it would 
ever be desirable to hand the responsibility for determining such policy matters to profit-
making security suppliers. Unfortunately in this case, the (ultimately costly) risks associated 
with e-Borders’s compatibility with EU law appear to have been completely overlooked; 
this should be seen as primarily an oversight arising from Government, not any company. 
A second issue that obviously contributed to e-Borders’ failure was the quality and 
effectiveness of the programme’s engagement with the travel industry; a constituency 
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whose support, in the words of the project’s original Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) 
within the Foreword to the e-Borders business case, ‘…is crucial to the successful delivery 
of the project.’79 It is important to recognise that, in the recent history of the UK’s strategy 
to improve border control, e-Borders would not be the first time where the Government’s 
record on engaging private sector stakeholders effectively would be questioned; the 
HASC’s 2001 report into Border Controls included, for example, the observation that ‘Port 
operators and carriers have told us that they are not consulted sufficiently by the border 
agencies.’80 However, an even weaker approach to ‘industry engagement’ appears to have 
developed on e-Borders. Whilst there is a suggestion that some parts of the travel industry 
were consulted even before the contract was let - the Business Case states that ‘the 
Programme is now involved in a series of workshops designed to explore and resolve 
specific issues and concerns’ and that ‘Engagement with carriers and ports will continue 
throughout the implementation’81 - it has become apparent that, whether deliberately or 
inadvertently, some travel sectors were not engaged effectively in the consultation 
process. The HASC’s 2009 report on e-Border is particularly illuminating in this regard; 
within a 12-page section titled ‘Problems faced by carriers’ the Committee highlights that 
whilst ‘the maritime sector was engaged in discussions at an early stage of the process’, an 
unfortunate situation emerged where; 
…the overwhelming sense we received from our maritime witnesses was 
that, far from laying strong foundations on which they would be able 
quickly to build a practical system, the talks had made little progress and, 
indeed, had in some respects gone backwards.82 
The question of whether some commercial travel companies (or even sectors) may have 
resisted, or perhaps sought to limit, the additional requirements arising from e-Borders is 
important and one that may have played into this sentiment. However, the sense of a lack 
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of effective consultation and engagement is supported by the 2013 Vine Report; this listed 
‘the lack of alignment between the e-Borders and the business models employed in the 
maritime and rail sectors’83 as one of three main issues listed within a section titled 
‘Barriers to achievement of data collection targets’84. Whereas some innovative models of 
engagement were developed in particular with the aviation sector - the HASC identifies 
that this sector’s involvement extended ‘even to the point of being included in meetings 
with prospective suppliers as part of the procurement process’85 - it cannot be said that 
this was replicated across the entire travel industry. This appears to be a significant failure 
in project design, particularly in view of e-Borders’ inevitably heavy dependence on these 
industries.  
Whilst this thesis is reluctant to engage in any ‘blame game’ type of discussion, this 
shortcoming in ‘industry engagement’ inevitably invites the question as to who was (or 
indeed should have been) responsible for engaging the travel industry; the Government or 
its prime contractor? Whilst the actual contract signed between the Government and the 
Raytheon-led Trusted Borders consortium is not publicly available - thus the contractually-
agreed separation of responsibilities cannot be validated - the Business Case for e-Borders 
clearly identifies both how the obvious complexities around this particular issue were 
recognised at an early stage, and how the Government envisaged they would be managed. 
Indeed, it is striking to see a caveat contained within one of the ‘responsibilities’ falling 
upon the supplier in the ‘commercial approach’ section of the document; ‘The Service 
Provider will be responsible for ensuring that carriers provide data to e-Borders (subject to 
certain limits)[.]’86 Indeed, such was the recognition that ‘certain limits’ existed around 
ensuring the participation of the travel operators that the Business case also establishes a 
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three-stage process to be followed ‘if carriers and ports refuse to work with the Service 
Provider’87. In short, the dedicated process allowed the Service Provider to inform the 
UKBA around incidences of non-compliance on the part of an operator, opening the 
possibility that, subject to the implementation of an agreed ‘industry stakeholder action 
plan’, it may be ‘given relief/compensation (as appropriate) from its obligations under the 
contract.’88  
Whilst judging by the Business Case the primary operational responsibility would 
therefore appear to have been placed on the Service Provider for acquiring data from the 
travel operators, it can now be asked whether what seems to have been such a ‘hands off’ 
strategy on the part of the Government was sensible in view of the large number of 
transport operators that had to be engaged. Asked whether the requirement upon 
Raytheon to engage with such a multiplicity of private transport operators contributed to 
the difficulties that ultimately developed, one former employee of Raytheon responded: 
Yes, it has an enormous impact that a lot of the stakeholders, who are not 
paying for the programme, are private individuals or private industries.89 
Revealingly, a separate conversation held on the condition of anonymity with an industry 
executive with knowledge of Raytheon’s contract questioned the effectiveness of how the 
transport sector engaged on e-Borders, suggesting a lack of enthusiasm to participate 
contributed in the difficulties; ‘of course you’re going to stand up and say “count me out, 
I’m not being part of this because it’s too bloody complicated, it’s going to cost me 
money.”’90 The same executive offered a view of the dynamics that developed between 
the Government, Raytheon and the operators as follows: 
…we were in no position to control a third party. We had no leverage over 
them whatsoever. We couldn’t negotiate. They held all the cards. We had 
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to rely on the government to do something for us, and the government 
were; ‘not our problem, it’s your risk’. So it does complicate things when 
you… when the risk is in your area… is an area that you can’t control.91 
The notion that private sector operators might be hesitant to pay additional costs arising 
from a new security programme like e-Borders is not new and has been identified 
elsewhere92; indeed this ever-present, thorny issue appears to have been recognised from 
the outset of this project. In hindsight, it is obvious that a contractor like Raytheon might 
find it difficult to obtain data from private transport operators. Processes may have existed 
on paper to tackle any arising issues, but the events that transpired suggest that it is 
doubtful whether the overall (policy) framework for engaging end-users - a framework 
which was designed and ‘owned’ by the Government - was ever sufficiently robust in its 
approach towards ensuring effective ‘industry cooperation’. 
Whilst in contractual terms the emphasis might have been upon Raytheon to 
collect the desired passenger data from transport operators, and thus the ‘risk’ lay with the 
company if things went wrong, it is clear that the Government had a clear stake in the 
outcome of the company’s endeavors; not least from a security perspective. Furthermore, 
the e-Borders Full Business Case states the need for a shared approach to be maintained in 
the development of e-Borders, including in the specific area of stakeholder engagement, 
both within and outside Government:  
The Service Provider will be fully involved with the programme in the joint 
management and governance arrangements both with agencies and with 
carriers and ports.93 
Unfortunately, events clearly indicate that cooperation between the Government and 
Raytheon on engaging the transport industry completely fell apart. It may be some time 
before details of the most contentious issues arising from the arbitration procedure are 
revealed but, in light of the available evidence, it would be extremely surprising if a 
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disagreement over responsibilities in this area was not one of them. It is clearer that the 
relationship between the Government and Raytheon suffered particularly in respect to 
how the project should be managed. As an unnamed industry official apparently associated 
with one of the companies within the Trusted Borders consortium relayed to the Financial 
Times upon the cancellation of the project; ‘This is about a falling-out between Raytheon 
and the Home Office and about project management.’94 
Finally, it is now evident, following the arbitration ruling, that the Government’s 
case for sacking Raytheon was not as clear cut as its statements at the time of the contract 
termination suggested. Interestingly, in advance of the decision, the delay on the ruling 
was lamented by both the Home Office and the HASC; when asked about the anticipated 
date of the legal judgment on e-Borders, the Permanent Secretary at the Home Office 
stated; ‘To my frustration, I don’t know when we can expect a decision’95. In response, the 
HASC concluded in no uncertain terms: 
We are appalled at the handling of this matter post-termination of the 
contract; and that 3½ years later it is still not resolved. Neither the 
company nor the Government are in a position to explain more. The 
confidentiality means we do not known [sic.] what went wrong and are 
losing the opportunity to ensure this does not happen again. To avoid 
conspiracy theories there has to be full transparency and lessons need to 
be learnt.96 
The considerable length of the process does appear to be unusual; the website of the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) - the institution tasked with handling the 
e-Borders case - states that; 
…around half of all cases referred to the LCIA that run their course from 
Request for Arbitration to Final Award are typically concluded in 12 
months or less, and more than three quarters in 18 months or less.97 
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Whilst the precise causes of the delay can only be speculated upon, it can be observed that 
Raytheon always strongly contested the Government’s suggestion; a letter submitted to 
the HASC in August 2011 by the UK CEO of Raytheon, Robert Delorge, read as follows; 
…our contract was terminated by the Home Secretary in July 2010 on the 
grounds that Raytheon was allegedly in material default of its contractual 
obligations. We vigorously refute that contention. We maintain that the 
purported termination was unlawful and that Raytheon is entitled to 
recover substantial damages for wrongful termination.98 
One industry figure with a close understanding of the dispute suggested on the condition 
of anonymity that any impression that the company should be held entirely to blame for 
the difficulties encountered would be incorrect. Reflecting on the findings of the October 
2013 Vine report, the individual stated: ‘It was a wonderful statement of Raytheon’s 
case.’99 It is now clear that Raytheon was not judged to be entirely at fault for the events 
which led to the Government’s decision to terminate its e-Borders IT contract; it is also 
now apparent that factors other than any sinister motivations on the part of ‘the SIC’ 
contributed towards the whole affair.  
What weight might be assigned, in considering both the project and the difficulties 
that transpired, to the strength of any influence exerted by those private sector companies 
who were involved in the project, and/or any alliance they may have formed with the 
public officials overseeing the programme? In particular, was there any evidence of a 
dynamic within the system towards overstating the necessary requirements - the practice 
known in the sector as ‘gold-plating’ - as it has been suggested occurs in the defence 
sector? Whilst in its 2009 report on e-Borders the HASC suggested that the significant 
number of changes in senior staff at the UKBA over the lifecycle of the programme could 
‘…have led to the perception that UKBA had been ‘captured’ by its chosen provider and 
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lost sight of what was reasonable and practicable’100, there appears to be no specific 
evidence of any occurrence of impropriety. Indeed the impression left is extremely far 
from the notion that some form of ‘cosy conspiracy’ was in operation; the UKBA and 
Raytheon appear to have been at complete loggerheads with each other. According to 
Raytheon’s CEO, for example, ‘…the Government’s targets and objectives changed 
repeatedly throughout the course of the Programme.’101 Even if the Government was 
consistent that it was Raytheon who was in breach of contract, this point is validated 
through the Minister for Immigration’s statement that ‘[t]here were 58 changes to the 
specifications for the contract’102. 
Furthermore, it would be fanciful to suggest that Raytheon deliberately entered 
into the IT contract with a view to ultimately seeking a substantial financial return gained 
through a legal challenge - one ultimately based on an argument of loss of earnings, having 
been sacked from the project. Having said this, it is hardly surprising that the outcome 
whereby a contractor receives substantial payment (paid for by the taxpayer) for work not 
completed might raise some criticism, if not outright suspicion. It is to be hoped that the 
Government’s commitment to share with Parliament ‘much fuller detail once the case has 
concluded’103 is upheld. Before then, as noted above, the lack of transparency around the 
e-Borders arbitration process is worrisome. That the LCIA is transparent about the rules it 
sets for confidentiality in its arbitration proceedings104 is of little consolation to analysts 
and researchers of e-Borders, not to mention the wider public. It could also be enormously 
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problematic - not least for all parties’ reputations - if it was decided that this type of 
process should be routinely pursued in the future. As the HASC has astutely noted, a lack 
of transparency does nothing to dissuade the development of conspiracy theories in this 
area.105 
It has also become apparent that, in addition to Raytheon’s own remuneration, a 
significant amount of public expenditure was allocated to various consultancy firms for the 
work they conducted on e-Borders. A response to a Parliamentary question has clarified, 
for example, that, between 2006-07 and the first three months of 2010-11, the cost of 
consultants and independent contractors to the e-Borders programme was £45.1m.106 
Whilst there is no suggestion of any untoward behavior being conducted by such firms in 
the case of e-Borders, it can be noted that, like FiReControl, the provision of such expertise 
did not succeed in averting the cancellation of what has been cited as an important 
Government contract. Whilst there would not appear to have been the level of ‘bad blood’ 
that existed between consultants and the prime contractor on FiReControl - with e-Borders 
the most serious antipathy appears to have been reserved for the Home Office-Raytheon 
relationship - we can question whether it is appropriate that upwards of £40m taxpayers’ 
money was spent on employing ‘experts’ that ultimately failed to prevent a contract 
cancellation.  
Finally, as noted above, the success of the e-Borders IT contract relied on the 
provision of passenger data by the transport industry. In this context, it is important not to 
overlook how schemes such as e-Borders might be affected by the commercial interests of 
such operators, and the role that new Government requirements may play in influencing 
their behaviour. Recent research by Dibb et. al. has expertly examined these under-
                                                          
105
 HASC, ‘The work of the Permanent Secretary’, p.7 
106
 Hansard, Damian Green, Parliamentary Question Reply, 15 Sep 2010 : Column 1074W, Via: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm100915/text/100915w0002.ht





researched interactions; usefully specifically in the case of e-Borders. Importantly, their 
article provides an assessment of the potential impact that Government regulation may 
have (or be seen to have) on the commercial interests of the carriers: 
For carriers, e-borders has the potential to threaten these interests 
because of the operational costs involved in implementing the initiative 
and its potential to damage customer relationships.107 
The findings of their research - drawn from 24 original semi-structured interviews - 
supports the damaging evidence provided by transport operators to the Parliamentary 
inquiries referred to above, and casts new light on how transport operators considered e-
Borders negatively. Additionally, it further questions the effectiveness of engagement that 
was established with them. In a striking statement relating to the premise of the whole 
scheme, the authors conclude: 
Compliance with e-Borders was seen as conflicting with the commercial 
interests of travel firms due to the costs and other resources involved, 
disruption caused to existing operations and ways of working, and 
negative effects on customers and on service quality.108 
That Raytheon might struggle to overcome the (commercially-driven) resistance inherent 
in the above conclusion should, perhaps, not be very surprising; it can be noted in our 
analysis of the contemporary characteristics of the industrial-complex within the CT sector, 
however, that this dynamic does not exist in the defence sector. Furthermore, according to 
one industry executive, the secondary legislation that was designed and put in place to 
ensure that the carriers complied with the service provider’s requests for data ‘just didn’t 
cut it’109. A failure on the part of Raytheon to fully appreciate the constraints that would 
arise from this dynamic - the natural logic of private operators’ clear desire to protect their 
own commercial interests - was considered as being  part of Raytheon’s ‘naivety’.110 One of 
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the consequences of this case, revisited in the concluding chapter, is that Government and 
its suppliers must do more to take account of such interests in the future. 
Before then, it is worth noting that Dibb et. al. raise further questions about the 
quality of the Government’s industrial engagement on e-Borders. They conclude that ‘[i]n 
general, there was a feeling among respondents that the government had not taken into 
account how the industry already worked’111, citing the response of one airline 
representative as follows: 
They were having conversations with system suppliers rather than carriers. 
The obligation falls on the carrier but the system supplier had to do the 
development work.112 
That the Government focused on ‘getting its own house in order’ - seeing its role primarily 
as a coordinator of the multiple government agencies involved in e-Borders - and that, 
ultimately, it appeared to rely on its supplier to engage with operational side of industry 
(laden with its own commercial interests) is clearly evident from the Full Business Case. In 
a striking indication of the lack of the imagination it exhibited to the question of how to 
structure public-private cooperation around e-Borders effectively, neither ‘Carriers and 
Ports’ nor the ‘Travel Industry’ were even included as a ‘main partner’ of the programme in 
the Government’s identified list of ‘Key stakeholders’113. Furthermore, a diagram contained 
within the Business Case to illustrate the process of obtaining data from carriers is 
extremely simplistic and arguably indicative of the Government’s complete lack of interest 
in how the data would be collected. The diagram below presents the image of data flowing 
naturally in and out of a central hub: 
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Whilst this approach was possibly convincing on paper at the time, it is now doubtful that 
the flow of data could ever have been so straightforward; particularly given the reality of 
the complex governance structure and public-private dynamics analysed above. 
4.4 Character and impact of the industrial-complex in Border Security 
The Government’s approach to industrial engagement on e-Borders reflects a lack of an 
appreciation on the part of policy-makers that, under the commercial structure that was 
selected, a key requisite for e-Border’s success would always have been the effective 
engagement by its contracted security supplier of the operational side of industry; ideally 
all under the watchful eye of an ‘Intelligent customer’. As addressed in the concluding 
chapter, the e-Borders case-study appears to show that there is an unfortunate lack of an 
appreciation - perhaps even a worrying disinterest - in Government around the difficulties 
associated with reconciling the conflicting commercial interests that exist. How to 
structure the engagement between the supply and operational sides of industry, and 
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define Government’s vital role therein, becomes an absolutely core consideration in this 
context; regrettably, in the case of e-Borders, it appears that it was not seen as such. 
As we saw with FiReControl, the IT contract for e-Borders developed serious 
difficulties and, following the Government’s sacking of its prime contractor, Raytheon, 
became widely seen as nothing short of a disaster. Several factors have been offered as 
potential contributors to the difficulties that emerged in the programme; the secretive 
nature of the arbitration procedure between the Government and Raytheon means it is 
still not yet known what exactly transpired. Nevertheless, it is now clear that the 
Government’s argument that Raytheon was the main (if not sole) cause of the difficulties 
did not stand up to scrutiny. 
The e-Borders case study also usefully illustrates the existence of at least two 
different sets of commercial outlooks in the UK’s border security sector; the chapter has 
shown how the interests of ‘suppliers’ and private sector ‘operators’ do not always 
perfectly align with each other. Thus the commercial dynamics within this CT sub-sector 
are varied, and can approach each other from opposite sides of the profit-making 
spectrum. The extent to which any non-alignment of such interests means that a 
potentially corrosive ‘industrial-complex’ of the sort we have considered in past can ever 
materialize therefore needs serious consideration.  
Whilst Raytheon and some consultancies did benefit financially from e-Borders, 
the case-study suggests that, in the UK’s border security sector, the idea that the MIC has 
transferred into the security sector is an over-simplification; the reality is that - at least in 
the final few years of the contract - the Government embarked upon a serious (and costly) 
legal dispute with its prime contractor, challenging the idea that a similar ‘confluence’ of 
strategic interests is at play in CT. Instead, it is apparent that the Government actually 





respect of how the transport operators upon whom the whole programme evidently relied 
were integrated. Regarding its relationship with Raytheon, the Government’s engagement 
with the company became extremely acrimonious and did not resemble the dynamics that 
critics have argued characterize ‘the SIC’. 
Ultimately, the unhappy experience of the e-Borders IT contract shows that the 
question of how Government should structure public-private cooperation more effectively 
must be addressed. The chapter suggests that on e-Borders, as with other large-scale IT 
projects such as FiReControl, the Government failed to engage the private sector properly 
on this matter. We shall encounter similar dynamics in the next chapter covering the 



















Chapter 5: Olympic Security 
Introduction  
Securing the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (London 2012) was always going 
to be a significant challenge for the UK. Prior to the successful passing of the Games 
themselves, it had long been recognised that more would be expected of London 2012 in 
security terms than any previous Olympics1 and that the security for major events had 
become a ‘spectacle’.2 Even before 7/7 - an attack which occurred the day after London 
won its bid thus creating an association between the Games and the potential for 
insecurity3 - the level of public interest in the plans for London 2012 promised to be 
substantial. As the British Prime Minister stated in his 2012 ‘New Year’s message’; ‘This will 
be the year Britain sees the world and the world sees Britain.’4 
This was the context for the British coalition Government’s then Defence 
Secretary, Philip Hammond, to announce on 15 December 2011 that he expected 13,500 
military personnel to be deployed in support of the London 2012 security operation5, thus 
reminding observers that ‘government’s provision of manpower from the armed forces 
and the police remains integral to securing most recent Games.’6 Such an extensive use of 
military assets would be enhanced even further. On 12 July, just weeks before London 
2012, the Home Secretary announced that, as a result of a failure to supply sufficient 
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numbers of private security officers at the venues, an additional 3,500 Armed Forces would 
be deployed.7 On 24 July, just days before the Opening Ceremony, the Culture Secretary 
then announced that the Government had decided to deploy a further additional 1,200 
Armed Forces personnel (that it had placed on standby the previous week).8 As reportedly 
described by a senior military officer, the deployment of over 18,000 military personnel on 
UK shores was ‘the largest peacetime operation ever performed by the armed forces.’9 
This chapter examines the Government’s often troublesome interactions with the 
private sector in achieving its London 2012 security objectives. With one notable exception 
- which itself only covers the ‘security industry’s’ involvement10 - the private sector’s 
involvement in London 2012 security had, prior to the Games, been largely overlooked as a 
major issue worthy of academic analysis. The G4S contract ‘fiasco’ or ‘debacle’, as it has 
been variously described11, changed this and the matter of the failure of the Games’ 
primary security contractor failing in its obligations subsequently received extensive media 
scrutiny. Indeed, during the event - which happily passed safely and was ultimately 
considered a major success for the UK - G4S received fierce criticism and the military’s 
resulting extensive involvement in the security operation for the Games was hailed by the 
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Chairman of the London Organising Committee (LOCOG) as one of the ‘defining features’ 
of London 2012.12  
With the Games long since passed, it is timely to reflect upon London 2012’s 
security arrangements and consider important questions about the effectiveness of the 
public-private cooperative arrangements therein. Until now, the detail of these multiple 
and extensive interactions have not been fully analysed, and the critical focus has been 
over the presence of vested corporate interests in Olympic security arrangements.13 A 
better understanding of the landscape is needed to assess the validity of any claims which 
purport to show the negative impact of the private sector’s (or, indeed, ‘the SIC’s’) 
involvement in London 2012 security, and consider the consequences of such public-
private cooperation. Additional scholarly attention is justified because, despite the major 
problems that arose with the G4S contract, a case can be made that the Games could not 
have been delivered safely without the public-private security cooperation covered below. 
This chapter first describes the security policy framework that was established for 
London 2012, before outlining the scale of, and substantial growth in, the Games’ security 
budget. It then analyses the private sector’s involvement in the security preparations for 
London 2012 through the conceptual framework established for this thesis; particularly 
close attention is paid to the public-private dynamics and problems which arose around 
the largest manpower security contract for the Games awarded to G4S - the widely-
accepted causes of which are challenged. The chapter shows how the UK Government 
relied on a wide range and variety of private sector entities in delivering its security 
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objectives, and that the system of public-private interaction which emerged was only one 
factor amongst many in potentially accounting for the growth in the Olympic security 
budget. Finally, the extensive involvement of companies in London 2012’s security 
arrangements clearly strengthens the notion that an ‘industrial-complex’ of a different 
character to the defence sector exists, and that private sector engagement is now a crucial 
element of the non-military CT aspects of the UK’s national security strategy.  
5.1 Government policy approach and governance arrangements  
When the UK won the right to host the thirtieth Olympic Games, on 6 July 2005, the 
Government immediately inherited the responsibility of ensuring a ‘safe and secure’ 
London 2012 in accordance with the requirements of the ‘Host City Contract’ it signed with 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC). This security policy ownership was clear from 
the outset - the security chapter within London 2012’s original bid document explains, for 
example, that ‘[u]ltimate responsibility for security at the Games will belong to the UK 
Government in the form of the Home Office’14; this was later reiterated in the Olympic and 
Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy.15 In implementing the strategy, the aim of which 
was ‘[t]o deliver a safe and secure Games, in keeping with the Olympic culture and spirit’16, 
the Government was clear that, whilst a wide range of ‘key partners’17 would be involved, 
it ‘owned’ ultimate responsibility for Olympic security. 
If ‘one of the thorniest aspects of security is its governance’18 under normal 
circumstances, this was particularly so for London 2012. The challenges of security 
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coordination around such major events have been well documented19, and it is in this 
context that the Government detailed the roles and responsibilities of the many 
contributors in its (published) Olympic security strategy.20 Reflecting (perhaps even 
increasing) the complexity, London 2012’s security governance arrangements underwent 
significant alterations between 2004 and the actual event. For example, it was decided 
immediately after London’s bid was successful that an ‘Olympic Security Directorate’ - the 
main anticipated coordinating mechanism for the Games’ security - should no longer 
reside inside the Organising Committee’s structures as proposed by the bid document, and 
that it should be coordinated by the authorities under the leadership of a new ‘Olympic 
Security Coordinator’ lead by a senior police officer.21 Furthermore, the decision in 
December 2008 to ‘move the OSD [Olympic Security Directorate] from the Metropolitan 
Police to the OSCT’22 was arguably even more significant because it clarified that the 
Government (rather than the police) had responsibility for security policy. Whilst earlier 
agreement of these governance arrangements would have been preferable, this decision 
was widely welcomed amongst the UK security policy community, including for example by 
the HASC.23 After a period of some uncertainty, there was finally no doubt that the Home 
Office headed the governance structure for London 2012 security. 
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Within this framework, the Government envisaged that the private sector had 
crucial roles to play in the strategy. It articulated its position within the Olympic security 
strategy as follows: 
The Strategy will require close cooperation with industry and the private 
security sector across a range of issues. Communicating the Strategy to 
these sectors, and providing a clear statement of coordinated and 
consistent capability requirements, will be vital.24 
Whilst no additional details were provided on how it was that industry would so vitally help 
to secure the Games, the strategy was explicitly clear that it depended to a certain extent 
on the private sector. After reviewing the growth in Olympic security budget, this chapter 
analyses the origins and character of the public-private interactions that emerged. 
5.2 Security expenditure  
Controversies around the ‘mushrooming security cost of the Games’25 have regularly 
appeared in discussions around the Olympics. Indeed, the security budgets associated with 
this rising industry have grown strikingly; it has been noted that ‘mega-events offer a 
bonanza of growth opportunities’26, and recorded that whereas for the Sydney Olympic 
Games $180million was spent on security operations this rose to an estimated $1.5billion 
for Athens 2004.27 In short, the steady post-9/11 increase in security costs for major events 
has been expertly documented28 and it is now widely accepted that ‘the cost burden of 
providing security at such events has risen dramatically.’29 Despite this context, sharp 
criticism was levelled towards the high and growing security costs associated with London 
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2012.30 This section provides a short analytical overview of the increasing levels of security 
funding that were associated with the Games. 
Whilst the level of funding that London’s original Olympic bid document envisaged 
for security would later cause consternation as a result of its eventual under-estimation, it 
was at least quite transparent. In addition to the £20m that London’s Candidature File 
stated would be allocated to security by the Organising Committee31, public funding 
amounting to £190million was earmarked for Olympic security prior to the successful bid’s 
submission.32 Following London’s victory, and 7/7 which immediately followed it, the 
Government completed a review of the Olympic Budget and announced a revised public 
sector package in March 2007. This included an additional allocation of £600m for ‘wider 
policing and security’ costs (with a further £238m contingency), and a revised Olympic 
Delivery Authority (ODA) security budget of £301 for ‘security for venue construction’ (with 
a further £53m contingency).33 The reasons for the increases have attracted some 
speculation.34  
It is important to clarify (as far as possible) the ‘final’ status of the Olympic security 
budget; this is a difficult task as budgets lay in different areas and constantly changed. For 
example, according to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport’s June 2012 ‘Quarterly 
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Report’ on the progress of the Games, it was stated that the ODA’s security costs 
amounted to £277m.35 Furthermore, the Home Office stated in December 2010 that it 
believed that ‘it should be possible to deliver the core cross Government safety and 
security programme for about £475m.’36 Whilst this would seem to be an attractive 
reduction, the Department was equally clear that it would retain the ability to draw on the 
original £600m figure if necessary, including the associated £238m contingency as 
appropriate. In addition, the security costs that were separately ‘owned’ by LOCOG for 
venue security increased substantially in the course of the project, and were only clarified 
with the announcement in late 2011 of an anticipated and substantial £553m publicly-
funded grant.37 According to a February 2012 report of the PAC, this sum would cover 
(amongst other items) the main G4S security contract (originally amounting to £284m) and 
the costs of the military’s contribution to venue security for the Games (£48m).38 Whilst 
the subsequent contract failure meant that the military’s contribution towards venue 
security would increase substantially - thereby directing significant additional Olympic 
Security costs to the MOD budget - no rise in the overall budget would be expected as a 
result of G4S’s acceptance of ‘its responsibility for the additional cost of the increased 
military deployment resulting from the shortfall in workforce delivery.’39 Furthermore, in 
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September 2012, LOCOG explained that the contract had been reduced from £284m to 
£236m, and that the ‘final’ sum to be paid to G4S would be subject to negotiation40; it was 
eventually announced in February 2013 that G4S would receive £204m in revenue for its 
services41, and that, overall, it would eventually make a total loss of £88m as a result of the 
contract.42 
It may never be possible to accurately state the full, ‘final’ overall Olympic security 
budget for London 2012; whilst certain costs have been published, as shown above, the 
investment made in support of London 2012 by the Intelligence Services and the military, 
for example, have not been published in full. However, on the basis of the available figures, 
one can conclude that it easily amounted to around £1.2bn.43 Having established this 
context, the following section analyses the private sector’s involvement in the strategy and 
the extent to which any ‘industrial-complex’ impacted upon London 2012’s security 
arrangements. 
5.3 Public-private security interactions  
Analysis of academic literature, available Government documentation, company press 
releases, media reports, employment advertisements and trade publications relating to 
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London 2012 security reveals an extensive network of public-private security relationships, 
supporting the notion that a system of a different character to the MIC exists in the non-
military, CT-related aspects of contemporary UK national security strategy. The major 
interactions (contracts, engagements, or strategic partnerships) that emerged between the 
public and private sectors for the Games are detailed below; particular attention is first 
given in the ‘security suppliers’ category to the example of the G4S security contract.   
Case Study: G4S Olympic Security Contract 
London’s Olympic bid document, submitted to the IOC in November 2004, always 
envisaged that manpower-related security services provided by the private sector would 
be utilised to protect visitors, participants and London 2012 venues at the Games.44 Nearly 
six years later, in March 2011, it was announced that G4S Secure Systems had been 
appointed as the London 2012 Games Organisers’ ‘Official Security Services Partner’, and 
that the company would thus take responsibility ‘for recruiting, training and managing the 
10,000-strong security workforce that will be tasked with securing the Games.’45 At the 
time, the Chairman of LOCOG, Lord Coe, proudly announced that this ‘partnership’ with 
G4S built on the earlier contract the company had signed with the ODA to secure the 
Olympic Park site during the construction phase of the project.46 There certainly seemed to 
be confidence at the highest level that G4S was suitable for the task. 
 The evolution in the monetary value of G4S’s contact has proven to be difficult to 
ascertain; after all, neither LOCOG’s (publicly-subsidised) security service contract nor 
many of its specific details have ever been published. Nevertheless, prior to the contract 
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unravelling, LOCOG’s Chief Executive indicated to the PAC in December 2011 that he 
expected G4S would receive just over £300m for the deal.47 As is now well documented, it 
was also revealed during the same month that at peak times around 23,700 security 
guards (instead of the 10,000) would in fact be required48, resulting in LOCOG having to re-
write the requirement of its original contract (which G4S subsequently agreed to) and, of 
course, more extensive military involvement.49 Notwithstanding the £50m loss that in 
August 2012 G4S announced it expected to make because of its inability to meet the 
upgraded requirement50, and the eventual reduction of the value in revenues of the 
contract to £204m as stated above, this remained the largest private security service 
contract for London 2012. Despite the contract failure, G4S would later state that it 
provided around 8,000 officers at peak times51; this speaks volumes of the extent to which 
the State was content for a core element of the Games’ security provision to be 
outsourced. 
The question of who was ‘to blame’ for the failure to provide the required number 
of security guards was subject to considerable media speculation in the lead up to London 
2012, and subsequently after the Games. G4S accepted failure on its part with a public 
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apology52, and notoriously when its Chief Executive, Nick Buckles, stated when providing 
evidence to the HASC that he ‘could not disagree’ that the episode represented a 
‘humiliating shambles’ for the company.53 Subsequently, G4S received the lion’s share of 
the criticism, even if it has been argued (including by the present author) that the 
Government was not a marginal player in the affair.54 Whilst it is tempting to further 
examine the causes and seek to identify the ‘culprits’ (as some journalistic accounts have 
done55), a more sensible question for this thesis in the context of its inquiry into the 
existence of any dynamics associated with the MIC in the CT sector, however, is around 
what accounted for the character, size, and growth of the contract. To answer this, a 
greater understanding is needed of how an additional 8,400 security officers came to be 
needed and why the size of the contract grew so substantially from £86m in 2010 to 
£284m in 2011.56 
Whilst there has never been any suggestion that G4S played a direct role in 
formulating the revised, larger requirement, it can be observed that the contractor was 
appointed as LOCOG’s ‘Official Security Services Provider’ ten months before the revision 
and, indeed, that LOCOG was the first Olympic organiser in history to offer a sponsorship 
arrangement in this new, bespoke ‘security service’ category; a relationship obviously 
existed between the supplier and its client. However, unlike the ‘category exclusivity’57 
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provisions that are contained in the most valuable Games sponsorship categories - i.e. 
those which both allow company sponsors to market themselves exclusively within their 
service area and, if they so wish, benefit from a ‘first right’ to supply requirements 
emerging in their sponsorship category - the CEO of LOCOG explained to the HASC in 
September 2012 that the (nearly) £5m that G4S paid for sponsorship was for ‘marketing 
rights’58 and that the deal was treated separately to the supply contract.59 Whilst these 
arrangements were consistent with the rights associated with any other deal of such value 
within an Organising Committee’s domestic sponsorship programme60, the complicating 
factor in the case of the G4S contract is that (as shown above) it was the Government, not 
LOCOG, who provided the funding for it. That there was a complicated system of public-
private interaction around the G4S contract cannot be disputed.61  
This is not to suggest that, following its appointment by LOCOG, G4S was in any 
way involved in the shaping of the revised, larger requirement; no evidence was found in 
the course of this thesis that it did. By contrast, one industry executive suggested on the 
condition of anonymity that G4S may actually have been reluctant to agree to deliver the 
late, revised requirement.62 The idea that the company may have been pressured into 
fulfilling the revised contract at first seems possible in view of the late identification of the 
additional requirement and the strong view that G4S could have fulfilled the contract; in 
the words of the Head of Security Operations at LOCOG, Andrew Amery, ‘G4S were best 
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placed to deliver this following the increase in requirement’63. Having said this, Amery also 
emphasised that the company ultimately entered into the revised contract willingly: 
G4S always understood the risks from the outset of the sponsorship 
process, I do not believe they would have signed unless they were either 
totally content with the deal or had some form of ‘guarantee’ from the 
government… which clearly they did not! 64 
This explanation certainly seems plausible; even if questions remain around how hesitant 
G4S may have initially been in respect of delivering the revised requirement at such short 
notice.   
 The extent to which any system of public-private (and potentially wider) 
interaction - what has been labelled as ‘the SIC’ - directly affected or resulted in the growth 
of the Olympic security budget generally, or indeed the rising costs and failure of the G4S 
contract itself, is worth further examination; data is available to show how some 
companies may have contributed towards the plans being established on shaky 
foundations. In particular, it is surprising that private sector consultancies were so 
influential in being contracted to both make an early estimate of the ‘true’ costs of London 
2012 security, and to actually assess LOCOG’s security personnel requirements. With 
regards to the former, Jennings explains that a 2002 Arup study on the feasibility of a 
London Olympic bid estimated the total costs of security to be worth £160.2m65; that this 
figure appears to so closely resemble the stated original budgetary estimate included in 
the official bid document might suggest that it was considered as ‘received wisdom’, and 
accepted with too little scrutiny. Whilst the time pressures associated with submitting an 
Olympic bid should not be underestimated, the extent to which the financial estimate was 
‘off target’ should raise questions over whether it could ever be appropriate for the 
findings of a private company to potentially form the statistical basis of such an important 
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security budget. The present author’s involvement in London’s 2012 Olympic bid should 
not make these observations any more or less prescient.  
More significantly, the leading management consultancy firm, Deloitte, publicly 
associated itself with the development of ‘a functional model to help LOCOG fully 
understand the security personnel (private security and stewarding) requirements across 
34 venues’66; a corporate brochure available on its website before the Games explained 
how it identified that ‘up to 5,000 private security staff will be needed for in-venue 
security.’67 Whilst the full size and scope of the Games’ security requirements might not 
have been understood at the time the assessment was completed, it is evident from the 
final manpower resourcing figures (cited above) that Deloitte’s version of the estimate 
turned out to be remarkably inaccurate. In light of the late, increased requirement (and 
thus significant budget growth) so clearly contributing to at least the context for the failure 
of the G4S contract, it might legitimately be asked whether it was appropriate to task a 
private sector company with the completion of such an important assessment, and what 
mechanisms of oversight existed to monitor their work.  
Interviews have suggested that other unusual dynamics existed around the approach to 
assessing the manpower security requirement for London 2012. The Project Lead on 
Olympic Security for the BSIA trade association recalled, for example, how work on scoping 
the requirement actually began in collaboration with industry in 2007/8: 
We talked about scoping the requirement. And we did. The industry spent 
time (…) doing that. We developed a template with the concept that as 
information became available it could be fed into the template. I believe 
that that was a very sensible thing to do, as it would inform planning and 
                                                          
66
 Deloitte, ‘The State of Play: our journey to London 2012 and beyond’, Issue 1, 2009, Via: 
http://www.deloittelondon2012.co.uk/london-2012/the-state-of-play/issue-1-our-journey-to-
london-2012-and-beyond (accessed 12.01.12), p.20 
67





provide a timely specification for numbers and duties. There would have 
been no surprises.68 
That such activity was completed for LOCOG free of charge might raise some eyebrows. 
According to Evans, however, it was the fact that the work was discontinued that was most 
significant; indeed, it can easily be seen how it contributed to the serious problems that 
eventually transpired. In a potentially damning revelation of the performance of the 
consultants operating inside LOCOG, he stated: 
The fact that later down the line it [the scoping exercise] was stopped by 
the consultants within LOCOG (…) removed the only method to deliver the 
specification in good time and this led to the very late delivery of the 
requirement.69 
The idea that the modelling was not adequately completed was suggested by two other 
individuals interviewed for this thesis. According to one industry executive familiar with 
the G4S contract:  
…they did change the requirement for the Olympics because there was… 
there was a mistake with the modelling about how many security guards 
were needed. And so suddenly they had to boost their number of recruits. 
Suddenly they had to go flying up, and they obviously weren’t set up to do 
it.70 
Were there to be any doubt that the modelling was mishandled, another industry official 
identified the problem: ‘…the models Deloitte used were incorrect’71. To date, there 
appears to have been no public admission - by LOCOG, Deloitte or anyone else - around 
the possibility that the work conducted around the scoping of the manpower security 
requirement for London 2012 venues was deficient, and that this shortcoming might have 
contributed to the subsequent problems. 
 Whatever the precise roots of the difficulties, and who was to blame for them, the 
failure to identify an accurate requirement can now be seen as an extremely costly 
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mistake, to put it mildly. According to Evans, the need in the manpower sector of the 
security industry to identify the true requirement at the earliest possible stage is always 
‘the most important thing of all’72; in this case it ‘was incredibly late being delivered’73. It is 
hard to see how the fact that a ‘final’, more accurate requirement was not identified and 
resolved at an earlier stage than December 2011 - incredibly, just six months before the 
actual deployment - could not have contributed to the difficulties which were encountered 
with the G4S Olympic security contract.  
At the risk of repetition, there is no dispute that G4S entered into the revised 
contract (i.e. including the additional requirement) freely; it can even be suggested (as it 
was in the final report of the HASC74) that the company displayed an over-confident, even 
arrogant attitude towards its ability to deliver what was obviously a challenging 
requirement in such a short period. It was certainly apparent from his evidence to the 
HASC that Nick Buckles believed it would not present difficulties; indeed he claimed that 
‘…we felt we were the only company able to do it[.]’75  
From the available information, therefore, the company clearly (mistakenly) felt that it 
could meet the additional need. This chapter does not to seek to excuse G4S for its clear 
contributions towards the failure: one industry interviewee summarized the situation well 
as follows: 
There was a feeling of unfairness because of the late, larger requirement 
inflicted upon them by the Home Office. So I feel certain sympathy for G4S. 
Notwithstanding that, they made some of their own mistakes.76 
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Another industry executive was less sympathetic, suggesting that the company may have 
been engaged in a ‘conspiracy of optimism’ and that, with regards to its actual inability to 
deliver, G4S ‘…probably should have come clean about it a lot earlier’77. Whatever G4S’s 
actual outlook and the causes of the late identification of the issue, it is clear that the 
failure to earlier recognise the shortfall proved to be a low point of an episode that G4S’s 
CEO obviously clearly regretted.78 
 Whilst engaging in ‘blame games’ is undesirable, it is hard to see, however, how 
the primary responsibility for identifying the manpower security requirement for London 
2012 venues could have fallen to anyone other than LOCOG and/or Government. It is of 
some concern, therefore, that it has been suggested that this work was outsourced to 
commercial consultants. The extent to which any such consultants may have been 
considered as being an integral part of the organising committee’s structures should not 
distract from a more fundamental point; it would be worrying were it to genuinely emerge 
that it was neither LOCOG nor the Government, but an embedded consultancy firm who 
not only made (as seems to have transpired) an under-estimate of the requirement, but 
who potentially more damagingly may have actually made the decision not to properly 
complete such important modelling work.  
Furthermore, it might also be asked why it was that the authorities decided to only 
initially contract 2,000 new staff from G4S in light of the earlier, manpower security 
assessments of 6,500 in the original Olympic bid document79, and the 5,000 later publicised 
by Deloitte (however flawed either of these may have been, and notwithstanding the 
existence of a recruitment initiative designed to help meet the significant requirement80). 
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Indeed, the apparent decision not to require G4S to recruit more new staff in view of these 
earlier assessments - and the eventual reality that an additional 8,400 security staff would 
be needed - can now be seen as a highly questionable decision. In retrospect, much more 
searching questions perhaps should have been raised over both the Home Office’s and 
LOCOG’s effectiveness in developing and overseeing the estimated requirement for, and 
the implementation of, the contract; it is hard to see how anyone other than these two 
organisations could have been responsible for doing so. Indeed, against this backdrop it 
can be suggested that the strength of both LOCOG’s and the Home Office’s monitoring of 
the scoping and delivery of the requirement - crucially in the context of (an unusually) high 
level of public subsidy that it was itself allocated for the contract - was lacking. As one 
industry official explained in an interview: 
So [the] G4S [Olympic Security Contract] is a very good example of poor 
oversight by LOCOG and culpability coming in at the end as an excuse for 
Government. And actually there was poor commercial oversight, there was 
poor planning and there was poor preparation.81 
It is surprising that in the HASC inquiry the performance of Government and LOCOG did 
not receive greater scrutiny; they were completely vindicated of any responsibility. 
Furthermore, the Government and others concerned seemed content to allow G4S to 
publicly receive the full blame for the contract failure - it is particularly noticeable, for 
example, that the Government’s response to the HASC report declines to specifically 
address the Committee’s finding that G4S was ‘solely’ to blame, stating its position as 
follows: 
The Government welcomes the Committee’s recognition of the hard work 
and achievements of that community and of the successful contingency 
planning that was able to deal effectively with problems that arose when 
G4S said that it was unable to meet its contractual obligations.82 
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Whilst these statements are careful not to ‘point the finger’ at G4S directly, there is no 
doubt where the authorities believed the problems lay. The former Head of Security 
Operations at LOCOG explained to the author that ‘a better form of words could be used’ 
than those of the HASC in its assessment that G4S was ‘solely’ to blame, but nonetheless 
concluded: 
The statement is factually true - they failed to deliver the contract that 
they (in my view/understanding) freely signed understanding the risks. 
They simply did not have the ‘back office capability’ to manage the 
workforce. That said, information would come through at last minute and 
the task was a massive one… but they said they could do it.83 
There is no doubt that G4S mishandled its contract. However, as seen in regards to the 
involvement of consultancy firms in the IT contracts for e-Borders and FiReControl, the 
support provided by Deloitte in the preparation for the Olympic security contract appears 
to have been overlooked by those scrutinizing the contract, and now seems highly 
questionable. Having said this, it should be stressed that the company appears to have 
contributed to an under-estimation of the manpower security requirement - a not 
necessarily straightforward task84 - rather than make any effort to over-specify or ‘gold 
plate’ the requirement; it is this latter dynamic which is most often presented as being 
associated with ‘the SIC’ or dynamics relating to Government contracts of such a large size. 
Either way, the contribution cannot be said to have been ideal. It is perhaps only slightly 
ironic that, after the failure of the contract became very publicly debated, G4S later 
appointed another private sector consultancy, PricewaterhouseCoopers, to review the 
causes of the contract failure.85 
Additional reasons for budgetary increases 
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In researching for this case study, it became clear that factors other than ‘the SIC’ 
contributed to both the rising costs and failure to fully deliver the G4S contract. Firstly, the 
change of Government following the 2010 General Election resulted in the development of 
a greater emphasis towards, and arguably a more limited appetite for risk around, the 
security preparations for the Games; including in particular the venue security 
arrangements. As one of her first acts, the coalition Government’s new Minister for 
Security, Lady Pauline Neville-Jones, completed an ‘audit and review’ of the Games’ 
security preparations and this identified the need for more focussed attention in certain 
areas.86 The Minister’s special adviser prior to her appointment, Mark Phillips, explained 
how with respect to the plans for London 2012 ‘the issue at the top of my list was in-venue 
security numbers’ and that ‘we had known that it was an issue for a long time’87. It seems 
apparent, therefore, that the new Government already possessed an awareness of the 
difficulties. Its realisation that it would be responsible for overseeing the Games’ security 
operation - that it would occur ‘on its watch’ so to speak - obviously contributed to its 
decision to strengthen the arrangements significantly, including by increasing the budget 
for venue security.  
 Secondly, it can be suggested that the substantial increase in LOCOG’s security 
budget to meet the additional requirements for the G4S contract resulted at least partly 
from a lack of relevant experience existing in that organisation. Whilst the 2009 
appointment of the former head of the British Transport Police, Sir Ian Johnston, as 
LOCOG’s Director of Security and Resilience may have reassured some in view of his 
stature and seniority, it has been argued by one individual with knowledge of the G4S 
contract that the retired policemen who were appointed to LOCOG in the latter years of 
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planning had a limited understanding of the requirements of ‘force generation’.88 Whilst at 
one stage (as explained in Chapter 7) LOCOG’s security team employed the services of a 
former G4S employee in order help with the management of the contract, the fact that its 
security leadership had limited experience of dealing with such contracts simply cannot 
have helped matters. 
Finally, the 7/7 attacks and the wider security risk landscape meant that the threat 
posed by international terrorism to the UK was already ‘substantial’89 at the time of the 
Games.  As the Director-General of MI5 explained in speech shortly before London 2012; 
‘[t]he Games present an attractive target for our enemies.’90 The combination of an 
already heightened threat level with the potential attractiveness of an attack against the 
Games would, in itself, be a serious consideration for those deciding the security measures 
(and thus levels of investment) around them. According to Amery, high levels of Olympic 
security spending arose because: 
London was always going to be an expensive Games in terms of security 
given the environment and threat level it took place in. Indeed the 
international terrorist threats have continued to grow in recent years 
which has seen proportionate increases in cost to mitigate this since 
2001.91 
Critics of the SIC might not accept the validity of the threat assessment, and the associated 
levels of spending therefore needed; it was nevertheless consistently articulated as the 
basis of the security plans (and expenditure) for London 2012. 
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It is clear, then, that factors other than any influence exerted by the ‘SIC’ existed 
and thus may have contributed to the growth of both the G4S security contract, and the 
Games’ security budget more generally. This is not to suppose that G4S or any other 
involved company might not have possessed the desire to do so; the evidence suggests, 
however, that the arrangements around the scoping and delivery of the contract in 
particular were much more chaotic, and that they suffered from considerable 
miscalculation, uncertainty and flux.  
A note on scrutiny and oversight 
The resulting failure of the G4S Olympic security contract deserved (and continues to 
deserve) to raise questions over the level and effectiveness of the regime of (internal and 
external) oversight around it; this is especially important in view of the apparently total 
surprise with which the Government and others greeted the last minute problems.92 In so 
far as this matter relates to this thesis more broadly, it can be recalled that, in his warning 
on the MIC, Eisenhower considered that, at least in the US, the ‘complex’ thought of as a 
system included a legislative element; he even originally contemplated including the word 
‘congressional’ within the original expression.93 The argument put forward was that 
politicians and even Congress comprised a core element of the cosy, elite system which 
posed such a potentially damaging risk.  
 Applying this line of thinking to both the UK example - and, indeed, to the 
argument introduced in the opening chapters that the dynamics associated with the MIC 
have transferred into the non-military CT aspects of national security - it might be logical to 
expect that elements within the UK Parliament might have therefore welcomed increasing 
levels of Olympic security expenditure; perhaps especially when any components would 
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clearly benefit private companies such as G4S. Whilst it was notably silent in its public 
commentary on, and scrutiny of, any aspect of the G4S security contract prior to the 
serious difficulties transpiring in July 2012, the reality is that Parliament was extremely 
critical of the company’s performance once the problems emerged. The HASC in 
particularly offered a devastating critique of G4S’s involvement in Olympic security, 
conducting a swift inquiry into the episode shortly before the Games, and concluding in an 
associated, high profile report that the company was ‘solely’ to blame for the issues which 
transpired with the contract. It concluded in no uncertain terms: 
The blame for G4S’s failure to deliver on its contract rests firmly and solely 
with the company. There is no suggestion that LOCOG, the Home Office or 
anybody else involved in the process contributed to the problem in any 
way.94 
At the time, few doubts were expressed over the validity of this conclusion95; the HASC 
report noted that even G4S accepted the verdict.96 This chapter has already shown, 
however, that the requirements changed at a late stage, that the overarching governance 
arrangements for the contract (and Olympic security more generally) were incredibly 
complex, and that there was also an awareness in policy circles that there was an issue 
with delivering the requirement. That the HASC did not appear to wish to address the 
broader governance context for London 2012 security, especially in view of its remit for 
holding the Home Office to account, is baffling.  
 Perceptions within the security community were sought through interviews and 
written correspondence - both in the security industry and more broadly - around the 
appropriateness of the HASC’s scrutiny on the G4S security contract; a number of 
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responses were striking. One senior industrialist welcomed the approach of the HASC and 
the manner in which Nick Buckles was scrutinised during the inquiry: 
It was a great example of understanding where accountability lies. And the 
fact that the CEO of G4S was sitting there in the public glare, and being 
hammered, is a tribute to the process and the democratic and commercial 
engagement.97 
Contrary views also existed, however. In an enlightening discussion on the HASC’s handling 
of its Olympics Security inquiry, one interviewee was candid about the possible 
motivations of the Committee, and the manner in which it reached its conclusions: 
…the select committee were always going to say it was all Nick Buckles’ 
fault, because, you know, talking about contractual requirements doesn’t 
interest Keith Vaz [the Chairman of the HASC], and it certainly doesn’t 
make for a good media pitch. So I think he was obviously going to get the 
blame.98 
Supporting this critical suggestion, Evans also reflected bluntly on the efficacy of the 
HASC’s inquiry: ‘[That] …was a disgrace as, in my opinion, it was shared equally between 
LOCOG and G4S and it was just too easy a route for the HASC to blame the private 
sector.’99 
 Whilst the politics of parliamentary scrutiny are certainly intriguing, the suggestion 
in this case that G4S may have been ‘on a hiding to nothing’ in so far as the Committee’s 
deliberations were concerned is important to this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, it clearly 
illustrates how, whatever one thinks of the validity of the HASC’s conclusions, the 
Committee felt no sense of duty to defend (as classical MIC theory applied to the ‘wider 
security’ arena might have it) the reputation of the UK’s largest security company, G4S; any 
idea that any form of ‘cosy’ or worrying relationship might exist between the UK 
Parliament and this company therefore appears to be way off the mark. Secondly, by stark 
contrast, the fact that in this case the HASC declined to offer any criticism of the 
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Government or LOCOG in the course of its inquiry - including up to and including its final 
report - is surprising in view of this chapter’s analysis. Whether deliberately or 
inadvertently, that the HASC declined to scrutinise some of the other actors and obvious 
additional factors which may have contributed (if not further upstream) to the G4S security 
contract failure, as this chapter has sought to do, is worrying. Indeed it may even suggest 
that whilst G4S’s influence on the requirement may have been minimal, representatives at 
least two corners of the ‘classic’ confluence of interests under examination in this study 
may have been too closely aligned for comfort. 
Other suppliers 
Whilst considerable attention has been devoted to the largest private security contract for 
the Games, it is important to recognise that many other commercial security suppliers 
were involved in the London 2012 Olympic security strategy; the Games planners’ 
interaction with equipment manufacturers was another crucial category of interaction. The 
ODA revealed in October 2009, for example, that to secure the main ‘Olympic Park’ in East 
London a ‘host of security packages’ had been awarded: these included the provision of 
access control systems by Reliance High-Tech, biometric systems by Human Recognition 
Systems, a range of screening equipment for pedestrian and vehicle entry by Rapiscan 
Systems, and CCTV and perimeter security systems by Honeywell Control Systems.100 In 
addition, a search conducted on an online ODA ‘Suppliers Map’101 identified 23 dedicated 
security contracts, including the provision of a high profile perimeter fence that is ‘3.6 
metres high with a power topping section on top’102 supplied by Zaun Fencing.103 Whilst 
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such contracts might seem typical of any such infrastructure project, the substantial 
number of them illustrates the extensive public-private interaction that existed. Indeed, 
such was the high level of corporate interest in the ODA’s security contracts that the body 
organised an additional ‘security industry day’ for the large number of companies that 
were unable to attend the original event.104  
 There were other significant London 2012 security equipment contracts; it was 
announced in March 2011, for example, that, building on the success of its ODA contract, 
Rapiscan Systems had become ‘Official Security Equipment and Systems Supplier’ to 
LOCOG, and that it would ‘provide over 2000 vehicle screening, people screening and 
baggage and parcel inspection systems to all Olympic venues.’105 Whilst this might appear 
as a startling figure in its own right, the supply of capabilities extended beyond physical 
protective measures. The security of the Games’ essential information technology systems 
was a key consideration, for example; Gilmore identifies that ‘Atos Origin has the job of 
ensuring that results and communications IT is not compromised.’106 Furthermore, it was 
announced on 8 July 2011 that Airwave would supply LOCOG with ‘Apollo’ - a private 
mobile radio service for over 18,000 staff and volunteers, including the security function - 
for the duration of the Games.107 These were all lucrative contracts, illustrating the high 
level of security expenditure for London 2012 and the extensive network of public-private 
interactions around it.  
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A more sensitive private security capability for London 2012 was industry’s supply 
of ‘close protection’ services to VIPs and athletes. As Evans explains, demand for these 
services around major events ‘is often beyond the capacity of any nation’s police force and 
the police are normally forced to ration such protection to those under the greatest 
threat[.]’108 Whilst the full extent to which such private sector capability was utilised for 
London 2012 is not publicly available, a report by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on 
Specialist Security published shortly before the Games highlighted a concern around the 
absence of ‘a formal system to monitor client demands for close protection.’109 Despite 
one scholar previously suggesting that private military and security companies ‘are not 
likely to be utilised for MES (Major Event Security) in the EU’110, a precedent may have 
been set for London 2012 because, in the run-up to the Games, the BSIA established a 
Close Protection Co-ordination Unit to put ‘visiting dignitaries in touch with suppliers that 
work to the relevant British Standards for quality’111, writing to ‘over 150 consulates, 
Ambassadors and High Commissioners’ to advertise the capabilities of the sector.112 It 
appears that the private sector’s involvement in this area should not have been a surprise; 
Armstrong documents that Tarique Ghaffur suggested to the 2006 annual conference of 
the British Association of Private Security Companies that there could be opportunities for 
them to ‘part police’ the Games.113 The supply of close protection services to London 2012 
clients is evidence of another ‘security industry’ sub-sector being involved in the strategy. 
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That so many security industry sub-sectors have been ‘hidden’ and comprise what this 
thesis looks upon as a much more multi-faceted ‘industrial-complex’ reflects how the 
concept has hitherto been under-researched. 
Security consultancy extended beyond the completion of statistical analysis to 
include the design aspects of the Olympic Park; the company Buro Happold even received 
a ‘security excellence award’ in 2007 in part for its work on the ‘Security Master Planning’ 
for London 2012.114 Furthermore, even more striking is the work that KMPG completed for 
the Home Office. The scale of its contract has become increasingly apparent: the 
department revealed in December 2010, for example, that KMPG was the third largest 
recipient of its consultancy funding during 2009 and 2010 for the work it was doing both 
on ‘Olympic Security and Value for Money.’115 A search of the Home Office’s ‘transparency’ 
website revealed that the OSCT paid KPMG £294,343 in one month alone (June 2010).116 
Whether this use of private consultancy amounts to what O’Reilly calls ‘state-corporate 
symbiosis’117 might be questionable; less debatable, however, is that it was an important 
component of the programme management for London 2012 security. Whilst the 
involvement of Deloitte in supporting LOCOG to produce a technical manpower 
requirement is one thing, the involvement of KPMG in such a prominent role at the Home 
Office - the Department responsible for overall policy - is arguably an entirely different 
matter. Following what can be seen as the detrimental involvement of consultants in the 
cases of e-Borders and FiReControl, it is remarkable how little attention has been paid to 
such similar dynamics emerging in the case of the security for London 2012. Perhaps it was 
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because the G4S contract affair did not tarnish the impression of the overall management 
of the Olympic security programme that the role of KPMG was not more deeply 
scrutinised. The jury is still out, however, over whether the appointment of such 
companies is (or should be) desirable. 
The Government’s intention to utilise existing UK security capabilities to support 
London 2012 security - to ‘laminate’ Olympic specific measures over existing national 
arrangements118 - was clearly evident. Amongst the most prominent of these was the UK’s 
border security capability119 including the ‘e-borders’ programme; indeed, the Senior 
Responsible Owner of the UKBA’s London 2012 programme articulated a strategy to draw 
on e-borders to deliver ‘enhanced business as usual’ in support of the Games.120 The 
Government’s separate major capability in this area, ‘Programme Cyclamen’, was also in 
operation at the time of the Games. 
Other departments and agencies also invested in new capabilities for the 
Emergency Services before London 2012. In November 2009, for example, the Home Office 
announced a £39m investment to boost the capacity of the Airwave radio system in 
preparation for the Games.121 Additionally, the MPS upgraded its police command and 
control capabilities to support the London 2012 security operation.122 The capabilities of 
Endeleo and Electrosonic were used to establish a new ‘Special Operations Room’ for the 
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MPS123; its website states that it doubled its capacity ‘[t]o cope with the size and scale of 
the operation in 2012[.]’124 
Finally, in addition to specific contracts, the Government developed more 
‘strategic’ engagement with the security industry; working in particular with RISC. An 
analysis of the origins and activity of this body is presented in Chapter 6; suffice to say here 
that, in so far as London 2012 was concerned, Evans documents the creation of an Industry 
Advisory Group (IAG) co-chaired by the OSD and RISC, arguing that ‘London 2012 is 
witnessing unprecedented involvement of industry in the planning and review 
process[.]’125 This clearly serves as evidence of an exchange at the policy level between the 
public and private sectors in the Olympic security strategy, adding weight to the notion of 
the existence of an industrial-complex in the CT arena. 
Private Operators   
In addition to engaging the security suppliers’ community, the Government also engaged 
private operators who were involved in London 2012 security. As highlighted by Gilmore, 
the event organiser (LOCOG) was itself a private company126 - Evans stresses the 
importance of this as security was not the organisation’s main driver127 - and the 
Government’s security strategy articulated the organisation’s range of ‘in-venue’ security 
responsibilities.128 In short, such was the importance of venue security to the success of 
the overall Games operation that the Government had an inter-dependent relationship 
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with LOCOG ever since London was awarded the Games. The allocation of a £553m state-
funded grant to LOCOG for venue security can be understood in this context. 
The CLM consortium129 - the ODA’s contractor for the delivery of the new Games 
venues - was also an important private operator of security for London 2012; it protected 
the Olympic venues during the construction phase of the project, and its Logistics and 
Security team even received a ‘Considerate Constructors’ award in 2011.130 Furthermore, 
the private company Westfield - the owner and operator of East London’s new shopping 
centre located adjacent to the Olympic Park - was an important contributor to the security 
plan; not least because it was always anticipated that 70% of spectators attending events 
in Stratford would pass through its site.131 Indeed, reflecting its proximity to the main 
cluster of venues, LOCOG announced plans to operate vehicle screening from the 
Westfield shopping centre on 5 September 2011132; in a further development, Westfield 
was announced as an ‘official sponsor’ of the Games two days after this announcement.133 
There is no doubt that the security plan depended on the contributions of both CLM and 
Westfield, both of whom were private companies. 
The significance of the role played by the IOC in any Olympic Games’ security 
arrangements has been disputed - it has both been suggested, for example, that the ‘IOC 
make clear in guidance to potential host cities that it is their responsibility to provide a safe 
environment’134 and that ‘security policy for the organisers of the Olympic Games is 
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dictated by the IOC.’135 However, it is clearer that it is a private entity, operating in 
Switzerland, and possessing its own commercial perspective and priorities. Perhaps most 
significantly, the IOC has consistently ensured through its Olympic bidding requirements 
that each host Government accepts responsibility for the security of the Games (and in 
particular the costs of them). This was no different for London 2012, and the importance 
the IOC placed on security in this case was equally clear as it articulated its confidence in 
the UK’s security preparations.136 Even after the G4S contract failure, the President of the 
IOC, Jacques Rogge, explained his satisfaction with the contingency established for the 
Games; ‘The troops are a source of reassurance for the public, I don’t see it as a negative 
thing.’137 The IOC was therefore clearly an influential stakeholder in respect of London 
2012’s security arrangements; this should be understood, however, in the context of its 
insistence that it would be the UK Government who should oversee and be the ultimate 
guarantor for financing them. 
It was not only sporting venue operators with whom the Government interacted 
on London 2012 security issues; it should be recalled that a large number of additional 
events were organised by private event companies across the UK during the Games. These 
were not ‘official’ events but their association with London 2012 by timing would certainly 
result in ‘a need for extra security.’138 Whilst the Government indicated that it did not 
intend to subsidise the security of ‘crowded places away from the Olympics’, the Director 
of Olympic Safety and Security in the Home Office, Robert Raine, outlined in a speech to 
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the Police Foundation that it would be necessary to continue to ‘work in partnership’ with 
the events industry on the security of such events139; substantial security responsibilities 
were thus placed in ‘private’ hands. To ensure appropriate coordination around these 
additional activities, the Greater London Authority developed a ‘London Events 
Coordination Calendar’: the original vision for the initiative was to appoint resources to 
generate ‘…a central repository of all ‘events’ of interest’ planned from the 1st May to 31st 
October 2012 to be used to evaluate the viability of hosting such events from a safety, 
security and visitor experience perspective.’140 This reveals that it would be wrong to look 
upon LOCOG as being the only venue operator of security for London 2012; the reality is 
that the authorities were engaged with a much wider set of companies on securing events 
across the UK. 
Finally, emergency preparedness training for the Games was delivered by the 
private sector. Although at least one ‘traditional’ security training contract was supplied to 
the public sector by the company SCS141, that G4S was tasked with training LOCOG’s 
security officers and volunteers also shows how operational ‘private-to-private’ dynamics 
were present in the Olympic security strategy.  
Wider Business  
Several initiatives were developed between Games security planners and wider sectors of 
the UK economy. Perhaps the most significant was the ‘Cross-Sector Safety and Security 
Communications Project’ (CSSC) which was established to ensure the efficiency of safety 
                                                          
139
 Robert Raine, ‘Working with the private sector to deliver a safe and secure Olympic Games’, 
Speech to 2009 Police Foundation annual conference. 7 Sept. 2010, Via: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azR3h9ugcfQ&feature=channel&list=UL (last accessed 
29.12.14)  
140











and security communications between emergency planners and London’s businesses both 
at the time of the Games and thereafter. The website of the initiative explains:  
CSSC was founded in June 2011 by a team of senior security experts, with 
the aim of building a platform to facilitate communications between 
private and public sector on issues surrounding security and business 
resilience. The initial focus of CSSC was to help businesses prepare for 
business as usual in the lead up to, and during the Olympic and Paralympic 
Games.142 
Other details are available of what was pitched as a ‘truly cross-sectoral’143 project 
including the participation of ‘twenty-three business categories from banking, insurance, 
security and supply chain to retail, tourism, hotels, night-time economy and media’144 - in 
essence the project was geared at providing threat and real-time security information to 
the private sector in an efficient manner. 
In an interview for this thesis, the leader of the initiative, Sir David Veness, 
explained how the failure of the authorities to effectively communicate with the business 
community at the time of the 2011 riots in London served as a ‘bit of a jolt’145 to the 
authorities in the context of how to communicate to the private sector on security issues 
for London 2012. The rationale behind the establishment of the CSSC was further 
explained: 
The one thing that business in all of its dimensions wanted out of the 
prospect of this largest peacetime security operation ever was 
communication from the public to the private sector - not classified 
information, not breaking news, but timely, actionable, authoritative 
information on which a business of any size could make a decision.146 
In so far as the costs of the CSSC were concerned, Veness further explained that ‘...the 
entire CSSC project was run with zero budget from the public sector and was all funded on 
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goodwill and secondees from the private sector.’147 Any suggestion that this category of 
the private sector may have been seeking to appropriate public funds through the 
establishment of the scheme, in the spirit of the more conspiratorial SIC-type theories, 
could not be viewed as serious; the ambition appears to have been to simply strengthen 
the levels of public-private communication around security risks and issues, and enhance 
the private sector’s preparedness in that context. Interestingly, CSSC was not the only 
effort at seeking to engage the private sector considered as the business community in the 
widest sense. Alongside this initiative, the Games Organisers, LOCOG, published a planning 
document for businesses which includes a section outlining safety and security advice for 
the private sector.148 Whilst problems transpired in their efforts to work with their own 
commercial security suppliers, officials clearly placed a high priority on the development of 
a wider business engagement strategy as a part of the security strategy for London 2012. 
The (private) education sector also contributed to the Games’ security 
arrangements; notwithstanding the failure to recruit and train sufficient numbers of 
security personnel. Most significantly, a scheme called ‘Bridging the Gap’ was established 
in collaboration with the security industry with a view to meeting the significant manpower 
requirements that it was always anticipated would be placed on the private security 
industry for the Games.149 This was a ‘private’ project in more senses than one: whilst 
suppliers’ decisions to participate may not have been entirely altruistic, it was reported 
that LOCOG ‘…invested more than GB pound 1 million in Bridging The Gap to assist young 
people in learning new skills and gaining on-the-job training.’150 The supposed uniqueness 
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of this initiative was even articulated by the Government; the (then) Security Minister, 
Pauline Neville-Jones, stated: ‘Bridging the Gap is an innovative example of partnership 
working between the Home Office, LOCOG, further education colleges and the private 
sector.’151 The failure to deploy sufficient numbers of security personnel in time for the 
Games raises questions about the efficacy of the scheme, but it also clearly represents a 
further intended cooperation between the public and private sectors in the Olympic 
security strategy. 
Several other business sectors were involved in London 2012 security which 
further illustrates the diversity of the public-private security cooperation that emerged. 
Firstly, as suggested above the ‘Sponsor Effect’152 brought with it ‘a significant demand for 
security’153 from those (national and global) companies who formed an official association 
with the Games.154 Secondly, privately-funded event organisers were involved in hosting 
conferences to act as platforms for the articulation of London 2012 security preparations; 
prominent amongst these was the suite of Olympic security-related events organised by 
CityForum Limited.155 Finally, as Jennings outlines, the insurance industry plays an 
important role in the preparation for any Olympics156; the IOC and other organisations 
have increasingly been purchasing ‘insurance for cancellation due to terrorism or natural 
disaster for recent Games.’157 In the case of London 2012, it proved a significant challenge 
to find insurance cover around the main security services contract; it has been suggested 
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that G4S eventually purchased a policy from the US market because it could not find 
satisfactory UK cover.158  
5.4 Character and impact of the industrial-complex in Olympic Security 
This chapter suggests that three main characteristics of the ‘industrial-complex’ in CT were 
exhibited in this case - firstly, both the IOC and other event organisers including LOCOG 
appeared to be, like other ‘private operators’ examined in this thesis, reluctant to allocate 
their own resources towards security; the Government provided a substantial public 
subsidy to cover the costs of venue security in this context. Secondly, many ‘suppliers’ 
possessed an interest in the emergence of a large number of substantial Olympic security 
contracts; that there were substantial commercial opportunities, or at least the perception 
of such opportunities, is not in question. A third dynamic arose which saw wider business 
sectors of the economy putting in place new measures to enhance (and fund) their own 
security arrangements.  
It is worth briefly elaborating on these dynamics, as they have not been covered by 
other existing scholarly contributions on London 2012. Firstly, as it was a private company 
operating for a limited period, LOCOG would have possessed a limited interest in investing 
a substantial amount of its own resources towards the financing of venue security. It can 
also be suggested that there was potentially a strong incentive to resist doing so; namely 
the Government’s guarantee to the IOC that it would underwrite the costs for the security 
of the Games. According to the co-chair of the London 2012 Olympic Security IAG, the 
significance of these guarantees was never truly understood and may have actually directly 
contributed to the G4S security contract episode. Reflecting on why the provision of 
manpower security has so often failed at recent Games, Evans stated: 
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And so you’ve got to ask the question - why is that? And foremost in my 
thinking is the guarantee of safety and security which was required by the 
IOC in the original bid document, and which was agreed to by our Home 
Secretary. If you have a Government guarantee to provide a safe and 
secure Games, then ‘why should the IOC worry about private sector 
delivery and why should the organising committee make their 
preparations in a way that would meet private sector delivery 
requirements?’ is the thought that occurs to me. They know that the 
Government is obliged to step in, if the private sector fails to meet its full 
requirement, with staff from the police and armed forces; and this at no 
cost to the IOC / Organising Committee. And I don’t think we ever 
understood that and certainly I never saw this element of the guarantee in 
the register of risks.159 
Albeit it is offered in retrospect, Evans makes an extremely compelling case; there may 
well have been an inclination on the part of the private event organiser, LOCOG, to seek to 
avoid taking on additional costs, particularly in the context of the UK Government’s 
guarantees provided to the IOC. It is worth considering, therefore, whether there may 
have been an irresistible urge within LOCOG to ‘offset’ its security costs to others; it can be 
observed that whilst the IOC was not a factor in that case, a similar dynamic existed with 
the transport operators in the e-Borders case. Whilst it may never be possible to validate 
the extent to which it sought to draw on public funding, the Government’s decision to 
allocate a substantial state-funded grant to LOCOG at such a late stage of the Olympic 
security planning process could be understood from this perspective. 
Secondly, whilst it has not been demonstrated that the public-private interactions 
illustrated above directly impacted upon the growth in the Olympic security budget per se, 
many commercial security suppliers clearly profited financially from London 2012’s 
security arrangements. However, not all companies benefited as advocates of a more 
negative account of the ‘SIC’ system might suggest. In the case of the largest publicly-
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funded Olympic security contract, for example, G4S’s failure to deliver fully on its contract 
meant that the company would eventually expect to make a loss of £50m.160  
Finally, the wider business community implemented its own new mechanisms to 
enhance security communications in preparation for, and in the event of, an emergency 
situation at the time of the Games (and beyond). A dedicated page on a security trade 
association website161 provides clear evidence of a systemic exchange with the public 
sector as a part of the scheme; the latter regularly provided information to businesses 
across London. There is no indication, however, that any public funding was allocated 
towards the project. 
In conclusion, the private sector’s involvement in the safety and security of London 
2012 was extensive, significant, and, particularly in the case of the G4S Olympic security 
contract, highly problematic.162 It is because the high level recognition of the role of the 
private sector in the Olympic security strategy had not previously been comprehensively 
investigated that this chapter examined its involvement. The research has revealed 
multiple public-private interactions in London 2012’s security preparations; a variety of 
exchanges took place across the ‘Private Supply’, ‘Private Operator’ and ‘Wider Business’ 
dimensions, supporting this thesis’s argument that a new type of ‘industrial-complex’ is 
operating in the UK’s CT sector. 
Any specific, tangible effect that any ‘SIC’ may have had on London 2012 security 
expenditure has not been shown. On the contrary, the research suggests a possible 
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inclination of the (private) event organiser within the system, LOCOG, to decline to invest a 
substantial proportion of its own resources towards security; this appears to have resulted 
in the Government deciding during the final years of planning that it would be necessary to 
cover the Games’ venue security costs. LOCOG could be forgiven for possessing this 
disposition in view of the Government’s guarantees and the fact that it was ultimately a 
temporary event company; on the other hand, the Olympic security strategy was clear that 
the delivery of routine safety and security measures at venues was the responsibility of 
LOCOG163 and, as it transpired, there were failures in both the assessment and delivery of 
the requirements around them.  
Subsequent parliamentary scrutiny of the G4S contract affair has revealed more 
details about the public-private dynamics that existed within the Olympic security strategy. 
Most notably, senior figures including the Home Secretary and the leadership of LOCOG 
attributed the failure of the security contract to G4S in front of the HASC, with the 
Committee itself concluding that the blame rested ‘firmly and solely’ with the company.164 
Perhaps controversially, the author maintains the argument that this was a highly 
unsatisfactory and inaccurate conclusion; the level of interdependency that existed 
between the public and private sectors at the heart of London 2012’s security governance 
framework was never properly examined by the HASC and can clearly be seen to have 
contributed to the G4S contract failure. That the ‘ownership’ of responsibility for venue 
security was shared - symbolised by the Government’s decision to finance the 
arrangements at the same time maintaining that the contract was ‘owned’ by  LOCOG - led 
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to the creation of an unusual, arguably highly undesirable governance structure that 
ultimately failed to prevent the ‘last minute hitch’165 occurring shortly before the Games.  
Whilst the Home Office and LOCOG appear to have worked together extremely 
closely - the CEO of LOCOG, Paul Deighton, stated to the HASC that together with the 
police ‘[t]he nature of the relationship between us and the Home Office (…) was extremely 
tight and collaborative’166 - the ‘final’ venue security requirement for 10,400 ‘new’ private 
security personnel was only agreed in December 2011.167 It is clear, therefore, that G4S 
had very limited time to deliver the additional numbers168 and that the responsibility to 
monitor the implementation of the revised contract might have been discharged more 
effectively. Whilst the media and Parliamentary outrage which directly preceded the 
Games concentrated on G4S’s failures, the chapter has found that there appear to have 
been significant problems with the modelling that it has been suggested was completed by 
Deloitte; a private sector consultancy.   
This chapter identified several additional factors which may have heavily impacted 
upon the security arrangements (and therefore associated expenditure) for the Games. 
The coalition Government’s realisation of its responsibilities following the General Election 
of 2010; the already existing ‘substantial’ terrorism threat to the UK; and key figures’ lack 
of experience at handling aspects of such major security operations may all have 
contributed to the increases in the security costs for London 2012. The system of 
interactions between the public and private sectors in this sector - the industrial-complex 
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in CT - can, therefore, only be properly considered one factor amongst several in 
accounting for the substantial growth in the London 2012 security budget.  
In conclusion, the chapter demonstrated that the private sector’s involvement in 
London 2012 security was extensive and highly varied. This reinforces the notion that an 
industrial-complex of a different character to the MIC now exists in the non-military CT 
























Chapter 6: Strategic Engagement 
Introduction 
Detailed analysis of three large post-9/11 public sector security contracts has shown that, 
notwithstanding their serious difficulties, a considerable degree of ‘closeness’ emerged in 
the character of the relationship between the public and private sectors in CONTEST. 
Whilst the analysis of the case studies in the previous chapters has questioned whether the 
‘industrial-complex’ in the CT sector should be considered a sinister conspiracy, an 
extensive network of public-private interaction clearly exists in at least these three sub-
sectors of the CT aspects of security policy.  
To develop this thesis’s investigation into the origins, character and consequences 
of the private sector’s involvement in UK national security strategy, it is necessary to look 
beyond individual themes and specific procurements; this is important because, 
traditionally, the MIC has itself been considered as a broader system than merely the 
acquisition of specific capabilities. This chapter therefore examines the origins, character 
and activities of the principal primary, official and formal channel of communication that 
was established in the UK between Government and the security industry on non-military, 
CT-related security issues; the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers’ Community 
(RISC). The findings support the conclusions of previous chapters - the industrial-complex 
in the CT sector possesses some of the dynamics associated with the MIC, but its 
characteristics differ in important respects. 
It is important to consider the character and operation of RISC when considering 
‘the SIC’ in the CT sector because, with only limited exemptions1, a lack of scholarly 
attention has been paid to the motivations, potential influence and impact of industrial 
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representative organisations upon security policy and associated spending levels. This is a 
surprising oversight in view of the ferocity and volume of the criticism that has been 
levelled towards the emerging ‘SIC’ since 9/11.2 Indeed, one might have expected that RISC 
would have been subject to extensive scrutiny in view of the fact that UK Government 
security policy documentation after 9/11 has referred to the important role it plays in 
supporting the Government’s security objectives.3 This contrasts with the criticism levelled 
towards the engagement structures that have emerged between Government and industry 
within the defence sector4. 
Several reasons may account for the apparent apathy with which scholars have 
treated the development of RISC. Firstly, in contrast to the defence sector there are some 
limitations around what can be discussed (let alone published) on structures dealing with 
what are undeniably sensitive CT matters. Secondly, it may be that ‘domestic security’ 
issues are seen as potentially less glamorous than military issues; discussing whether 
private contractors should be permitted to kill adversaries on the battlefield or whilst 
supporting military operations, whilst largely a fictional proposition, can be seen as more 
exciting than debating whether security guards should be able to search passengers at UK 
airports, for example. This lack of scholarly attention may need to change, however, in 
view of the extensive level of private sector involvement in non-military areas of national 
security such as CT, as illustrated above, and the growing prominence with which its role 
features in Government documentation. 
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This chapter provides for the first time an analysis of RISC’s ambition to support 
and influence Government on the industrial aspects of security policy after 9/11. Whilst 
there is nothing necessarily wrong with ‘lobbying’ per se, it is the contention of this thesis 
that it is essential for this development to be properly analysed to determine whether new 
mechanisms of oversight and accountability are needed in this sector. Furthermore, whilst 
defence spending continues to account for the largest proportion of the UK’s national 
security budget, non-military security expenditure has grown substantially since 9/11. This 
thesis has consistently argued that it is right and proper, therefore, to consider whether 
the dynamics once attributed to the MIC have shifted to security sector, and/or affected 
policy. Finally, as Chapter 7 will examine in further detail, a more active and coordinated 
(yet remarkably little commented upon) UK Government strategy is now being pursued 
with RISC around how to harness the contributions of the security industry; including on 
controversial issues such as the promotion of security exports internationally. As RISC has 
sought to contribute to the development of this activity, proper attention should be 
afforded to the origins and character - not to mention the appropriateness - of the role it 
has played. 
6.1 Origins of cooperation 
Whilst RISC was formally launched in March 2007, the original idea to establish a 
mechanism for more structured dialogue with the private sector on CT issues preceded this 
date. It is important to consider the origins of the organization not only to examine the 
causes of, and reasoning behind, its foundation, but also because such a historical enquiry 
provides insights into the character of public-private interaction that has emerged. In 
researching this element of post 9/11 public-private security cooperation, this thesis 
benefitted from interviews with individuals involved in the development of RISC, and for 





from what emerges as RISC’s direct predecessor organization - the little known Joint 
National Security and Resilience Advisory Council (JNSRAC). 
Early ambitions 
The first and (as it transpired) only ever Chairman of the JNSRAC, Mr. John Backhouse, was 
interviewed and offered an account of how the entity initially emerged in 2005. The 
impression left is of an absence at the time of any existing structures for coordinating 
Government-industry liaison on CT matters, with only an ad hoc collection of individual 
companies and industry trade associations with various interests in ‘security’ apparently 
interested in creating such engagement. Serious discussions developed on the idea of 
forming a more comprehensive pan-industry engagement mechanism for the UK, albeit 
initially very informal in character. According to Mr. Backhouse in an interview with the 
author, initial discussions held at a preliminary security industry meeting convened by the 
Intellect Industry Association (now rebranded as TechUK) at a hotel on Park Lane in London 
in early 2004 - for ‘so-called interested security companies within the Intellect 
membership, who in some way, shape or form, had innovations and products to offer 
within this new security sector’5 - suggested much need for improvement. Backhouse 
reflected:  
…it was apparent from that meeting there was no direction, no 
strategic planning or even interface with Government agencies. There was 
a mission statement, but (…) objectives, strategies or tactics seemed to be, 
light on the ground.6 
Mr. Backhouse also recollected: 
I was of the opinion there needs to be someone who can coordinate this 
activity because we were going through (…) a period of ‘amber’ in respect 
of some of the perceived threats to homeland security which were being 
reported in the news[.]7 
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According to Backhouse, in 2004-05 there was an overwhelming sense that the security 
industry was being treated on an ‘ad hoc’, uncoordinated basis and this needed to change 
in the new context.  
The first meeting of the initially-named ‘National Security & Resilience Council’ was 
convened at the premises of the Intellect Trade Association on 20 June 2005 and the notes 
of the meeting immediately illustrate how consideration was given to the appropriateness 
of somehow replicating the structures that already existed in ‘defence’ to the ‘security’ 
sector. Indeed, the Chairman introduced the meeting by stating that the ‘objective was to 
ascertain whether members perceived any value in establishing a new Defence Council to 
address the Homeland Security (HLS) domain?’8 In addressing this question, a consensus 
quickly emerged that the creation of such a forum would be beneficial; one attendee 
stated, for example, that ‘a collaborative approach should be developed’9, whilst another 
advanced the idea that ‘Industry should be collectively assembled even if HMG [Her 
Majesty’s Government] is not.’10 Such were the perceived shortcomings of the existing, 
disorganised approach, that another member even ‘saw coordination as the ‘Holy Grail’’11. 
There was no shortage of ambition during the group’s discussion on the ‘Proposal to 
Establish a Council’; it is even recorded that the Chairman ‘suggested that the ambition 
should be to become the lead single voice for UK/Europe/Global.’12  
Further discussions took place on the possible future membership of the body, and 
on identifying the Council’s future objectives; the minutes state that the budding entity 
believed that ‘high-level coordination activity is essential’ and that ‘The Council should 
develop a partnership between Industry and Government (Central and Local), Emergency 
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Services & Academia’13. With the first stated objective of the organization being to develop 
a ‘partnership’ with Government, the organization quickly turned its attention to potential 
future membership. The initial meeting recognised the need to involve a broad coalition of 
interested parties in future meetings; an action was specifically agreed to ‘invite the 
relevant industry Chairman from HLS groups in the DMA, SBAC, RUSI (Sandra Bell) and 
Chatham House to the next meeting’14. The group certainly seemed to be successful in 
addressing this issue; whilst the initial gathering attracted only six attendees - interestingly, 
from companies operating in defence and thus providing evidence of dynamics shifting 
from ‘defence’ to ‘security’15 - 14 representatives participated in the following meeting.16   
A picture of increasing activism subsequently emerges from JNSRAC’s documentation 
and the early discussions reflected a strong and increasingly coordinated industry-led 
desire to secure a more formal and regularized form of strategic engagement with the 
Government on security issues. For example, a discussion on the rationale and aims of the 
new structure took place during the second meeting of the now re-named JNSRAC on 27 
July 2005. The Chairman opened the meeting as follows: 
Our agreed purpose today is to establish a way forward, a direction, 
working together as one united body or council, with a broad and definite 
mandate intent to assist those National and Local Government and 
Authorities involved in the broad subject of Security and Resilience.17 
Whilst not everyone might be comfortable with such a mandate being handed to an 
industry body, it is perhaps reassuring that the new structure purported to wish to support 
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the UK’s security objectives, rather than be limited to the pursuit of its own commercial 
interests18. 
The JNSRAC was clearly seeking to establish a formal structure for cooperation 
with Government and the group discussed how it would be important to identify an 
appropriate interlocutor; as one participant put it, the senior Cabinet Office official, Mr. Bill 
Jeffrey (then Security and Intelligence Coordinator), would be ‘a good lever for industry to 
exercise especially in identifying an HMG focus to industry’19 and the minutes also record 
the Chairman’s statement that he ‘[u]nderstood that Mr. Jeffreys (sic.) is very keen to 
support this Council’.20 This represents a clear desire on the part of industry, therefore, to 
establish a dialogue with a least one corner of the ‘iron triangle’ (the Executive), and the 
suggestion that Government might have been receptive to it. 
Emerging objectives 
Additional documentation shows that careful consideration was given to how to realize the 
JNSRAC’s emerging objectives. Most strikingly, in an initial discussion of the ‘Purpose and 
Tasks’ of one of JNSRAC’s working groups, a primary aim was recorded as being ‘To 
understand and influence policy’21; this clearly establishes that the organization did 
consider developing a role for lobbying within its structures. Furthermore, having 
embarked upon an exercise in defining ‘the key customers within National, Regional, and 
Local Governments and the Civil Sector’22, the participants agreed that ‘Sir Richard 
Mottram (who had succeeded Bill Jeffrey as Security and Intelligence Coordinator) was the 
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most important individual to target’23 before identifying ‘the key message to be delivered 
to him’24. In a statement that might concern critics of ‘the SIC’, one of the bullet points 
covering what it believed should be relayed to Sir Richard was that JNSRAC ‘…exists to 
bring coherence to advice and on industrial capabilities to inform procurement decisions by 
Government departments’25. Whilst such discussions appear to have been of only an 
informal nature, they are revealing of the JNSRAC’s apparent desire to seek to inform 
government thinking outside official contracting procedures.  
The JNSRAC’s emerging efforts to engage Government achieved notable progress; 
meeting minutes record that two senior civil servants - Sir Richard Mottram and Bruce 
Mann26 - were involved early on. Indeed, the JNSRAC’s Chairman noted that the presence 
of Sir Richard at its meeting in December 2005 promised to make it a ‘landmark event’27, 
introducing the meeting as follows: 
Sir Richard, I stress that JNSRAC is not another Trade Association - neither 
is it a bureaucratic quango - It is a functional, voluntary, advisory and 
consultative body of senior executives all involved in the wide arena and 
scenario of National/Homeland Security, offering ourselves as a single 
collective advisory council for efficiency and effectiveness. - A single 
coordinated voice with one hymn sheet and without any grandiose 
Ideologies.28  
In a pithy conclusion to the meeting seemingly designed to state industry’s offering in no 
uncertain terms, the Chairman stated that JNSRAC aimed to become ‘…a National Defence 
Industrial Council for National Security and Resilience.’29 This striking statement confirms, 
perhaps more than any other cited in the thesis, that the foundations of JNSRAC (and 
therefore RISC) were borne out of a comparison with the arrangements that already 
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existed in the defence sector; arrangements around which the Cabinet Office’s Security 
and Intelligence Coordinator would certainly have been aware. Critics might look upon this 
as alarming new evidence of the more damning SIC thesis - that the MIC was seeking new 
ways to institutionalize itself in the burgeoning CT sector. Worse still, the emerging 
collaboration appears to have been developing largely as a result of an ‘industry push’ and 
not a ‘government pull’. It is clear that a form of systemic exchange was developing, and 
that JNSRAC was actively promoting the need for stronger mechanisms for strategic 
dialogue. 
Further dialogue took place between the JNSRAC and its high profile guest; a 
roundtable discussion indicates how industry views were relayed to Sir Richard on the 
shortcomings of the status quo mechanisms for public-private sector cooperation. One 
attendee suggested, for example, that reforms to procurement could save Government ‘a 
great deal of money’30, whilst another lamented how ‘Requirements and needs are 
fragmented’ in the security sector, meaning that; ‘Industry is therefore reluctant to invest 
which puts risk on HMG as well as taking longer to achieve implementation of a solution’31. 
There is nothing in the minutes to suggest that the Government was in anything more than 
‘receive mode’32 or that it would take the various issues raised by those present 
automatically at face value. However, Sir Richard’s statement that ‘…I am concerned about 
what you have told me and I will go away and think this through’ does seem to indicate 
that the Cabinet Office, if not other departments33, was minded to carefully consider 
JNSRAC’s perspective.    






 The minutes record several questions having being posed to the JNSRAC meeting by Sir Richard, 
including: ‘Given the existing machinery is there a market failure?’; ‘What are you thought’s on the 
lessons from 7/7?’; and ‘Has JNSRAC discussed these issues elsewhere within HMG?’ ibid. pp.5-7 
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The extent to which the JNSRAC persuaded Sir Richard to commit the Government 
to work with it (and subsequently RISC) is not entirely clear - John Backhouse described Sir 
Richard’s involvement in establishing the alliance as ‘instrumental’34 but there is no 
evidence that he personally attended another meeting of the organization. However, it is 
clear that Government thought enough of the organization that it continued to send 
officials to participate in its meetings35. It is easy to understand why the JNSRAC might 
have been able to achieve such resonance; whilst the first of its (internal) meetings 
described above notably took place shortly before the tragic events of 7/7, UK CT policy 
(including the industrial aspects thereof) quickly grew as a priority after this event. From 
the available evidence, JNSRAC quickly established itself as the leading industry forum that 
Government could engage with on this matter; on paper at least, it deliberately positioned 
itself as an easy and representative way in which the Government could consult the private 
sector. 
6.2 Inappropriate Foundations? 
The question of what constituted the motivations of those involved pushing for the 
establishment of a more formal structure for public-private cooperation is important to 
consider at this juncture; evidence that it was designed solely out of commercial self-
interest might support the ‘SIC-as-conspiracy’ thesis. To apply the proposition put forward 
by White in his study on the politics of the manpower-orientated part of the security 
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industry - that, ultimately, ‘private security companies are driven purely by profit 
motivations’36 - one might assume that, in pursuing a more formalized cooperative 
structure, industry’s desire to generate new business was the sole underpinning 
motivation behind establishing JNSRAC (and subsequently RISC). Any such conclusion 
would appear to be unfounded, however; judging by its public pronouncements, JNSRAC 
saw itself primarily as a structure capable of supporting the Government’s national security 
and resilience objectives. This purported raison-d’être features particularly prominently, 
for example, in the ‘Project GaIN report’ that was submitted to the Government by the ‘UK 
Security and Resilience Supply Base’ through the JNSRAC in June 2006. Understood to have 
been drafted primarily by (JNSRAC Council member) Dr. Sandra Bell, then of the Royal 
United Services Institute (RUSI), this report illustrates how the case for creating ‘a 
framework of operation across the entirety of the supply and demand communities’37 was 
justified on the basis of the need to improve the public-private interface for national 
security reasons. Having presented the threat environment, the introduction of the 
document states explicitly: 
…security and resilience progress is being hampered by a lack of interest, 
on behalf of industry, to invest in capability solutions to meet the security 
and resilience challenges the nation faces. Much of this is driven directly 
by the lack of attractiveness of the UK security and resilience market which 
is widely viewed as fragmented, diffuse and opaque in places.38  
In responding to what it sees as ‘barriers in the UK to industry investment’39, the report 
makes a series of bold (if not controversial) recommendations on how public private-
cooperation in the CT sector should be structured. It includes, for example, the notion that 
there should be ‘information exchange’ on government strategies including CONTEST40, 
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and that a series of what it calls ‘Joint Policy Working Groups’ should be established.41 
Most significantly, the report proposed that the JNSRAC should be superseded by RISC, 
arguing that whilst there had been ‘great success’ under the ‘trial’42, a new approach was 
needed: 
It is recommended that the supply base build on the work of the JNSRAC 
and create a single body representative of UK suppliers across the entire 
security and resilience spectrum that can bring definitive industry 
expertise and enable the sharing of risks with the demand base. It is 
proposed that this new body be called Security & Resilience Industry 
Suppliers Council (RISC).43 
In short, to be more representative a revised approach was being advocated that would 
include a wider set of participants than had been involved in JNSRAC. Whilst Project GaIN 
should be seen as more of a proposal than a policy, the report placed a significant 
emphasis on the need to improve the institutional cooperative arrangements that it 
argued would be needed to enhance security and resilience; i.e. to serve the public 
security interest, not solely industry’s own commercial priorities.  
That said, one interview conducted during this research raised an important new 
question around whether economic considerations may have been a driving motivation 
behind the idea of forming JNSRAC. In a potentially worrisome explanation given on the 
condition of anonymity by one individual familiar with the development of the 
organisation, it was suggested that industry’s original purpose for setting up the 
organization was actually to generate business for companies; not to support national 
security objectives.44 An awkward silence followed the author’s follow-up question on 
whether this might validate the worst fears of those who would urge caution around, or 
might even oppose, private sector involvement in national security strategy. 
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Other senior industrialists involved in JNSRAC and later RISC openly addressed the 
question of whether any more sinister motivations associated with SIC theories might 
underpin such strategic mechanisms of public-private engagement. Asked whether the 
dynamics associated with the MIC were now present in the security sector, the former 
Chairman of RISC replied: 
I don’t think the military-industrial complex concept really applies to 
security. After all, the military-industrial complex was supposed to be a 
kind of unhealthy relationship between very large companies and very 
large government spenders, with people (...) leaving the government 
service and going to work for large companies and all that. I don’t think 
that really applies in the security sector because (…) there’s a much higher 
proportion of smaller companies, and I don’t see sort of anything 
equivalent to the kind of the US defence giants dominating the scene.45  
The former secretary to RISC, Derek Marshall, also stated that the cooperation ‘doesn’t 
have the feel of a cosy conspiracy’46, reflecting; ‘I don’t start from the premise that I see 
industry and government colluding to whip up events to use their services.’47 Of course, 
critics might argue that senior representatives of the security industry would naturally 
argue like this; their strategy, the argument might follow, is to conceal and/or deny any 
potentially inappropriate elements of the system. Whilst on the basis of the evidence 
obtained during this thesis such arguments are unproven, it is equally true that any 
protestation from industry that there is ‘nothing to see here’, however well-intended, 
should not necessarily be taken at face value.  
The evidence suggests that to claim that a conspiracy existed would be to overdo 
it, however. Whilst there has hitherto been a shortage of analysis on the activity of JNSRAC 
and RISC, neither body has ever sought to pretend that industry did not possess 
commercial objectives in the security sector. For example, the Chairman of the JNSRAC was 
open about part of the motivation for establishing the alliance:  
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…that is why JNSRAC was created, as it were, to give companies a forum of 
opportunity for coordinated discussion, and to take their innovations 
further, commensurate with current Security status gained from 
intelligence, thus opening avenues for business and profit from sales in a 
new global market.48 
 
Here, then, is clear recognition that commercial considerations did play at least some part 
in the establishment of JNSRAC - whilst this may be seen as undesirable, it is hardly 
surprising. Indeed, as the following chapter demonstrates, there is a sense in both 
Government and industry that it is entirely appropriate to align both national security and 
economic considerations in pursuing cooperation between the public and private sectors 
in this arena.49 
Notwithstanding this thesis’s later contention that the private sector’s involvement 
in UK national security strategy should be afforded greater scrutiny and oversight, there 
appears to be limited evidence for any serious concerns about the activities of JNSRAC and 
RISC. Whilst it is clear that prior to 2006 there was very little publicly-available information 
on the ways in which Government was working with industry on CT issues, perhaps 
contributing to an impression of untoward activity, this can be explained as being mainly 
because any such strategic engagement was extremely ad hoc until the end of 2005. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that it was not until 2006 when the Government took the 
step of publishing CONTEST for the first time; a development that one industry executive 
saw as a ‘big step forward’50 for industry in the same way that it was for the general public. 
Government and industry subsequently became increasingly transparent on the work that 
they had been doing together on security and resilience issues, often through (but not 
limited to) the specific mechanism of RISC. That is not to say that it has been transparent 
about all its activity; or that there has been sufficient scrutiny of its activity.   
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6.3 From JNSRAC to RISC 
Whatever the desirability of JNSRAC’s agenda, the recommendations from the GaIN report 
were accepted and appear to have been taken forward with the wholehearted 
encouragement of senior Government officials. The minutes of the final meeting of the 
JNSRAC, for example, celebrated that within a speech he delivered in October 2006 the 
then Home Secretary, John Reid, had ‘acknowledged Project Gain and sought further 
progress before the end of 2006.’51 Further analysis of Reid’s speech reveals a set of 
comments that deeply resonate with this thesis. In analyzing how innovation might be 
applied to the CT context, the Home Secretary stated: 
There is much we can learn from the experience of such a mature sector 
[the defence industrial base] and what it can bring to the emerging market 
in security and resilience we are now seeking to create and grow. We don’t 
do that with naiveté; it is always worth remembering what Dwight 
Eisenhower – hardly a renowned left-wing firebrand – had to say about 
what he called the “Military Industrial Complex” in his 1961 Farewell 
Presidential radio broadcast.52 
This clearly illustrates that in its attitude towards working with industry on CT issues, the 
UK Government was seeking to take lessons from, if not replicate, the arrangements that 
existed in defence. Furthermore, it is prescient for this thesis that the Home Secretary - 
himself a former Defence Secretary - would choose to specifically refer to the MIC concept. 
The insistence of the then Home Secretary’s that ‘Eisenhower’s warning’ needed to be 
taken into account leaves no doubt that the dynamic was firmly in the mind of the most 
senior Government Minister engaged in, and ultimately responsible for, the initial 
formation of RISC.  
Whatever concerns may have existed around the possibility for ‘unwarranted 
influence’ being exerted in this new context, they did not deter the Home Secretary from 
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warmly welcoming the ideas of Project GaIN and specifically the RISC initiative now under 
development. His comments have not been analysed elsewhere and are worth quoting in 
detail because they provide insights into how Government was thinking about the creation 
of the new structure: 
The work you as suppliers are doing in forming a new trade body is most 
welcome. Of course, we have yet to see the details of the Security and 
Resilience Industry Suppliers Council (RISC) to be launched before New 
Year. But September’s “Project GaIN” report from the UK Security and 
Resilience Supply Base is insightful. The statement in the report’s 
introduction, which claims the UK market in security and resilience is 
fragmented and budgets too small, is striking. Inasmuch as I am 
determined that the emerging market grows through partnering for 
competitive advantage, that is no cover for allowing such important 
products and services to come to us only or mainly through foreign 
imports. As in all struggles, the winners are those able to innovate and 
learn ahead of the adversary. We need a clear lead in driving delivery, 
innovation and growth in security and resilience. Your emerging trade 
body’s suggestion that links are established with ministerial leaders and 
wider stakeholders seems in keeping with my insistence that everyone is 
involved in the struggle to advance our values.53 
Here is a clear suggestion, then, that the Home Secretary strongly favoured the 
development of a UK-based industry capable of providing innovative capabilities to 
support national CT objectives, and that such a sector should work closely with 
Government at all levels. Whilst John Reid would presumably have been unlikely to agree 
that something resembling a corrosive ‘SIC’ was under development, this shows how the 
establishment of a new, systemic exchange between the public and private sectors in the 
CT sector was being actively encouraged at the highest levels of Government.    
JNSRAC had helped to persuade senior policymakers that stronger levels of 
engagement were needed, and served as a catalyst to the formation of RISC. Its successor 
organization wasted no time in developing its agenda - the first formal meeting of the new 
RISC Council took place just weeks later. Revealingly, the new Chairman54 asked members 
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for ‘any opening points about their aspirations for RISC’55; several contributions indicate 
how commercial matters were not far from the forefront of attendees’ minds with one 
bullet point expressing, for example, a desire to obtain ‘[a] clearer picture of HMG’s plans 
and procurement strategy for security to guide private investment decisions’.56 At the 
same time, an awareness also existed that any such priorities should not be developed in 
isolation; the record specifically lists ‘Striking a balance between improving the security of 
the nation and developing a competitive industrial base’ as one particularly self-aware 
aspiration. The fact that the meeting also discussed the appropriate Terms of Reference for 
the Council, launched a new Working Group on international matters, and considered 
whether funding for a new secretariat would be needed also shows how the organization 
had embarked upon a highly energetic start-up phase. Whilst no one from Government 
appears to have attended this meeting, the Home Office’s ‘apologies’ were noted – as was 
its reassurance that it ‘fully supported the creation and development of RISC, and hoped to 
engage further in the near future.’57 
The formal launch of RISC took place during an event at RUSI on 29 March 2007, 
during which the Home Secretary was ‘delighted’ to deliver the keynote speech.58 As part 
of his remarks, Reid referred to RISC as ‘a powerful channel of communication between 
Government and market in security and resilience’, arguing that industry’s ability to 
produce and sustain innovation ‘is certainly a vital key to our fight against terrorism’59. 
Given the alliance’s earlier, targeted efforts to secure the participation and support of 
Government, this would presumably have been seen as a significant victory and certainly a 
source of great encouragement. The positive energy on display by RISC’s Chairman in the 
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media following this high profile announcement would certainly support this: ‘Through the 
formation of RISC, the UK security and resilience sector will act as one, in concert with 
government, to deliver a significantly fortified frontline of security and resilience’60. His 
optimistic reflections on the launch and RISC’s potential went even further, as he 
addressed his high hopes for how industry’s commercial performance could benefit; ‘The 
dual prize will be stronger economic growth and enhanced national security.’61 The 
enthusiasm of those involved can be easily understood: whether for national security or 
economic reasons, or indeed a mixture of the two, RISC had now been formally endorsed 
by the Government. Far from worrying about whether it might be seen as a conspiracy, the 
industry was being open about its objectives - should anyone care to listen.  
This chapter has already demonstrated that extensive interaction took place after 
7/7 between the UK Government and the security suppliers’ community in forming the 
JNSRAC and RISC; an organisation which continues to exist today and which clearly remains 
the Government’s main conduit to the security industry. A recognition of both the national 
security and economic underpinnings of RISC consistently appeared in the (industry) 
discussions on the structure and the priorities of the new organization; the alignment of 
these were seen as positive by the industry, and by some in Government - including the 
Home Secretary.  
6.4 An Effective Mechanism? 
Whilst important, the process of establishing institutions or structures for public-private 
dialogue on security matters is only one aspect of the cooperation. As this dissertation is 
also concerned with the character and effectiveness of the implementation of such 
cooperation it therefore asks: how effectively did RISC develop in practical terms and, in 
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doing so, has it contributed to the creation of ‘an SIC’ of the character sometimes 
presented by critics?   
As data pertaining to these questions was not previously available, interview 
participants were invited to comment on the effectiveness of the strategic mechanisms 
that had been established for public-private cooperation in CT including RISC. A wide 
variety of viewpoints were offered on the effectiveness of the organization since its 
establishment and what (if anything) it had actually achieved. For example, a former 
secretary of RISC, Derek Marshall, was conservative in his estimation of the success that 
had been achieved; ‘…it seems to me that some progress was made, but I mean it was 
limited progress.’62 Comparing the experience of RISC with the arrangements that had long 
since existed in the defence sector, Marshall stated that the latter was ‘much closer’ and 
suggested that a deliberate effort was made not to replicate some of the deficiencies 
associated with that type of engagement in the security sector63. Having explained that 
‘RISC showed itself to be useful to government in a number of ways’64, and that 
‘Government lapped that up’65, he explained that he could ‘understand why government 
wouldn’t want to rush into that kind of more deep relationship’ in security66. This sense 
that more could have been achieved was reflected by other industrialists, including one 
executive who, speaking on the condition of anonymity, explained that he ‘…had seen lots 
of engagement and discussion but I wouldn’t necessarily describe it as a partnership, or a 
very loose one if it is.’67 Another former trade association official, David Evans, described 
the engagement as ‘a mixed bag’68, explaining that the quality of engagement was 
extremely variable; albeit seeing the Home Office as ‘an open thinking body that saw 
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engagement with the private security industry as being important’69. The desirable end 
goal for industry, it seems, would be the emergence of a much closer relationship with 
(and across all relevant parts of) the Government. The existence of such a relationship in 
the CT sector - a relationship which if established might resonate with the concerns 
associated with ‘the SIC’ under consideration - has clearly not yet emerged in many leading 
industry figures’ minds, despite the original vision and intentions of RISC.70 
For a former Chairman of RISC, there is a more fundamental issue inhibiting 
progress considered in this way: 
I’m not sure that either party to that relationship has thought yet quite 
carefully enough about what it needs from it. What does government 
actually want from industry in the security space? We have a partial 
answer: (…) it wants ideas; it wants ideas for solutions to new problems 
and all that. But it does tend to look at those very much through a kind of 
technical lens. It doesn’t yet look at them through the eyes of someone 
who is concerned about efficient procurement.71 
This view is supported by the first industry secondee to the OSCT who provided an 
interpretation on how industry was viewed inside the Home Office; ‘It appeared to me that 
the Home Office considered that industry could solve some of the technical problems that 
they were facing, which is why they saw industry as fitting within the Science and 
Technology unit.’72 The impact of the decision to locate industry’s first ever secondee in 
the S&T section of the OSCT - not within its strategy unit - should not be understated; it 
can be reasonably argued that the effect of this would have been to make it more difficult 
to realize any aspiration to embark upon a more strategic conversation with Government 
from that location. The decision can be seen as symptomatic of the Government’s 
hesitation - both at the time and arguably today - around the whole issue of industry 
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engagement; whether or not this is a reassuring outcome will depend on the eye of the 
beholder. 
If correct, the idea that Government and industry have not yet resolved (or even 
truly embarked upon) a proper, policy-level conversation on what should constitute the 
scope and priorities of industry’s involvement in national security outside technical 
matters, despite the establishment of RISC, might temper the fears of those who believe 
that a unified, carefully-considered conspiracy has arisen. On the other hand, critics might 
be concerned at how this thesis’s evidence clearly suggests that some industrialists would 
wish for an even deeper relationship with Government. The purpose of this section is not 
to conclude on which of these readings is the correct one; diverging views on the 
appropriate level of corporate involvement in security are to be expected and, when 
backed by evidence, extremely welcome. However, any idea that Government and industry 
have been on exactly ‘the same page’ with regards to the type, level and character of their 
engagement through RISC - as the ‘SIC-as-conspiracy’ theory might suggest - may be seen 
as a misreading once one understands the frustrations that exist in industry on the limited 
‘progress’ made to date. 
This is supported by leading industry figures’ recognition of the limitations of even 
those RISC initiatives that have been looked upon by industry as being ‘successful’. One 
such programme of activity was the creation of a set of joint Industry Advisory Groups 
(IAGs) that were established by RISC and the OSCT in 2008-09; the 2009 iteration of 
CONTEST explained that ‘[t]hrough RISC five joint Industry Advisory Groups have been 
established in areas of particular importance to this strategy’73. The Government outlined 
the rationale for the groups as: 
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…to better exploit Government-funded research, develop Government 
requirements, focus private sector investment and enable access to 
innovation.74 
Whilst the idea of industry helping to ‘develop requirements’ might set alarm bells ringing 
amongst those critical of any non-contractual basis for interaction, the impression left 
upon closer examination is that none of these groups actually delivered many tangible 
results. It transpires, for example, that significant issues arose within even the most highly 
praised of these fora; the ‘CNI IAG’. One industry executive aware of the group’s activity 
responded candidly upon being asked whether the method of engagement proposed for 
the CNI sector as represented by the ‘Omand Triangle’ (introduced in Chapter 1) had been 
achieved: ‘I can answer the question: The answer is no.’75 The executive explained that 
despite attempts to ‘…create better engagement and capabilities capture, and more 
support for infrastructure operators, I still think there’s a long way to go[.]’76 Separately, it 
can be observed that the Olympic Security IAG77 did not prevent the emergence of the G4S 
contract issue.  
Some participants were more positive about the overall role played by RISC. 
Richard Fletcher, for example, described RISC as ‘a sensible idea’, labelling as ‘successful’ 
what he described as the ‘R&D interface’ between various parts of government and 
industry.78 However, he was also clear that some very practical difficulties arose; 
‘Inevitably it [RISC] was bedevilled by bureaucratic jealousies within government and 
considerable commercial jealousies from the private sector.’79 A separate positive 
appraisal was provided in interview by an industry executive with an understanding of the 
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OSCT’s secondee arrangements. During the conversation, the interviewee was upbeat 
about the cooperation: 
…we actually made a massive amount of progress, I felt, because we were 
completely embedded (…) and we were heavily engaging in really helping 
at the grass roots. Discussing; informing; putting in what industry would 
really think. What they would do. What they wouldn’t do. How that policy 
would impact industry.80 
The idea that because industry was ‘embedded’ in the OSCT it may have been able to 
articulate its viewpoint from that position is not a new one; RISC’s first industry secondee 
to the OSCT was involved in the production of a series of booklets published by the Home 
Office that pertained to the role of industry, for example.81 Some comments suggest more 
strongly, however, that the suppliers’ community through RISC was seeking to exert 
greater influence upon Government policy through its engagement. In a discussion on the 
process around the formulation of the Government’s 2012 ‘National Security Through 
Technology’ (NSST) White Paper82, one industry executive explained (on the condition of 
anonymity) how concerns grew inside the Home Office:  
…individuals then got worried that actually maybe industry was having too 
much of an impact to resolve. We [industry] were far more effective at 
corralling and inputting, and […] coming out with logical arguments about 
why things should go certain ways, than Government was itself. So there 
was a feeling then that we were having undue influence on policy and 
strategy as a result of it. We clearly still have a lot of work, behavior to 
change and trust to build to dispel such fears.83 
It appears that a view emerged inside the department that the arrangements had to be 
reined in. Reflecting on why the Government reviewed the scope of industry’s involvement 
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in the policymaking process, one industry executive (speaking on the condition of 
anonymity) explained; 
…it definitely came out as a perception ‘they’re the private sector, they’re 
all about profit and making money, they can’t possibly have the same ethic 
as the civil service would have. This was disapproved (sic) but it remains a 
common perception.84 
Whilst there is no evidence of any specific untoward activity having taken place, it is 
perhaps reassuring to find that someone in the Home Office was making an assessment of 
the appropriate level of industry’s involvement in contributing to this policy. Following the 
publication of NSST, the Home Office took steps to establish its own new in-house ‘Security 
Engagement Team’ (SIET) headed by a new Director-level appointment. Whilst this 
decision was ultimately extremely sensible because it promised to develop stronger public-
private coordination in the sector, the impression left is that, prior to this, RISC had the 
ability to affect at least the industry-related aspects of Home Office policy, and that it 
probably took Government too long to reach the conclusion that it must develop its own 
structures for working with the sector. In short, it may well have relied too heavily on 
contributions from the private sector that, upon more serious reflection, many (including, 
it would seem, individuals within Government) could consider as being inappropriate. 
This chapter raises important questions about whether an industry body or its 
representatives should ever be in a position to influence Government policy matters 
directly. In addition, it also suggests that there is currently very limited (if not an absence 
of) external or independent oversight of the mechanisms that have been set up inside the 
Home Office to engage with industry. Whilst reassuring to a certain extent, it appears that 
only because of the concerns of certain unnamed officials, the scope of industry’s 
involvement was reconsidered. The ad hoc character and lack of transparency around 
these developments should be viewed, therefore, as unsatisfactory. Without the 







development of stronger institutional constraints and formal oversight in this area, it is 
easy to see how the engagement might develop in such a way as to play into the 
(understandable) worst fears of those who might be concerned about the potential harm 
that could be done by unchecked cooperation.  
It should be recognised that no one in industry would be likely to see the need to 
apologize for wishing to cooperate closely with Government in the policy space – especially 
on the development of specific industry-related policies such as NSST. Indeed, the 
overwhelming sense derived from interviews is that more could and should be done to 
reform and improve the quality of the structures that exist for developing dialogue 
between Government and security industry. For example, the current secretary of RISC, 
Mark Phillips, explained in discussing the effectiveness of the current engagement 
mechanisms: 
The biggest issue is how do we ensure that Government has the reach it 
needs to all elements of the security sector, including those parts of 
industry who are working on technologies that you might be able to apply 
(…) in the security space.85 
This clearly indicates that a view exists even within RISC that the organisation is not yet 
properly configured. The former CEO of EADS agreed that there is significant room for 
improvement in how public-private dialogue is developed on security matters, explaining 
soberly: ‘…do you feel that that’s a genuine conversation going on between industry and 
government? No, no.’86 Whilst in making this comment Robin Southwell did not  
specifically refer to RISC or its performance, that the organisation was expressly set up for 
this purpose means that his comments can hardly be taken as a ringing endorsement of its 
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activity. The shortage of scholarly contributions covering how the arrangements might be 
developed or improved is regrettable in this context.87 
Attitudes within Government on the desirability of engaging with industry at the 
policy level - and on the effectiveness of RISC for doing so - were also mixed. The Director 
of the Home Office’s Center for Applied Science and Technology (CAST) was generally 
positive, explaining that RISC had been an important mechanism for Government in 
helping to engage with the whole sector: 
…there are thousands of them that are out there and it is difficult to 
engage and to communicate. So the trade associations have been a very, 
very helpful vehicle for that - and therefore coming together as an 
umbrella under RISC.88 
Interestingly, whilst recognizing the ‘danger (…) of company commercial interests getting 
in the way of a more collective experience’, Rob Coleman saw the opportunity that RISC 
had to act as ‘an unbiased leveller’, and even commented on the purported benefits he 
saw of the advocacy role being performed by the organisation: ‘I think you have seen there 
has been quite a bit of lobbying, and that’s not a bad thing - its helping understand some of 
the positions.’89 The underlying assumption here appears to be that it should always be the 
Government who actually determines the policy. 
Offering an alternative perspective, a former Head of Strategy at the OSCT, Charlie 
Edwards, drew on his experience to express doubts around whether it is useful for 
policymakers to involve the private sector in the policy-making process through 
organizations such as RISC. Referring to the formulation of the 2011 iteration of CONTEST, 
he explained: 
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…are they [the private sector] really going to provide anything of value to 
me when I am thinking about CONTEST? Probably not, in terms of thinking 
about the strategy. But do I want to share CONTEST with them, and 
understand what the implications are for them? Probably, out of interest, 
but it’s not really going to affect me at all.90 
Edwards was not the most senior individual to offer such a viewpoint. The former Minister 
for Security in the Home Office, Lord West, similarly expressed reservations around 
whether industry should ever be involved in policymaking in this area; ‘Policy and strategy 
are not really the business of the private… of the private enterprises.’91 He continued: 
‘…that’s not really where industry should be. Industry should be coming up with ways of 
achieving the policy and strategy the government has decided upon.’92 
For Lord West, then, a clear line must be drawn between the respective roles of 
Government and industry. The attitude that Government in the form of the Home Office 
has hitherto merely been looking to industry for technical solutions seems to be prevalent 
amongst senior representatives of Government; its message certainly seems to have been 
transmitted across into some parts of industry. In further evidence of this, one executive 
summarized the engagement as follows; ‘I’m not sure the Home Office part of the 
operation has really felt a need to involve industry in policy and strategy very much. I think 
they see us more as, well, you know; “we’ll tell you what it is and then you can provide 
it.”’93 This may well be the appropriate balance in terms of actually determining policy, but 
it does not necessarily reflect the repeated insistence, found in a number of security policy 
documents encountered during this research, that the Government depends on the private 
sector to realise the UK’s security objectives.94 Furthermore, it is notable that the attitude 
is far away from being the sort of cooperation that the GaIN report developed by industry 
originally envisaged - and that the Home Secretary at the time so warmly welcomed. 
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That is not to downplay the significance of the recent decision taken and aimed at 
improving the quality of engagement between Government and industry in the security 
sector, the appointment of a new ‘Director - Security Industry Engagement’ within the 
OSCT in June 2013. This was seen by many interview participants, both from Government 
and industry, as an important move that promised to considerably strengthen existing 
arrangements.95 This thesis benefitted from the first appointee of the role agreeing to 
participate in the study and being interviewed. In responding to a question on the 
effectiveness of the strategic engagement to date, and the mechanisms for doing so, 
Stephen Phipson interestingly contrasted the situation with the arrangements of the 
defence sector; noting the benefits of the ‘uniform market environment’, in the case of the 
latter, where ‘if you’re in industry you can see the way that works’96. Reflecting the opinion 
of the Head of Industrial Policy at the MoD who believed that his department and industry 
have ‘a good relationship at the strategic level’97, Phipson also saw the arrangements as 
working ‘quite well’ in defence;  
…there’s a great deal of exchange between MOD and the prime 
contractors both in terms of people and in terms of understanding of 
policy. So it’s a pretty robust and mature way of doing business.98 
Within security, by contrast, Mr. Phipson explained that it is more difficult to develop 
effective public-private engagement as a result of the widely-recognised perceived 
‘problem’ of coordination in the sector; ‘…the issue (…) in national security is that we have 
more than 100 agencies involved[.]’99 His concise summary of the effect this has on the 
supporting industry is worth citing as it appears to represent the view of many individuals 
operating in the security sector: 
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The fragmented approach from the departmental view in government 
creates a very fragmented industry underneath it, and so you get varying 
degrees of policy interaction.100 
This problem of market ‘fragmentation’, as interviewees and RISC documentation describe 
it, is a core, defining characteristic of how the post 9/11 UK security market operates. The 
fact that the defence market possesses one customer, in the MoD, is a key differentiator, 
explaining why the ‘terms of engagement’101 look different in that sector, and why they are 
arguably easier to achieve.  
This fundamental difference in the operation of the defence and security ‘markets’ 
is of deep significance because it calls into question whether it is fitting, or even helpful, to 
categorize the sectors in the same way. Indeed, a case can be made that, to properly 
understand the landscape, the types of public-private interaction within each individual 
national security sub-sector often differ and thus need to be analysed on their own terms. 
From this perspective, it is easy to conclude that, whilst there may be some common or 
similar dynamics across different sub-sectors, any suggestion that the MIC has simply 
transferred into a singular ‘SIC’ would be misleading. Such simplifications do not take 
account of the complexities that this thesis has examined.  
In addition to (and partly as a result of) the highly disaggregated landscape in the 
non-military security sector, the level and quality of public-private engagement within each 
sector varies considerably; this often depends on the ‘maturity’ of the policy portfolio 
and/or the individual approach of the relevant department or agency.  In a revealing 
statement, Phipson described how he saw the variances across government: 
I think the interaction on CONTEST, for example, in the Home Office has 
been quite good, but if you look at the interaction on other ones - 
absolutely not. Not very clear at all. And there’s lots of them.102  




 Footnote 35 (Chapter 1) 
102





The evidence suggests that the defence and the security sectors operate very differently; 
as has already been seen in the previous chapters, ‘security’ is comprised of numerous sub-
sectors, many of which can exhibit quite different characteristics. In national security 
considered in the broadest sense, responsibility for working with industry at the strategic 
or the programme level tends to be ad hoc and has generally been devolved to individual 
Government departments. Previous chapters have already demonstrated this fact; e-
Borders, FiReControl and G4S Olympic Security contracts were all managed by different 
parts of Government, for example.  
Understanding this ‘fragmentation’ issue as a core, differentiating, if not unique 
characteristic of the CT and wider security sector helps to explain why RISC (amongst other 
individuals and government organizations) has frequently articulated the need for 
improved levels of coordination in the sector; this argument featured as a core element, 
for example, in RISC’s submission to Government as part of the pre-NSST consultation 
process.103 This high level of fragmentation in the sector also illustrates why the core 
aspects of the Security Industry Director’s role (as defined by the job description for the 
position that was available in 2012) placed such a strong emphasis on the need to 
coordination both with industry, but also, crucially, across Government.104  
Whilst Stephen Phipson’s appointment signaled that the Government had 
accepted responsibility for playing a greater role in working with the security industry, 
there appears to have been no attempt on either ‘side’ to pretend that commercial 
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objectives do not form a central element of the joint agenda. Critics may not welcome this 
development, but the increasing commercial orientation is perhaps not very surprising. 
When he was the Chairman of RISC, for example, Mr. Phipson was one of the most vocal 
proponents of the need for greater policy attention to help the sector realize its economic 
as well as security potential.105 Now that he finds himself inside Government, and staffed 
with a team of over 10 people, he is arguably in an even stronger position to help to 
generate growth in this budding sector.  
6.5 Origins and character of strategic engagement through RISC 
The experience of RISC’s development - from its earliest inception as JNSRAC to the recent 
appointment of its first ever Chairman to a senior position in the OSCT - shows how 
industry and Government have increasingly sought to work closely together to harness the 
security capabilities and economic potential of the UK-based security sector. In its 
presentation of a set of new insights, the chapter has shown how the design and structure 
of the alliance drew much of its inspiration from prior arrangements in the defence sector, 
and that in this context a desire was expressed at the highest levels of Government for the 
need to prevent the more detrimental aspects of the MIC transferring into the security 
sector. 
Whether one believes that this stated aspiration was genuine, or indeed 
successful, the chapter has shown how commercial motivations as well as concerns for 
national security underpinned both the origins of RISC, and its subsequent activities. 
Furthermore, the creation and development of this innovative new structure received the 
support of some of the most senior figures within the UK security policy community and 
from within industry. Having secured this joint support, a considerable array of new 
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structures and mechanisms were created to improve communication between 
Government and industry, with the creation of advisory groups and industry secondments 
among the more innovative and arguably more controversial developments. It is almost 
perplexing in this context how so little scholarly attention has been devoted to the 
alliance’s activity before now. 
Whilst no interview participants were fully satisfied at the level of progress that 
had been achieved to date by RISC, this chapter has shown how, after 7/7 in particular, a 
systemic exchange developed and evolved between the Government and industry at the 
level of policy and strategy - at least insofar as industry issues are concerned. Whether 
such an exchange should be limited solely to supporting national security objectives is now 
no longer in question, since a policy agenda has clearly developed (supported by 
Government) around how best to harness the security industry’s economic potential, as 
well as its role in the implementation of national security strategy. An analysis of how 
Government and industry have been seeking to realize such economic objectives in 
practice, and the extent to which other related concerns on the system of interaction in 












Chapter 7: Wider issues of concern 
Introduction 
Micro-level analysis of three large post-9/11 public sector security contracts and RISC 
demonstrated considerable proximity in the relationships that have emerged between the 
public and private sectors in the CT aspects of national security strategy after 9/11. Whilst 
analysis of the case studies cast doubt on the notion of an ‘industrial-complex’ in terms of 
a sinister conspiracy, a network of public-private interaction clearly exists in relation to 
CONTEST.  
This thesis’s examination of the character of the private sector’s involvement in 
national security now looks beyond analysis of specific case studies and into some wider 
characteristics of public-private interaction in CT. This is important because, as argued in 
Chapter 2, the MIC has historically been considered as a broader system of interaction than 
those revolving around the acquisition of specific capabilities. Chapter 1 introduced how 
the three additional issues are examined on the basis that they are concerns commonly 
associated with the MIC, classically conceptualized; this chapter subjects these more 
general characteristics to scrutiny, examining the extent to which the same (or similar) 
dynamics are now present in the CT and ‘wider security’ sector.  
The first section of this chapter examines how the phenomenon known as the 
‘revolving door’ - the rotation of government and private sector employees between the 
public sector and industry - has emerged in the CT sector, analyzing the potential 
significance of this development. The second section analyses the extent to which 
economic considerations have played a role in the post 9-11 non-military security sector; 
consideration is given to whether such dynamics feature in security procurement (as they 
have done previously in defence acquisition), and to whether employment considerations 





the UK Government’s emerging emphasis on CT-related security exports, analyzing this 
trend in the context of its traditional focus on (and the scholarly community’s interest in) 
the support given the defence industry in overseas markets. The consideration of these 
three themes casts new light on the private sector’s involvement in CT - and supports the 
conclusion drawn from the analysis in previous chapters - that the industrial-complex in 
the UK’s CT sector possesses some of the dynamics associated with the MIC, but operates 
quite differently in important respects. 
7.1 The ‘Revolving Door’  
Analysis on the MIC has often cited the supposed effect that the phenomenon of one-time 
public officials joining the defence industry upon their retirement may have had on 
perpetuating a potentially corrosive system; perhaps even shaping individual contract 
awards inappropriately. Indeed, the movement of public officials into industry in this way 
is rarely looked upon positively. Roland, for example, describes the emerging trend as ‘[a] 
revolving door shuffled defense executives back and forth despite the evident and 
egregious conflicts of interest.’1 The potential dangers of what has been presented as an 
almost perpetual, rotational phenomenon is also considered by Ledbetter, who identifies 
how the ‘revolving door’ came to be associated with what he describes as one of the major 
‘charges’ levelled against the MIC: 
…the notion of a revolving door between the military and its contractors 
was part of the merchants of death thesis back in the 1930s; by the late 
1950s it operated on a much larger scale and in peacetime.2 
 
The idea put forward by critics including Hughes and Wedel and Kennan, then, is that a 
corrosive system has emerged whereby (normally senior) former defence officials routinely 
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leave public service to take up well-paid jobs in industry, or in some cases vice versa.3 
Through this process, such officials are seen to adopt a vested commercial interest in 
promoting ever higher levels of defence spending - both generally, but also potentially in 
relation to certain capability areas or specific contracts. Such individuals are said to assist 
their companies by drawing on their pre-existing access, gained through prior Government 
service, to decision-makers and a wider network of contacts. In this way, it is argued, they 
can help to identify opportunities and influence future defence business decisions, advising 
their companies throughout on their strategic development. The suggested outcome is 
that the ‘revolving door’ dynamic contributes towards an inappropriate level of public-
private engagement that ultimately helps defence companies make large sums of money. 
The resulting popular image of the ‘revolving door’, therefore, is one of former 
public servants ‘cashing in’ and operating in a self-interested fashion in their attempts to 
bear influence upon defence acquisition. A recent story in The Telegraph newspaper neatly 
illustrates the disdain with which the dynamic can often be portrayed; it sought to 
implicate a number of former senior military officials for their involvement in assisting a 
fictional Korean company secure defence contracts, before presenting a view of the scale 
of the problem: 
In 2009/10, the latest year for which full figures are available, 326 officers 
or MoD officials were cleared to join the private sector. Of these, 240 went 
to defence companies. Fully 20 were generals, admirals or air marshals.4 
Investigative journalists are not alone in identifying (or being uncomfortable with) the 
circulation of employees between Government and industry in the national security sector; 
political campaigns have even been launched to challenge the processes around the 
practice. The UK-based Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT), for example, considers 
the ‘revolving door’ to be ‘a key feature of the relationship between the Government and 
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military industry’5 and, in support of its overall aim ‘to end the international arms trade’6, 
includes a ‘Revolving Door Log’ on its website to highlight what it sees as some of the most 
regrettable high profile appointments.7 Another NGO, Transparency International (TI), aims 
to eliminate corruption in the defence and security sectors and has similarly published 
work on the ‘revolving door’. A TI Working Paper on this subject identifies ‘defence’ as a 
sector that is ‘particularly prone to the revolving door phenomenon’8, stating what it sees 
as the risks arising from the dynamic: 
Increased interaction between business and government has also meant 
increased opportunities for corruption. A rise in conflicts of interest, and 
the creation of a ‘revolving door’ in government, demonstrates the 
thinning of boundaries between the public and private spheres.9  
Such is the dominant tone of most analysis on the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon in the 
defence sector. This is notwithstanding the fact that many people in Government and 
industry have presumably seen the benefits of the practice, as supported by the 
employment dynamics evident in this chapter. 
The main question for this section of the dissertation is whether since 9/11 there 
has been evidence of such a ‘revolving door’ existing in the non-military CT and other 
associated sectors. In line with this thesis’s broader enquiry, it is important to consider the 
impact that the any such phenomenon may have on non-military security policy and 
expenditure; the effect of this type of public-private interaction has hitherto been in short 
supply in literature on the ‘SIC’. 
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Interview data revealed a variety of attitudes on how the ‘revolving door’ operates 
in the UK’s national security arena. Describing the character of the private sector’s 
involvement in national security strategy, Omand identified the following dynamic: 
If we were looking at general national security strategy, which of course is 
dominated by defence, then I think the relationship could be described as 
circular. Companies that are major defence suppliers tend to employ 
retired service personnel to advise them on future requirements and 
future direction of policy which could then help target research and 
development (…)[.]10 
Omand also explained that, generally, such dynamics operate differently in the security 
and intelligence sectors; ‘…particularly in the internet age where thought leadership is as 
much in the private sector as the public sector’.11 Whilst Omand stated that he had not 
‘come across many cases where the private sector really has views on the future direction 
of policy as against the future direction of, say, the equipment programme’12, the fact that 
such a senior former Government official - one that has operated at highest levels of both 
the defence and security sectors - believes that there may be increased scope for the 
private sector to contribute ideas on policy matters suggests that further consideration of 
this issue is needed.13 The relevant point for this thesis is that the ‘revolving door’ within 
the industrial-complex in CT exhibits different characteristics when contrasted with 
defence. 
Further analysis confirms the movement of employees between the Government 
and the private sector in the non-military security sector. An examination into the 
employment history of the individuals involved in interviews for this research reveals 
significant rotation. As Appendix B outlines, 15 of the 26 interviewees had during the 
course of their careers worked in more than one of the interview categories (i.e. in 
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Government, industry or academia).14 Amongst them, it is notable that one former 
Chairman of RISC, John Howe, had been a Deputy Chief of Defence Procurement before 
joining industry (for Thales UK) in 2000.15  
Analysis of the employment movements of those involved in contracts examined in 
Chapters 3-5 is also revealing. In the case of FiReControl, for example, EADs’s Policy 
Adviser between 2005-2009, Richard Fletcher, was a one-time ‘career official in British 
Intelligence & Security Organisations between 1966 and 1998’16. Regarding e-Borders, one 
industry executive speaking on the condition of anonymity identified the prominence with 
which one independent consultant, Mr. John Yard, helped Raytheon Systems to secure the 
IT contract; Mr. Yard’s biography appearing on a company website confirms that he 
provided advice to Raytheon on their successful bid.17 Significantly, Mr. Yard’s short 
résumé both indicates that he was a former senior civil servant and that the positions he 
occupied appeared to serve as a highly marketable quality; ‘His wide experience on both 
sides of the fence means that he is constantly in demand and he has often been brought in 
to help resolve problem contracts.’18 Mr. Yard was not the only individual involved in e-
Borders to have moved from the public sector and into industry; Ms. Brooke Hoskins, 
identified as Raytheon’s programme director for the project19, had previously served at the 
Department of Trade and Industry.20 Whether a more appropriate metaphor is ‘hopping 
over fences’ or ‘whirling through revolving doors’, two figures associated with Raytheon’s 
e-Borders contract bid had once worked in senior Government positions. 
                                                          
14
 Appendix B, p.316 
15
 ‘John Francis HOWE’, Debretts.com, Via: http://www.debretts.com/people-of-
today/profile/819/John-Francis-HOWE (accessed 19.01.15) 
16
 ‘Richard Fletcher’, Anthem Corporate Finance Website, Via: http://www.anthemcf.com/team-
senioradvisor-RichardFletcher.html (accessed 26.03.14) 
17
 ‘John Yard’, CIO Development Website, Via: http://www.ciodevelopment.com/about-us/john-
yard/ (accessed 26.03.14) 
18
 Ibid. (Emphasis added) 
19
 Andrew Jack, ‘Britain set to test pioneering ‘e-borders’ monitoring system’, Financial Times, 4 
August 2008. 
20
 ‘NMI appoints Neul CEO Stan Boland as chairman’, NMI Website, Via: 





Research into the employment dynamics around London 2012 security also reveals 
considerable movement between the public and private sectors; especially after the 
Games. At least four senior public officials involved in various phases of the planning and 
implementation - Tarique Ghaffur21, Robert Raine22, Chris Scott23, and Steve Cooper24 - are 
known to have established their own private independent security consultancies after the 
Games, for example; it is understood that the latter two have provided support to FCO 
Services for support to the UK’s burgeoning Government-to-Government (G2G) security 
export drive (see section 7.3 below). Regarding the G4S manpower security contract, by 
contrast, some of the employment movements were rotational but less traditional in 
character. Firstly, the former Director of Events for G4S, Mr. Paul Bullen, was LOCOG’s 
‘Senior Contract Performance Manager’25; some awareness of G4S’s operations would 
therefore have been known by the Olympic organisers. Secondly, the author is aware that 
the UK Home Office seconded a senior official to G4S in the run up to the Games. That the 
Home Office had a ‘man on the inside’ reinforces the idea of a ‘revolving door’ existing in 
the non-military CT area. It also supports the portrayal in Chapter 5 of an extensive level of 
interaction between the public and private sectors on London 2012 security. 
Evidence of a ‘revolving door’ existing in the security sector extends beyond 
individuals operating at the operational level and into some more strategic positions. For 
example, the former Home Secretary and original Ministerial supporter of the 
establishment of RISC, John Reid, has been criticized for accepting an appointment as a 
senior adviser to G4S.26 Furthermore, two recent Government Ministers of Security - Lord 
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West and Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones - have alternated between public service and 
private sector employment; prior to their appointments both worked (as a senior adviser 
and Chairman respectively) for the same UK technology company, QinetiQ, which provides 
technological security solutions.27 Both previously held senior positions in the Armed 
Forces and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, respectively. Similar employment 
movements are also evident amongst those who have served under such Ministers; upon 
the completion of his duties as Lady Neville-Jones’ special adviser before the 2010 General 
Election, for example, Mark Phillips was appointed first as a Research Fellow at the Royal 
United Services Institute (RUSI) and, latterly (in 2012) as Security Policy Adviser to the ADS 
Group.28 Employment rotation clearly exists in the most senior UK security policy circles29, 
but whether the appointment of ‘security industry veterans’ and their advisers to senior 
positions in Government and industry makes it more likely that certain security solutions 
are adopted, as suggested by Hughes30, is debatable. Whilst Ministers may be the ultimate 
decision-makers for public security procurements - and indeed their cancellation - it should 
be noted that they are not the only individuals involved in shaping such requirements. 
Similar dynamics exist at senior official level. Most significant amongst these is the 
June 2013 appointment of Mr. Stephen Phipson as ‘Director - Security Industry 
Engagement’ within the OSCT. The reasons for this appointment have been analysed 
elsewhere31; suffice to note for present purposes that, prior to his appointment, Mr. 
Phipson had been the President of one of the UK’s leading security technology companies, 
Smiths Detection. Perhaps more significantly, Mr. Phipson had also served as the inaugural 
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Chairman of RISC and Vice President of Security for the Trade Association ADS - roles which 
contributed to him receiving a CBE for services to the security industry in 2010.32 That such 
a prominent, recognised one-time leader of the security industry has been given formal 
responsibility for engaging with the security industry on behalf of the Government is a 
particularly illuminating indicator of the ‘revolving door’ in action. Indeed, the Government 
was clearly proud of having secured Mr. Phipson’s services for this very reason; outlining 
the Home Office’s new plans for industrial engagement and the appointment, the UK’s 
Security Minister explained that ‘Stephen Phipson (…) brings with him a wealth of industry 
experience, knowledge and know-how which will be invaluable to this agenda.’33  
For the avoidance of doubt, research conducted for this thesis revealed no 
evidence suggesting anything inherently problematic about the nature of such 
appointments. That being said, conversations with some interviewees gave the possibly 
worrying impression that some industry figures believe that they now have ‘a man on the 
inside’ of Government. Asked about the state of the effectiveness of the Government’s 
new mechanisms for security industry engagement, for example, one industry executive 
replied: 
…we have high hopes for Stephen Phipson and his team in the Home 
Office now as being a voice of industry inside and a trusted channel for 
communicating with.34 
Whilst this is not read as being indicative of any sinister motivation, it suggests that some 
perceptions of the postholder’s proper functions may be misguided. Ideally, the new 
Director should be there to develop the Government’s engagement and relationship with 
the security industry and not vice versa. Whilst some shared objectives have already 
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emerged (see section 7.3 on security exports), the position was presumably not designed 
to act on industry’s behalf or established to serve its interests; it is to lead the 
Government’s engagement with industry.  
Only time will determine the character and effectiveness of the appointment. 
Interestingly, one interviewee expressed concern for Mr. Phipson in view of the 
commercial approaches that he had been seen to have so far adopted: 
I fear for his longevity in the government to be honest, because I think that 
he’s ruffling feathers - rightly so in my opinion, and God bless him for 
doing it - but he is ruffling feathers to get things done. And you know that’s 
not how Government works.35 
Regardless of whether the Home Office will eventually see Mr. Phipson’s contribution as 
‘invaluable’, its selection of this former industrialist as one of the Government’s own senior 
officials is perhaps the ultimate representation of the ‘revolving door’ operating in CT.  
Mr. Phipson’s appointment is not the only example of former industry officials 
working at the OSCT; in 2008 the OSCT invited RISC to help it recruit for the position of 
‘industry secondee’ to help manage the relationship. After a competitive recruitment 
procedure co-managed with industry, Adam Ogilvie-Smith (then of Thales UK) was the first 
appointee of this co-funded position; one he held from 2009 to 2011.36 Subsequently, Alan 
Jenkinson of IBM was the second secondee to be recruited into the OSCT’s position for 
industrial liaison. The appointment of around a dozen officials within the OSCT’s SIET 
following its establishment in 2012 appears to have halted the recruitment of further 
secondees from RISC, thus perhaps removing the need to question the desirability of such 
a funding arrangement. Nevertheless, the appointment of joint RISC/OSCT secondees is 
further evidence of the ‘revolving door’ in CT. 
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In Chapters 3-5 the involvement of consultants in managing security contracts or 
other government security programmes was noted and there is additional evidence that 
the OSCT has appointed other non-governmental experts to senior policy positions. 
Notable amongst these was the appointment of Charlie Edwards, on secondment from the 
Demos Think Tank37, as the Deputy Director for Strategy and Planning in the department, 
tasked with responsibility for developing the 2011 iteration of CONTEST.38 The 
appropriateness of appointing a think tank secondee to such a senior security policy 
position is an interesting question; whilst there is no doubting the individual’s personal 
expertise and qualifications, an unusual precedent may have been set owing to the fact 
that an outside expert was tasked to actually develop (i.e. not merely contribute to) 
strategy in one of the most sensitive areas of Government security policy.   
This thesis is concerned with what it calls the ‘industrial-complex’ in the UK’s CT 
sector specifically; its analysis on any ‘revolving door’ would not be complete, however, 
without considering how such a dynamic may be operating at the EU level. This is 
important because, whilst a full empirical analysis of the UK’s EU CT involvement is outside 
the scope of this dissertation, significant aspects of security industrial policy relevant to the 
UK are increasingly being developed from Brussels.39 It is relevant, therefore, to note the 
recent controversy surrounding the rotation of a senior EU security official on secondment 
into a security company (and back again). According to the Corporate Europe Observatory 
(CEO), the decision by the European Commission to approve Magnus Ovilius’s40 sabbatical 
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to Smiths Detection in 2008 ‘provokes important questions about how the Commission 
handles the risk of conflicts of interest.’41 In the opinion of CEO, the Commission: 
…should have been more sensitive to the potential conflicts of interest 
arising when a staff member goes on sabbatical to be employed in a sector 
related to his EU post and particularly where there is a lobbying element to 
the new work.42 
 
The lobbying role that Mr. Ovilius would be expected to undertake upon his appointment 
as the Vice President of Government Relations for SD was seen as inappropriate by CEO. 
This prompted the organization to write an official letter to the Commission in December 
2013, requesting details on both whether he had returned to the organization and the 
assessment process for doing so.43 According to the Commission’s carefully-worded 
response, Mr. Ovilius was ‘reintegrated’ into a new role at the Commission in March 2013 
after the following process had been completed: 
Before the reintegration of Mr Ovilius, the absence of links between his 
former position at Smiths Group (a multinational diversified engineering 
company) and his future possible post at the Commission, and any 
potential risks of conflicts of interests were thoroughly assessed, so as to 
ensure that there was a complete absence of conflict of interest on his 
return to the Commission.44 
 
Choosing to highlight this case study is not to suggest that in the course of any of his duties 
Mr. Ovilius behaved in any inappropriate manner, or that his ‘reintegration’ into a border 
management (not security-specific) role45 was not carefully considered. It nevertheless 
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provides a useful indication that a security-related ‘revolving door’ appears to be operating 
at EU level. 
It is worth considering how the revolving door might operate in security sub-
sectors other than CT in view of Omand’s earlier suggestion on how it operates differently 
than in defence. Certainly, some former UK government officials working on cyber security 
policy have moved into industry; Graham Wright’s move to Northrop Grumman in 2011 
from his position as Deputy Director of the Office of Cyber Security and Information 
Assurance is one such example.46 This is not an isolated transition; the former Director 
General for Information Security and Assurance at GCHQ, Nick Hopkinson, became the 
Director of Cyber Security at CSC47 and, additionally, John Suffolk took up the position as 
the Global Cyber Security Officer for Huawei Technologies in October 201048. Evidence of a 
revolving door operating in this sector clearly connects to the suggestion that a ‘cyber-
industrial complex’ may be emerging49; this thesis’s conclusion considers how its findings in 
the CT sector might relate to research on any broader type of ‘SIC’. 
With regards to this dynamic existing in other non-military UK security sectors, the 
recent case of the former Chairman of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency, Sir Ian 
Andrews, provides a relevant example, with a controversy emerging in August 2013 when 
he resigned from his position after he ‘had failed to declare his directorship in a 
management consultancy company, Abis Partnership.’50 It is also not uncommon for senior 
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retired UK intelligence and police officials to accept security-related jobs in the private 
sector. Amongst the most prominent of these, a former Director General of MI5, Lord 
(Jonathan) Evans, recently became a Non-Executive Director at HSBC Holdings plc.51 Earlier, 
Sir David Pepper’s application to become a Strategic Adviser for the consultancy firm, 
Defence Strategy & Solutions LLP, and his role as a member of the Advisory Board for 
Thales UK, was approved in 2009.52 In addition, Sir David Omand - cited as a leading author 
on the private sector’s involvement in national security throughout this thesis - was 
granted approval in 2005 to become an Adviser for SBAC.53 Sir Richard Mottram - cited as a 
key figure in the development of RISC in Chapter 6 - has moved in and out of Government 
since leaving the Cabinet Office, at one stage (between 2008-2014) serving simultaneously 
as the Chairman of the board of Amey PLC and of the Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratory (DSTL).54 Finally, within the policing sector, the Financial Times has reported on 
the practice of senior officers - including two former Commissioners of London’s 
Metropolitan Police Service - taking jobs in the security industry upon their retirement.55 
Three points should be made in assessing the character of the ‘revolving door’ in 
the CT and ‘wider security’ sector. Firstly, clearly not everyone supports the practice 
whereby Government security officials take up related commercial roles either before or 
after their appointments. Whilst he is not alone in his criticism, Hughes is perhaps the most 
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vocal critic of this phenomenon. In War on Terror Inc., he makes bold statements about the 
corrosiveness of this phenomenon; such was the erosion of the boundaries between public 
and private sector employees after 9/11, he argues, that it became ‘impossible to tell who 
was driving British security policy - permanent officials or the directors of private 
companies.’56 It is important to note, however, that his work declines to make any mention 
of the formal processes that exist around such appointments - specifically the formal 
approval mechanism that exists in the UK in the form the Advisory Committee on Business 
Appointments (ACBA) - and does not produce substantive data on specific acts of 
wrongdoing (such as corruption) to which the tone of his work alludes. Were such 
evidence to be provided then it would be reasonable to contemplate the desirability of an 
‘SIC’ existing along the lines popularly envisaged; in the absence of such material, it seems 
premature to draw on the employment movements illustrated in this chapter as conclusive 
evidence that a conspiracy exists. 
A second key consideration arising from this analysis of the ‘revolving door’ in CT is 
that the overlap that now exists between defence and security complicates the picture 
considerably. Whilst the above provides evidence of Government CT or security officials 
(i.e. not military personnel) taking up non-military security opportunities in the private 
sector, the reality is that examples abound of individuals providing advice across both 
sectors, and/or serving companies who operate in both sectors. In addition to having 
provided advice to the SBAC, for example, David Omand has also served as both a senior 
director of the Babcock management team and a non-Executive Director of 
Finmeccanica57; both these companies’ interests include security but are also (if not 
primarily) associated with the defence sector. Similarly, it is not only intelligence or public 
officials working on security-related issues who have later secured employment in the 
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security sector; there is now evidence of diplomats58 and military officials59 moving to work 
in the non-military security industry. It is crucial to take these evolving dynamics into 
consideration in our analysis of contemporary government-industry interaction; at this 
stage it can be tentatively suggested that the ‘overlap’ in the character of revolving door 
identified above supports the idea that in a contemporary context we might do well to 
continue to explore the potential emergence of a ‘national security-industrial complex’ 
even more broadly defined. 
Finally, substantive evidence has been obtained in the course of this research to 
suggest that the ‘revolving door’ dynamic is by no means limited to the defence and 
security sectors - even a cursory review of the annual reports of the ACBA illustrates that 
such employment movements occur across the breadth of the public sector. Supporting 
this observation, a recent BBC radio documentary, ‘The Accountant Kings’, focused on the 
use that is now made of secondments from large accountancy firms like KPMG and CAPITA 
within the National Health Service. The reaction of one senior KPMG consultant to the 
programme’s exploration into whether the Government’s use of secondments ‘all looks a 
bit cosy’ was as follows: 
I think we as a profession have been probably a little stunned by some of 
the reaction to secondments. I mean we see secondments as a way in 
which we can give better value provision of experienced resource into 
departments, for example. Its great training for the individuals and they 
receive a different exposure to a different set of organizations and 
challenges and so on. We get them back with experience of different 
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things, in the same way that we might second them to a charity or to a 
company aswell. We’ve definitely seen it as mutually beneficial [.]60 
Asked to respond to criticism that private consultancies are merely serving their own 
interests through such secondments, Mr. Collins replied: 
I think it’s a million miles away from being capable of being characterized 
as us drafting policy or, you know just… it just doesn’t feel like that. That 
isn’t the substance of it. That isn’t the intention of it - either in the 
government or the private sector.61  
It is timely to question the appropriateness of the increasing use of private sector 
secondments in policy departments (if not policy roles) - many senior political figures 
including the Chairman of the PAC have also recently done so.62 It can also be noted that 
whilst there may be a trend towards greater transparency around the use of consultants or 
secondments in and around Government, this in itself does not necessarily mean that the 
practice is desirable. However, there is also an additional possible explanation for the use 
of private sector employees in government in this way - that the additional capacity is 
genuinely needed. This view certainly resonates with the interviews conducted for this 
thesis; whilst the ‘revolving door’ clearly exists in the CT arena, this practice appears to 
have been pursued to boost capacity on either ‘side’ and no evidence has been found that 
such movement is hidden, or that any untoward behaviour is taking place. That such 
dynamics clearly also exist outside the military sector should perhaps not surprise 
observers; it does however inform our conceptualization of the industrial-complex in CT. 
7.2 Economic Emphasis - Procurement and Employment 
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This section considers, and contrasts with comparable arrangements in defence, the 
character of the existing overall structures for managing non-military security 
procurement. In the process, it considers the extent to which employment considerations 
have (or have not) become a factor in Government investment or decision-making in this 
arena.  
The operation of acquisition institutions within the defence sector has long been 
subject to scholarly criticism; some authors have questioned, for example, the desirability 
of the presence of industrial considerations in the sector.63 Harsher critics see these 
aspects of military-industrial cooperation as further evidence of the harmful nature of the 
system; CAAT is openly critical, for example, of public money being allocated to companies 
through the defence procurement system64, and actively seeks to close the UKTI Defence 
and Security Organisation (DSO) - the body responsible for supporting companies on 
military-related UK exports.65 The management and operation of the UK’s procurement 
system has also attracted significant scholarly scrutiny; even supporters of industry’s role 
in supporting the military have criticized the lack of effectiveness in defence acquisition.66 
Certainly, UK defence procurement has not operated perfectly. To properly examine the 
character of the private sector’s involvement in the non-military aspects of contemporary 
national security, this section considers whether procurement in security sectors such as 
CT exhibit the same characteristics and systemic failures as defence; this helps to explore 
whether an ‘industrial-complex’ of the same type as the MIC now exists in other areas of 
security.  
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Data gathered during interviews shows the character of the ‘security market’ 
differs significantly when contrasted with defence; including in relation to the structure 
and operation of what might generously be called the security procurement ‘system’. 
RISC’s first secondee to the OSCT identified, for example, how the procurement structure 
in security is considerably more diverse and disaggregated, comprising ‘many purchasers’ 
when compared to defence.67 A former Chairman of RISC amplified the point, highlighting 
the significance of the contrasting arrangements:   
…there is a feeling in industry that this [the security sector] is not quite the 
same as the defence sector, although many of the companies that operate 
are common to both sectors. But it is not like the defence sector in the 
sense that there is no single customer – a myriad of customers, public and 
private sector.68 
Whilst this striking difference in market structure is widely recognised amongst UK security 
practitioners, a case can be made that the significance of this point has not been 
sufficiently taken into account by the scholarly community; no previous study has 
addressed it at length in the UK context. This is a major oversight because the simplistic 
narrative that has arisen - the notion that the MIC has simply transferred into the security 
sector - does not stand up to scrutiny. Whilst some industry figures argue that more 
coordinated procurement arrangements are needed across the breadth of the ‘diverse’ 
security sector69, the present landscape is beset with challenges. At the risk of repetition, 
the fact that many ‘customers’ in the security sector are private companies differentiates 
the security market from defence; whilst it could be argued that many smaller defence 
companies provide products and services directly to private sector ‘prime contractors’ like 
BAE Systems, the reality is that, in defence, the Government (in the form of the MoD) has a 
more direct relationship with the supply base than any non-military security department. 
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Fundamentally, this arises largely because of the fact that, as one interviewee explained to 
the author, the MoD is ultimately the sole funder of defence and therefore a monopsony 
exists in the market.70  
Analysis of efforts to improve effectiveness in non-military security-related 
procurement casts further light on these dynamics. That it would be desirable to 
increasingly purchase capabilities across the 43 policing constabularies of England and 
Wales, rather than individually, for example, has been identified by senior policymakers as 
one such area for improvement. The former Minister for Security, Lord West, has 
described his own experience of the practice arising whereby Police Chief Constables can 
deliberately seek to purchase different capabilities: 
…I was at a dinner sitting with a chief constable each side of me. One of 
them was explaining what he was about to buy, and the other one did say; 
‘well there’s no way I’m going to buy that then.’ And I thought this was (…) 
a bit of a belter. And I’m sure there were very good reasons for it, but it 
just added to my feeling that actually we really do have to move forward in 
this area.71  
It appears that the long-standing shortcomings of police procurement are finally being 
taken seriously, with serious Parliamentary discussion now taking place on how to improve 
the Government’s approach. One identified successful reform relates to how Police Forces 
are now compelled to collaborate nationally around the procurement and utilization of air 
support such as helicopters; in written evidence to the PAC, the Home Office’s Permanent 
Secretary explained how, by collaborating through the ‘National Police Air Service’ in the 
way that was now compulsory; 
It is anticipated that it will save up to £15 million a year compared to the 
cost of previous arrangements when all forces have joined it.72 
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It would be difficult for even the most vehement critic of ‘the SIC’ to argue against the 
benefits to be had from the implementation of a national approach to police procurement 
when appropriate; especially where collaboration is so clearly financially beneficial, and 
where capabilities are so obviously needed. Other instances of non-military security 
procurement after 9/11 have yielded benefits from adopting a more centralized approach; 
as Chapter 3 indicated (pages 104-105), the delivery of the ‘New Dimension’ programme, 
for example, has been considered as exemplary in successfully acquiring new CBRN-related 
capabilities for the Fire Service nationally.  
The key implication from a policy perspective, it appears, is not necessarily to 
centralize all aspects of ‘security procurement’ - such a task would be difficult to 
coordinate across all of the purchasers operating in the ‘market’.73 Rather, the most 
sensible approach seems to be to identify potential areas of public security procurement 
that might benefit from a more coordinated approach at the national level, and where 
doing so would lead to quality and cost-effectiveness benefits.74 Naturally, the 
development of more centralization in procurement might worry those concerned by the 
emergence of ‘the SIC’; a more streamlined procurement system might make it easier for 
companies to interface with the State in shaping requirements, for example. However, it 
may be the case that the landscape currently remains so fragmented as to mitigate against 
the likelihood of any such dynamic emerging. 
Notwithstanding this last assertion, both the character and operation of the 
system for non-military security procurement has not received the scrutiny it deserves; in 
addition to the shortage of analysis on specific contracts, addressed above, it is noticeable 
how little scholarly attention has been given to analyzing the mechanisms that have been 
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(or could be) established to improve the overall structures for non-military security 
acquisition. This is a general problem that was illustrated in the case of the recent 
establishment of a new Police ICT company; a body designed to manage the procurement 
of IT for all Police forces across England and Wales where appropriate. Whilst prior to its 
emergence the HASC had examined the possible scope and activity of the company, 
strikingly little serious analytical work has been done around the appropriateness of 
outsourcing to a private company the task of police procurement. Even where scrutiny of 
the proposal took place, it was incomplete; the HASC even observed in a report that 
‘…[t]here is so little detail currently available about the police-led IT company that we find 
it difficult to reach a conclusion about its viability.’75 This can be seen as a worrying 
statement; but perhaps it should be little surprise that the establishment of the Police ICT 
Company went ahead in 2012, despite such profound questions being raised. 
The scholarly silence which greeted the new Police ICT company contrasts with the 
extensive analysis which surrounded the MoD’s proposal to outsource its defence 
acquisition arm, Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S); the proposition emerging was 
that a Government-Owned Contractor-Operated (GOCO) entity should be created. In this 
case, serious doubts were expressed in Parliament, in industry and in particular within the 
research community around the desirability of proceeding with the controversial scheme. 
The RUSI think tank, for example, published two briefing papers which questioned whether 
it would be sensible to outsource defence procurement along the lines suggested.76 In the 
first of these, the RUSI Acquisition Group stated: 
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The GOCO proposal suffers from an inherent weakness, since it seemingly 
rests on an argument that, because the government is not very good at 
negotiating and managing contracts with the private sector, it is going to 
negotiate a contract with a private sector entity to undertake the task on 
its behalf.77  
In other words, the report was damning of the logic underpinning the entire proposal. RUSI 
was not alone in its condemnation; a research note also acknowledges how the head of 
the industry trade association, ADS, believed that the Government needed to answer 
questions on the scheme.78  
Several potential reasons can be offered for the differing levels of external interest 
in the Police ICT and GOCO initiatives. Firstly, as RUSI’s Acquisition Group explored, the 
GOCO scheme was extremely broad in scope - covering not just ICT but all aspects of 
defence acquisition - and would therefore have been a more significant innovation. 
Secondly, the effect of the comparative level of resource allocated to ‘defence’ and 
‘security’ should not be overlooked. A better understanding of this helps to explain why 
defence (not security) procurement continues to dominate the discussion; defence 
acquisition comprises in excess of £13bn annually, whereas total expenditure on police 
contracts has recently been measured as comprising £1.7bn79 per year (of which, as an 
indication, £1.1bn was spent specifically on police ICT in 2010-1180). Perhaps it is little 
wonder why defence acquisition attracts more scrutiny. 
This imbalance in analytical attention may not continue, as there is now a clear 
sense - both in Government and industry - that the non-military security procurement 
system is beset by difficulties; perhaps almost even unworkable. Chapters 3-5 illustrated 
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the shortcomings at the micro-level; perceptions on the more general effectiveness of the 
procurement system revealed in interviews add weight to this argument. One industry 
executive speaking anonymously dryly commented: 
…having worked with the Home Office on programmes, and having worked 
with the MoD on programmes, the MoD ought not to be  too hard on 
themselves in terms of how they procure and manage programmes.81 
The apparent lack of coordination in the security procurement system, in contrast with 
defence, might help to explain this. The problems that exist also clearly connect to the 
underlying character of the security market examined above. As Howe explains: 
My feeling is, to be quite candid, that the parts of government with the 
biggest responsibility for security and counter-terrorism are actually quite 
remote from procurement activity.82 
Of course, this is all in the context that the initiation of several major non-military CT 
programmes is only a relatively recent development.  
As a general characteristic of the non-military security sector, therefore, it seems 
that central Government is more detached from the actual process of acquisition; with the 
exception of some major procurement projects, purchasing tends to be done by first 
responders, individual agencies or even private sector customers directly - not by 
departments like the Home Office. This is very different from the arrangements that exist 
in the defence sector, where the MoD has created within its remit (and devotes substantial 
resources to) the structures that are needed to pursue acquisition as a core aspect of the 
department’s activity, however inefficiently. Should such an apparently undesirable state 
of affairs be accepted? The problem is clearly recognised at senior levels in Government 
and, in discussing policy options on how to deliver more effective security procurement, 
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Stephen Phipson stated soberly: ‘…that’s red on my list: I really have no clear idea on that 
one at the moment’.83  
The absence of an official, centrally-coordinated structure to develop the policy 
aspects of the CT-related acquisition agenda, and across the national security sector more 
generally, would suggest that there would be little likelihood of economic considerations 
becoming a significant factor in the non-military security procurement decision-making 
process. This would certainly appear to be the case in the three major security contracts 
examined above; only with the G4S security contract was a proactive, positive case made 
around the prospect of employing local individuals in the security industry. Yet whether 
the establishment of the ‘Bridging the Gap’ initiative was a central factor in the contract 
award is not certain; the crucial consideration appears to have been that, rightly or 
wrongly, G4S was originally viewed as being ‘large enough’ to deliver the capacity that was 
needed. This is not to say that there were not repercussions for employment around the 
cancellation of any such contracts, however; the former CEO of EADS suggested that the 
UK Government’s decision to terminate the FiReControl project costed 500 jobs at EADS’ 
manufacturing and technology centre in Newport.84 That said, the robustness of the 
Government decisions to cancel the e-Borders and FiReControl contracts can be seen as 
evidence that their employment aspects were not more important than other 
considerations. 
Whilst economic considerations appear to have played a minimal role in the 
procurement aspects of CT, this is not to suggest that they do not continue to exist (or that 
they are not emerging) in the national security field more generally. The notion that ‘pork 
barrel’ politics exist in the UK is prominent in media coverage on UK defence policy; the 
connection between the New Labour Government’s decision to develop two new aircraft 
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carriers and the location of the then Prime Minister’s Parliamentary constituency has been 
noted, for example.85 Economic considerations also feature in the UK Government’s 
emerging strategy for cyber security; its first objective is to make ‘the UK one of the most 
secure places in the world to do business’.86 In parallel, the Government has recently 
developed an export strategy for UK-originated cyber technology.87  
The evidence suggests that it is fair to conclude, perhaps with the exception of the 
growing attention that is being afforded to exports in the CT and wider security sectors88, 
the structures that have been established for (and the decisions made around) public-
private cooperation around non-military CT-related procurement have not yet attracted 
the same level of policy and external analytical attention that has been seen in the defence 
sector. Whilst there are growing signs that this may not always be the case, the above 
analysis casts doubt over whether companies have been able to significantly influence, let 
alone ‘capture’ non-military security procurement. Should this issue develop as a policy 
priority, academia could have an important role to play in providing advice to the 
Government on how to improve the current arrangements for security acquisition; after 
all, as Chapter 2 noted, scholars have not held back in offering analysis and expertise on 
how to improve or reform UK military acquisition.89 
7.3 Non-military, CT-related exports 
Whilst the CT-related procurement system has been shown to be disaggregated, there are 
some areas of non-military public-private security interaction where coordination has been 
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strengthened; the joint emphasis placed on promoting UK non-military security exports is a 
case in point. This aspect of cooperation is important to consider because, as noted in 
Chapter 2, the topic of ‘exports’ has often emerged as a core theme of MIC–related 
scholarly literature and wider public discussion. As well as addressing why the UK 
Government supports industry with defence trade promotion - in essence, for both 
economic and security/political reasons90 - the literature debates the supposed benefits of 
pursuing such a strategy91, with wider discussions covering both the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of military-industrial relations around this priority. Whatever the benefits 
of pursing an arms export policy, it has undoubtedly become a core element of UK 
defence-industrial interaction and associated strategy; as Smith and Smith recognise, ‘[i]n 
those states for which manufacturing industry is a part of security policy, arms exports 
have also become a part of the policy.’92 It follows that, in considering the character of the 
private sector’s involvement in CT, it helps to pursue an inquiry into any equivalent non-
military export structures and/or activities. This section considers how and why there has 
been an increasing emphasis on joint working to promote UK security capabilities, and 
analyses the character of public-private engagement in this area. 
The most significant machinery of Government change relating to arms export 
policy after 9/11 - the replacement of DESO with the establishment of DSO within UKTI in 
2008 - also had the effect of re-orientating the Government’s emphasis on the pursuit of 
military exports in the national security field. The organization’s website at the time 
explains how responsibility for policy on defence exports moved from the MoD:  
UKTI DSO was formed on 1st April 2008, when responsibility for defence 
trade promotion transferred from the Ministry of Defence to UKTI. The 
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new group brings together trade development support across the defence 
and civil sectors under the umbrella of UKTI.93 
This decision now seems straightforward, but it proved to be controversial at the time. 
According to the Prime Minister’s 2007 statement, the decision was taken because: 
The Government believe trade promotion for defence exports should be 
more effectively integrated with the Government’s general trade support 
activities, while recognising and accommodating the specific requirements 
of the defence sector.94 
The UK Government’s intention to align defence exports with its work on promoting other 
sectors of the economy is certainly a logical one; a persuasive case can always be made in 
Whitehall that increased coordination can yield considerable benefits such as avoiding the 
potential for duplication. Other reasons may have existed, however, and one not 
implausible account suggests that the decision was in fact driven by the Treasury; which 
was reported only too happy to cut costs by reducing the subsidy received by the defence 
industry from what was considered an ‘anachronistic’ department.95 Certainly, critics of the 
industry (and the support it received through DESO) argued at the time that the level of 
subsidy was intolerable. One Think Tank supported the closure of DESO; 
…because it was part of an unwarranted subsidy of profitable defence 
companies; resulted in arms exports that undermined human rights; and 
because of wider concerns about the impact of subsidised arms sales on 
Britain’s international reputation and security.96 
The decision to relocate responsibility for promoting defence-related exports away from 
the MoD was also criticized by some leading industry figures. The CEO of BAE Systems, for 
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example, wrote to the Prime Minister to express his ‘considerable concern’ about the 
proposal, lamenting the lack of consultation that had taken place with industry on it. He 
argued damningly: ‘I can think of no benefit that “synergy” with UK T&I can offer that will 
begin to outweigh the lost excellence of the DESO operation.’97 Industry was not successful 
in reversing the decision, however; DSO was formed in April 2008.  
Some of industry’s worst fears appear to have been realized as the number of 
Government personnel dedicated to promoting defence exports reduced significantly after 
the transfer; DESO was staffed by 450 people upon its closure and around 150 personnel 
are now employed at UKTI DSO.98 By contrast, as UKTI DSO developed, the ‘synergy’ that 
could be achieved by developing the UK’s approach to security exports alongside defence 
was significant; at least certainly for those security companies who would not have 
previously had access to focused Government attention in supporting their export 
objectives. Indeed, such was the emphasis on promoting security as well as defence 
exports that the Head of UKTI DSO publicly referred to his organization’s focus on ‘security’ 
being ‘the middle name of DSO.’99  
New structures were created which would aim to help develop the DSO’s new 
emphasis and strategy on security exports. Most significantly, an industry-chaired UKTI 
‘Security Sector Advisory Group’ (SSAG) was established and initially chaired by Stephen 
Phipson (then President of Smiths Detection). According to the ‘Open to Export’ website: 
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The Sector Advisory Group is led by a senior businessperson with extensive 
corporate and commercial experience who (sic) purpose is to work closely 
with the Security Directorate within the UKTI to advise and assist on the 
development of effective strategies to boost UK and international 
growth.100 
This body is an example of systemic, strategic interaction between Government and the 
security industry on non-military, CT-related export issues - in this case (unlike RISC) it was 
even a Government-hosted entity. The ‘closeness’ of the relationship between 
Government and the security industry on this issue is further exemplified by the fact that 
the SSAG is now chaired by another former Chairman of RISC, Michael Clayforth-Carr. 
Furthermore, the forum includes industry members from technology companies such as 
BAE Systems/Detica and EADS as well as service providers like Control Risks and the Olive 
Group101; at least on exports, this shows that the Government has adopted a broad 
conceptualization of how it looks upon the ‘security sector’. Interestingly, the SSAG, which 
meets approximately ‘quarterly’, is also attended by at least one prominent academic; the 
Director-General of RUSI, for example, is a member.102 This shows how on the issue of UK 
security exports a system of formal public-private interaction has emerged whose 
representation extends beyond government and industry; this characteristic resonates 
strongly with existing MIC theories which portray the system as encompassing broader 
involvement.  
Other new structures emerged to support this priority; a dedicated ‘security 
directorate’ was even formed inside the new DSO. A UKTI brochure indicated the purpose 
of this department: 
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The UKTI DSO Security Directorate provides advice to homeland security, 
fire, police and commercial security sector companies to optimise 
government support for the UK’s unique and leading-edge UK industry.103 
In support of its objectives, the UKTI has also supported - both financially as well as 
through the provision of staff assistance - a number of high profile security trade events 
and exhibitions to promote UK capabilities. As part of its programme, DSO’s involvement in 
the Home Office’s annual Security and Policing Exhibition is perhaps the most notable; 
whilst the support it brings to industry in issuing invitations to overseas delegations is 
welcomed in the sector, organizations including CAAT have campaigned against what it 
sees as unwarranted support for ‘some of the world's most repressive regimes’.104   
The picture that emerges, therefore, is of Government and industry increasingly 
working together on CT-related exports since the establishment of UKTI DSO in 2008. 
Whilst DSO’s emphasis has continued to be directed mainly towards supporting the 
defence sector – even a cursory review of the DSO’s latest ‘contact directory’ indicates that 
it has only appointed a minimal number of security sector-specific employees when 
compared to the defence sector105 - ‘security’ now appears as a core aspect of its activity. 
Whilst some industry interviewees believed that UKTI DSO could operate more effectively 
on security issues, all those questioned during this research recognised the role it had been 
playing in supporting the industry in overseas security markets.  
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Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that ‘security exports’ is becoming more 
prominent as a policy priority not just for UKTI DSO, but also for other Government 
departments. One official indicated in a confidential interview that the centrally-organised 
Ministerial Working Group on national security-related exports ‘…has security sales as well 
as defence sales within its remit’ and insisted that a ‘Sales Review’ conducted by Cabinet 
Office shortly prior to the interview included security exports.106 The 2012 NSST White 
Paper also placed a significant emphasis on the steps the Government (in the form of the 
Home Office) planned to take to promote CT-related as well as defence exports; it 
announced, for example, an intention to potentially develop a ‘UK Security Brand’ as one 
‘mechanism for supporting security exports in a fragmented market’107. Most significantly, 
the appointment of the Director of Security Industry Engagement in June 2013 - referred to 
above and a position which arose as a direct consequence of a commitment made in 
NSST108 - generated a formal role for the Home Office on exports. The central importance 
of the export dimension to this new senior Home Office position was clarified in its original 
job description; it included under a list covering the ‘key responsibilities’ of the role the 
requirement to coordinate ‘between the UK counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, the 
security industry and security export opportunities’.109  
True to the originally-envisioned role, Stephen Phipson has been vociferous in 
promoting UK security exports since his appointment. In a magazine interview focusing on 
how the UK’s experience in hosting the London 2012 Olympics might boost UK security 
exports, for example, he explained how he looked upon his and his team’s responsibilities: 
‘Within the Home Office I lead a dedicated team focused on supporting and promoting the 
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UK security industry, and increasing the UK’s share of the security export market[.]’110 The 
idea that the Home Office would become so directly involved in the security export agenda 
would have seemed a very alien concept only a few years ago. The agenda appears to be 
developing rapidly and Mr. Phipson is clear that the relationship is not only developing at 
the official level. He is reported as stating to one industry association meeting: 
There’s a lot more senior ministerial interest in the security industry. The 
defence sector is under pressure, the demands are going down, it is a 
difficult environment globally; the security sector is a growth market.111 
Whether greater Ministerial attention towards promoting security exports is desirable may 
split opinion, but there is no doubt of the significance of this new trend; efforts are being 
made by the Home Office to replicate in the security sector the attention that companies 
have previously ‘enjoyed’ from the MoD in many areas including defence trade 
promotion.112  
This move towards such a strong new emphasis on security exports is especially 
important because it inevitably presents similar (if not the same) ethical dilemmas 
traditionally associated with international military sales. One Government official referred 
to an (almost literally) explosive example to illustrate how this ethical dimension applies 
equally to ‘security’: 
We’ve had requests for police helicopters to be armed. Do you want to be 
the government that’s doing that work with that foreign government? And 
so the ethical question is actually raising a lot of red flags; a lot of 
questions to be considered extremely carefully.113 
It is perhaps reassuring that the public official in question was minded to consider the 
appropriateness of exporting armed ‘non-military’ security capabilities, but there is little 
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evidence of external analytical attention being directed towards the potential implications 
of this increasing policy emphasis. Asked why the ethics of exporting security capabilities 
had not generated the same level of attention and analysis as has been seen in the defence 
sector, the same official replied; ‘that’s because we haven’t done big G2G [Government to 
Government] arrangements before, and we’re about to.’114 Whilst the pursuit of this policy 
may be beneficial to the UK for both security and economic reasons, it should be 
recognised that other risks could emerge that have more unforeseen and longstanding 
consequences. In addition to the obvious risks for human rights that could be presented by 
the policy - either directly or indirectly, despite protestations to the contrary - one 
interviewee noted (on the condition of anonymity) the irony of the fact that, as the 
Government aimed to export UK security capabilities, it did not appear to be procuring the 
same capabilities domestically. The interviewee’s sobering observation raises serious 
questions about the effectiveness and desirability of the current approach: 
And actually, by pushing it this route, and not addressing our home 
market, I think strategically there is a risk that we’re going to enable 
overseas countries to have better capability and be much better placed to 
operate in the 21st Century than we are ourselves.115 
This thesis has found little evidence to suggest that the UK Government has yet considered 
such potentially deeper implications of its strong current focus on exporting UK security 
capabilities; and in particular whether developing this in such a disconnected way from the 
UK’s own domestic security procurement programme is desirable.  
It is nevertheless easy to agree with Stephen Phipson’s assertion that, if the 
Government is successful in signing and developing G2G’s in the security arena, ‘…it’s going 
to change the way the interaction works with industry.’116 Indeed, such is the Home 
Office’s increasing involvement in security exports that one DSO official explained how the 
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department was the UKTI’s ‘main partner nowadays when supporting UK security 
companies looking to export’.117 Not all those observing developments in this area would 
agree that the approach being pursued is an optimal one. The editor of one UK security 
trade publication has been critical of the lack of detail around the department’s proposal 
to develop a ‘security brand’ for promoting exports and, following an explanation of the 
proposal by the Home Office, he argued that it raised ‘[t]oo many question marks by far.’118 
Separately, the secretary of RISC explained that his ‘big bug bear’ was in trying to persuade 
the Home Office: ‘don’t forget that there is a domestic agenda that needs to be done.’119 
Whilst frustrations exist around what has been seen as the overly export-
orientated direction being pursued by the Home Office’s SIET, its decision to publish a 
security export strategy document in early 2014 - a document penned jointly with UKTI 
DSO120 - was a significant development that was warmly welcomed by the sector’s 
representative trade associations.121 Whilst ‘Increasing our Security Exports’ was not the 
first public UKTI document on security exports, it is clearly the most strategic in orientation 
and transparent in detail. As well as listing specific target markets (such as Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait) and high value opportunities (such as the Qatar 2020 World Cup) pertaining to 
the security industry, it outlines seven ‘capability areas’ of UK expertise that it will aim to 
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promote through the development of ‘specific export plans’.122 Furthermore, additional 
information is provided, for the first time in public, on how the Government would see 
G2G agreements potentially working in the security sector:  
Through a G2G agreement we would offer, where appropriate: access to 
security expertise and strategic thinking within government, police and 
agencies; support to overseas governments to identify and specify their 
security requirements; and assistance in accessing the necessary 
capabilities from the UK security industry.123 
This is a clear signal that the UK Government is comfortable with security exporting, and 
that it aims to act as a broker with its allies in respect of promoting the capabilities of the 
UK security industry overseas. As the Ministerial Foreword to the document makes clear, 
Government and industry need to ‘work hand in hand to achieve our objective to increase 
UK security exports.’124  
Whilst Government and industry may need to work ‘hand in hand’ to realize this 
aim, it is useful to consider the influence that companies may have exerted on the 
formation of the UK’s security export strategy - any suggestion that they did might 
resonate with ‘SIC-as-conspiracy’ arguments. Whilst the trade associations underpinning 
RISC have clearly seen a role for themselves in the development of this Government 
strategy - ADS has stated that it aims to ‘set up and oversee the operation of a UK Security 
Brand’125 proposed within the document, for example - the actual usefulness of industry 
input into the strategy appears mixed. Explaining that Government and industry ‘engage 
better than we once did’ on security exports, the official offered the following observation 
about the process: 
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…in terms of consultations with industry, we had some good discussions. 
Have I always received a huge amount of feedback on our approach or 
suggestions of how it could be improved? Not sure that I have particularly. 
In the early days we were pretty much driven by what we were going to do 
and thought we should do, but nowadays we bounce ideas off industry 
and the trade associations and have a completely joined up dialogue.126 
This reveals the sometimes indifferent attitude that Government officials can adopt 
towards industry’s contributions on policy matters, perhaps reflecting the perception in 
and around Whitehall that ‘Government always knows best’. The more important point 
here, however, in the context of assessing the level of private sector (or ‘SIC’) influence 
that may exist, is that ideas are ‘bounced off’ industry; not the other way around. Whilst 
there is clearly a degree of ‘cosiness’ in the emerging government-industry relationship 
around security exports - the dialogue is ‘joined-up’ and the same interviewee explained 
that he can ‘pick up the phone and talk to anyone’127 in industry on this topic - the actual 
influence that the private sector has asserted on the Government’s policy orientation 
appears marginal; even if the Chairman of RISC insisted at the launch of the document that 
industry ‘will have a key role in developing performance measures and overseeing the 
delivery of the strategy’128. Whilst it is now apparent that Government and industry see 
‘security exports’ as a shared priority, it is not clear that undue influence has been exerted 
on the development of the strategy. Whilst some will argue that Government should not 
be working on this issue, Government does appear to ‘hold the pen’ on its own security 
export policy. 
The UK’s security export strategy makes several important references to the way in 
which the MOD is itself involved in the oversight and implementation of the Government’s 
policy. Most notably, the paper explains how a Ministerial Working Group on Defence and 
Security Exports chaired by the Defence Secretary will ‘[p]rovide ministerial leadership to 
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the development of UK Defence and Security export strategy’129 and that it will seek to 
exploit ‘synergies between military and security sectors where appropriate’130. That the 
security export strategy would appear to be subsumed into the remit of ‘Defence’ through 
this governance structure suggests that ‘Security’ might be considered in Government as 
the lesser partner in the arena of exports. Whether or not this perception is grounded in 
reality, it would be difficult to argue that a classically-configured, equivalent ‘SIC’ has 
emerged in the field of exports when, in reality, the structures which guide and oversee 
them remain so closely wedded to the defence sector.  
An additional important difference in how public-private interaction on export 
matters operates across defence and security is that many more Government stakeholders 
are involved in the promotion of non-military, CT-related exports. The strategy document 
includes a table which lists no less than 15 different individual government departments or 
agencies - including, perhaps controversially, the signals intelligence agency GCHQ131 - that 
are considered to be involved.132 The public-private dynamics around security exports, like 
the operation of the security market more generally, are therefore much more diverse 
than is, and has long been the case, in the defence sector; in this latter instance the UKTI 
DSO now leads, with the MoD viewed as the ‘sole customer’. It is this significant difference 
which again raises serious doubt as to whether the MIC-translation theory can so easily be 
applied to exports, let alone accepted more generally.  
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Finally, the document’s section on ‘Export Controls’ recognises that whilst it is 
important that ‘the UK should not export capabilities where there is a clear risk that they 
will be used to violate human rights or for internal repression’133, a significant difference 
exists in how the official mechanisms of oversight operate across defence and security 
exporting; the document recognises that ‘….[t]raditional export controls do not always 
readily apply to security systems.’134 Informal conversations with industry figures have 
revealed a pervasive view that, in some areas of security policy, the export security system 
has simply not reached the level of maturity as exists in defence. This characteristic is 
another indication that, on the basis of practices in the CT field, non-military public-private 
security engagement operates differently. Such evidence provides additional support to 
the contention that the use of the SIC concept to describe government-industry relations 
in the non-military security export context is an over-simplification; unique characteristics 
of interaction have emerged and evolved, and should be recognised as such. 
7.4 Character and impact of the ‘industrial-complex’ in three additional areas of concern  
This chapter has illustrated how the system of public-private cooperation in the UK CT 
sector after 9/11 replicates some, but not all, of the features traditionally associated with 
defence. In terms of similarities, the ‘revolving door’ has been shown for the first time to 
be much in evidence in the non-military, CT-related security aspects of UK national security 
strategy; whilst the movement in employment terms of public officials taking positions in 
industry (and vice versa) does not necessarily confirm the existence of, or inclination 
towards, any ‘unwarranted influence’ being exerted by such a system, it is striking how a 
number of the most senior individuals operating in the sector have followed career paths 
which have transgressed both public and private sectors.  
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The UK Government has, since the formation of UKTI DSO in 2008, exhibited a very 
significant new emphasis on promoting UK CT-related security exports for both security 
and economic reasons. Interestingly, the Home Office is now seeking to operate in the 
wider security sector in the same way that the MoD has traditionally played a role in 
supporting UK defence exports; that of seeking to facilitate G2G contracts with overseas 
partners, creating (ultimately commercial) opportunities for industry to help to deliver the 
capability. As with the experience in the defence sector, the Government’s new approach 
presents a controversial set of issues; the suggestion that the intelligence agencies are 
involved in promoting exports, or that the UK Government aims to provide security 
capability to controversial regimes such as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, for example, will not be 
supported by everyone. 
Nonetheless, the chapter also showed that the structure of the procurement 
‘system’ in the CT and security sector more broadly is more ‘fragmented’ than is the case in 
defence; this reflects how the security market has often been observed generally.135 It 
comprises a considerably wider range of public and private sector customers, and some of 
the State’s purchasing arms (such as for police IT) have already even been privatized. The 
evidence suggests, resonating with the findings of previous chapters, that whilst defence 
acquisition is not immune from its own challenges and difficulties, the system of 
acquisition that exists in the non-military, CT-related security arena is riddled with 
inefficiency and a lack of expertise, leaving considerable room for improvement. Economic 
considerations relating directly to the public procurement system in the CT and wider 
security field did not appear as a significant factor in the appointment (or indeed the 
cancellation) of the three main contracts examined for this thesis, perhaps owing to the 
smaller amount of resources that are available in the sector. 
                                                          
135






This thesis has sought to reassess the origins, characteristics and the consequences of the 
private sector’s involvement in the non-military CT aspects of contemporary UK national 
security strategy after 9/11. The resulting dissertation is intended to contribute an 
innovative assessment - supported by new micro-level analysis of hitherto under 
researched UK security contracts and other public-private interactions in CONTEST - of the 
character of private sector involvement in the security sector, and the extent to which any 
or all of the dynamics that have historically been associated with the MIC are present 
within this sector. Whilst the thesis recognised that hypothesizing over the existence of an 
‘industrial-complex’ presents methodological challenges, and poses some possible 
limitations, it is designed to explore whether the use of such terminology in the wider 
security context is actually appropriate.  
The thesis examined the character of the ‘industrial-complex’ in the UK’s CT sector 
between 2002 and 2014 by addressing the following main research question:  
 What are the origins, characteristics and consequences of the private sector’s 
involvement in the (non-military) CT aspects of UK national security strategy? 
Three additional supporting questions were addressed to inform the analysis: 
 Is the character of ‘industry engagement’ in the UK’s CT sector comparable with 
‘defence’?; 
 Has any industrial-complex in the UK’s CT sector exerted any ‘unwarranted 
influence’?; and 
 What are the consequences of any such system for researchers and practitioners? 
Having addressed these questions throughout this dissertation, the remainder of this 
chapter presents the conclusions of the thesis. 
8.1 Origins 
The dissertation’s combination of theoretical and empirical analysis means that the origins 





significant variety and new types of public-private cooperation that emerged after 9/11 
(and especially after 7/7) represent nothing short of a major revolution in the way that the 
Government interacts with non-state actors to implement its security objectives. As the 
risk of terrorism evolved, and has come to be perceived (at least by some in Government) 
to pose a significantly greater threat to the UK and its interests than prior to 9/11, so major 
new security programmes such as New Dimension and e-Borders have been developed by 
Government departments other than the MoD as a major component of the response. 
That the considerable additional investment that followed would attract the interest of 
commercial suppliers is perhaps hardly surprising. The ferocity with which many 
commentators criticized both the Government’s perception of the threat and the 
increasing level of corporate involvement in CT has nevertheless been notable.   
The extensive involvement of private companies in the non-military CT aspects of 
UK national security is not only explained by the greater number of commercial 
opportunities to have arisen in the sector. Other factors have contributed and include, for 
example, the public policy programme of privatization that was developed during the 
1980s and 1990s, which continue to this day. Whilst it does not appear to have been 
anticipated by policymakers at the time, this resulted in a situation in which the 
Government became (and continues to be) more dependent on ‘private operators’ of 
infrastructure to deliver contemporary national security because it is now companies, not 
government, that own these installations. Furthermore, initiatives such the CSSC Olympic 
security project have shown how parts of the private sector became more assertive and 
more organised after 9/11 in seeking to strengthen their own security. Such industry-led 
initiatives may form the basis of future collaboration and appear to defy the logic of one of 
the main arguments associated with MIC theory - that companies are only involved in 





Furthermore, it is the thesis’s contention that the private sector’s extensive 
involvement in the non-military aspects of national security strategy can actually be seen 
as reflecting the Government’s changing conceptualization of ‘national security’ in the 
contemporary threat environment. The opening chapters examined, with the private 
sector’s involvement in mind, the evolution of the UK Government’s definition of ‘security’ 
in more detail, highlighting how it now pays greater emphasis on addressing non-military 
security risks such as terrorism and cyber insecurity. More than any other single factor, this 
significant shift in understanding (and thus associated change in policy emphasis) has 
resulted in the emergence of new non-military security strategies (and associated 
programmes) which have drawn on the involvement of private companies to an 
unprecedented extent. Partly because the Government depends on private actors within 
these ‘new’ arenas such as CT, and partly because commercial companies have themselves 
sought to play an active supporting role, the result has been a significant level of private 
sector involvement in the security sector. It is the contention of this thesis that the 
combination of the various public-private interactions (however fragmented) amounts to 
what should be properly viewed as an extensive set of systems, and as such represents, an 
original contribution to the field. 
It is arguably appropriate in the closing stages to briefly recall how this thesis’s 
inquiry into the origins of the private sector’s involvement in UK national security strategy 
might connect to (or be explained by) other existing literature which relates to the 
privatisation of security. Amongst the many existing offerings in this space (examined in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.3) is Professor Philip Bobbitt’s theory on the emergence of what he 
has called the ‘market state’. Bobbitt’s central argument is supported by the findings of 
this dissertation; the thesis has shown with reference to the UK CT sector that a high level 
of interaction (if not interdependency in some areas) has emerged between the 





sensitive and fundamental duty: security. Bobbitt has had his critics but, absent any 
substantial refutation of the ‘market state’ theory, his thesis has profound implications in 
the sense that it advances the idea that, in the contemporary environment, it is not only 
desirable but now necessary for Governments to interact with companies on security 
issues such as CT.  
Seen from this perspective, the extensive level of private sector involvement 
evident in CONTEST thus potentially reflects a fundamental change in the underpinnings of 
the contemporary State structure; in short, any transition towards the coalescing of the 
market and the State might make it inevitable (and more understandable) that the 
Government would seek to work with the private sector on security issues. This radical 
idea should provoke deep reflection; that this thesis’s theoretical and empirical analysis 
can connect to it in a UK context is identified in the hope that it might encourage future 
debate.  
8.2 Characteristics   
The thesis has illustrated an extensive and often dysfunctional system of public-private 
interaction in the CT elements of contemporary UK national security strategy. In its 
analysis, several characteristics that have traditionally been associated with the MIC have 
been shown to be present in the non-military arena; especially in respect of commercial 
security suppliers’ involvement in this area. Most notably, several large-scale CT-related 
security programmes were established or funded by the UK Government after 9/11 to 
counter the terrorism threat; these closely resembled the type of large, fully-integrated 
programmes that have become associated with the defence sector. Like in the military 
arena, commercial suppliers became centrally involved in ‘delivering’ what in many cases 
became problematic contracts with deep-seated and high profile difficulties - often leading 





sharp criticism as a result. The boundaries between the public and private sectors in the 
management of these contracts often appeared unclear or blurred - the public-private 
dynamics in the case of London 2012 were particularly ‘circular’ - and acquisition in the 
security sector was shown to be no less afflicted with the difficulties that have arisen 
previously in the defence sector.  
Evidence has been provided of (and criticism has been levelled against) the UK 
Government’s approach to working with industry on other controversial issues relating to 
CT. In particular, concerns have been raised over the emergence in the CT sector of the 
‘revolving door’ (most commonly associated with the MIC) and, secondly, the significant 
emphasis being placed on developing a strategy to work with the security industry to 
promote UK security exports (i.e. alongside its traditional focus on seeking overseas 
defence business). The thesis concludes that some of the rotational dynamics that are 
popularly associated with the MIC are now present in the UK’s non-military CT sector.  
The extent to which evidence has been found that such dynamics have been 
genuinely detrimental, in line with most theories on the MIC (and any modern-day variety), 
is debatable, however. Whilst in the cases of all three major procurement projects 
examined in the preceding chapters - FiReControl, e-Borders and the G4S Olympic Security 
contract - there was some evidence of an arguably unhelpful role being played by some 
private sector entities (in particular several consultancies), no evidence has been found of 
any deliberate effort at threat inflation, or corruption, on the part of the involved 
companies, and/or any coalition of public-private interests comprising what has been 
labelled ‘the SIC’. Far from a serious picture emerging of a ‘sinister’ coalition of public and 
private sector actors or entities working closely together to ‘over-hype’ threats, and 
thereby encourage higher levels of spending on security contracts, this thesis’s analysis of 





disorganised and highly inefficient public-private interaction. In the end, all three contracts 
under examination ‘failed’ in the sense that they were not fully implemented; both the 
Government and the companies associated with them have suffered reputational damage 
as a result. The impact that was inflicted does not reflect the picture of ‘the SIC’ frequently 
presented by critics of public-private security interaction. 
Having illustrated the emergence of wide range of differing public-private 
dynamics in three specific CT sub-sectors, Chapter 6 identified the establishment of a close 
strategic relationship between the security suppliers’ community and the Home Office 
through ‘RISC’. In analyzing the origins of the alliance, new data drawn from interviews and 
archival documentation provided some evidence of the underpinning financial motivations 
of those who were involved in establishing the entity; the creation of this new body, and 
the widespread support it received in Government and industry, might be seen as 
confirming the worst suspicions of SIC critics. The thesis provides an original indication of 
the wide variety of activities that have been conducted between RISC and Government; to 
re-cap on some of the more eye-catching initiatives, these have included industry briefings, 
the formation of advisory groups on technical subjects, and the appointment of industry 
secondees inside Government (and vice versa).  
The lack hitherto of scholarly interest in the level and types of activity being 
pursued by RISC has been surprising. That said, this research found no attempt by RISC, the 
Home Office or any other involved parties to conceal the scope of this activity; by contrast, 
it was striking how open senior Government and industry interview participants were 
willing to talk about its development with the researcher (albeit sometimes on the 
condition of anonymity), and how much information on the alliance’s involvement in CT is 
available in both Government and industry documentation. Reflecting this, the existence of 





detected; differing views existed within the sector on the effectiveness of RISC’s activity 
and this thesis would not agree with those who would argue that ‘unwarranted influence’ 
is being exerted on CONTEST.  
Furthermore, RISC’s interest in seeking to work with Government would appear, 
from the evidence obtained (and arguably quite properly), to be focused on matters 
relating to the industrial aspects of national security - not on wider policy issues. In so far 
as this former priority is concerned, many views were presented of those who might be 
considered to be operating inside ‘the SIC’; the overall sense gained was that, whilst some 
progress had been made in improving the level of cooperation between Government and 
industry since 9/11, there was considerable room for improvement. Furthermore, doubts 
were raised in some interviews with policymakers as to the actual, genuine need for 
Government to consult with industry and the effectiveness of RISC’s activity; the picture 
that emerges is that Government can be dismissive of such external contributions, and 
therefore that the relationship is not always as ‘cosy’ as has sometimes been presented. 
This, of course, is not to deny the need to remain alert to any potential risks, or to suggest 
that everyone will agree that such a limited focus or desire for greater cooperation (not to 
mention the lack of effectiveness in it) is desirable; clearly more vehement critics of ‘the 
SIC’ might look unfavorably towards any such prospect. However, the evidence does not 
show that RISC has been seeking to extend its remit into the formation of CT policy outside 
industry-specific issues. Its possible motivation and ability to do so has been considered at 
the micro and macro levels and it would obviously be worrying if any such aim were to be 
successful. The reality, though, is that views in industry were disjointed and generally 
lacking unity of purpose; interviewees and other industry documentation raised questions 
of RISC’s effectiveness at hitherto forging anything resembling a genuinely ‘strategic’ 





A wide and diverse range of public-private interactions in the non-military aspects 
of CT was nevertheless presented by the evidence; even if such examples were generally 
found at the programme level. In contrast to the defence sector, however, what this study 
calls the ‘industrial complex’ in the CT sector incorporates several different features to 
those which characterize the classically-defined MIC. In CT, what constitutes ‘industry’ has 
been argued to comprise a wider set of commercial entities than merely profit-making 
security suppliers operating in the sector; private operators and business sectors clearly 
have a deep sense of their own roles in CONTEST, with the Government frequently 
articulating its own view of their necessarily strong level of involvement. Whilst questions 
were raised in the course of this dissertation around the extent to which companies or 
business sectors are genuinely engaged in or pivotal to the success of CONTEST, the 
research has shown that, in the sub-sectors under examination, the Government has made 
numerous and often serious efforts to engage the private sector in the pursuit of UK 
security objectives. Most notably, the success or failure of the UK’s CONTEST strategy (or 
any specific elements thereof) has been shown to have hinged in particular on the 
effective involvement of what this study has called the private operators of security; this 
was seen especially in the cases of e-Borders (with the aviation operators) and the London 
2012 Olympics (with LOCOG). In these cases, it is argued that difficulties arose in part 
because, in the context of the complex governance arrangements that exist in the sector, 
there were serious problems with the manner in which the private sector was engaged. 
A related, major differentiating characteristic of the ‘industrial-complex’ in CT, in 
contrast to the MIC, is that the sector possesses many more ‘purchasers’ of capability, 
spanning both the public and private sectors; ‘The markets are quite diverse – you have 
many purchasers’136, as one interviewee put it. Whilst this is not a new observation 
amongst policymakers, a case can clearly be made that its significance has hitherto been 
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under appreciated by the scholarly community. On the basis of this thesis, this 
characteristic of the security sector starkly contrasts with arrangements in ‘the MIC’ 
system where it is the MoD that is the ‘single customer’137 of capability. Furthermore, in 
the UK’s non-military security arena, there was until 7/7 an absence of any serious 
attempts at consolidating Governmental departments and agencies insofar as they relate 
to the private sector. These differences are significant and deserve a wider appreciation. 
It is this extreme multiplicity or diversity of stakeholders - the ‘fragmentation’ in 
the customer base as it was labelled by numerous interviewees - that can be seen to be a 
defining characteristic of the industrial-complex in the UK CT sector today. Within this 
system, it is not only governmental structures that are disaggregated; ‘industry’ itself can 
hardly be described as a cohesive supply chain. Indeed, as Stephen Phipson explained in 
response to a question on the effectiveness of government-industry cooperation across 
the security sector; ‘The fragmented approach from the departmental view in government 
creates a very fragmented industry underneath it[.]’138 Whilst some critics might disagree, 
the conclusion of this research is that it is this defining characteristic of the security sector - 
its structural fragmentation arising from its history and arguably very nature - that has 
hitherto mitigated against the emergence in the security sector of a ‘cosy conspiracy’ or 
singular ‘industrial-complex’ of the sort that has been often presented in MIC theory. 
Whilst several efforts - such as the formation of RISC and the appointment of an SRO for 
the Security Sector - have been made in recent years to increase levels of coordination in 
the security sector, the reality is that it remains a highly disaggregated picture, with 
multiple actors, departments, and companies working together on an almost countless 
number of sub-sectors and issues. The realities of Whitehall and commercial politics in this 
context have meant that, to date, nothing like the degree of proximity that has existed 
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between the defence industry and the Government has emerged in the non-military CT 
aspects of security.    
Finally, the fact that the security sector is ‘less mature’139 than the defence market 
can also be identified as another significant difference in the character of the industrial-
complex in CT when contrasted to the MIC. In a practical sense, the thesis showed how in 
the case of FiReControl, for example, a Government department (DCLG) did not possess 
the experience and expertise needed to deliver such a major security programme 
successfully. Additionally, it has been documented how the primary mechanism of 
strategic engagement between the Home Office and the security industry on CT issues, 
RISC, only emerged after 7/7. More generally, it is perhaps obvious to observe in 
retrospect that, as a result of the terrorist threat evolving so considerably (not to mention 
dramatically) during the 2000s, new security requirements would be bound to emerge, 
thus creating a relatively ‘new’ CT market for companies to compete within (and profit 
from). Whilst this statement might apply most directly to the experience of the US, the 
thesis has revealed and examined the allocation of significant additional resources for CT in 
the UK after 9/11, and the greater emphasis on public-private cooperation thereafter. As 
covered throughout this thesis, many writers, commentators and even scholars have been 
tempted in this context to apply MIC-type analogies to the security sector. 
It would be overly simplistic to conclude that the dynamics of the MIC have simply 
transferred from ‘defence’ to ‘security’ in an identical way, however; this research has 
shown that whilst some of the dynamics associated with the MIC certainly have appeared 
in the CT sector, several important, if not fundamental differences exist in the manner in 
which the sector operates. Caution should be applied, therefore, in using the ‘industrial-
complex’ label to describe the non-military security sector, or indeed any one of its 
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individual sub-sectors such as CT; Chapters 3-5 illustrated considerable variety in the types 
of public-private cooperation even within one sector. MIC terminology may have perfectly 
reflected its time - it was first conceived in the 1960s - and may still be particularly 
applicable to categorizations of the military arena. That being said, neither the term ‘the 
MIC’ nor ‘the SIC’ fully capture the realities and the diversity of the private sector’s 
involvement in all aspects of national security strategy today. 
After careful examination of the MIC concept and close attention to the (limited) 
existing available literature on ‘the SIC’, the new data gathered for this thesis supports the 
conclusion that, provided that the clear and major differences that exist in the military and 
non-military sectors are recognised, ‘industrial-complex’-type terminology can 
nevertheless be a useful term for describing the system of public-private (and wider) 
interaction that now so clearly exists in the non-military CT aspects of UK national security 
strategy. A system of extensive (and often malfunctioning) public-private interaction has 
undoubtedly emerged within CT and it is important to characterize and analyse this. Whilst 
the thesis has shown that several important differences exist in the character the MIC and 
the ‘industrial-complex’ in CT, dynamics once associated with the MIC are obviously 
present in CT; the ‘revolving door’ clearly operates in the non-military field, for example, 
and the examined case studies have also cast light on the commercial motivations of 
companies (such as EADS, Raytheon or G4S) or more strategic alliances (such as RISC) 
operating in security. 
The system of public-private cooperation within CT is nevertheless extremely 
disaggregated. The ‘industrial-complex’ that has been presented in this thesis reflects how, 
in contrast to defence, the non-military security sector comprises many more public and 
private sector entities than the relatively more straightforward, simply three-cornered 





and typology of actors within the system that are present in the CT aspects of UK national 
security strategy are thus more multifaceted. On the basis of this research, it can be 
conceptualized as follows:  










Figure 5 illustrates the ‘industrial-complex’ in the UK CT sector. The system encompasses 
extensive public-private interaction on CT issues; includes the involvement of a wide 
variety of public sector stakeholders; incorporates a diverse range of industrial entities; 
and stimulates the interest of other external ‘actors’ such as Parliament, the research 
community and other international entities.  
Whilst in empirical terms the research has shown that the private sector has 
become deeply involved in various aspects of CONTEST, and that both Government and 
the private sector have frequently articulated the need for close cooperation, in a more 
general sense the ‘industrial-complex’ in this sector has not been found to have become 





interest of a potentially damaging nature - let alone organised itself in the pursuit of any 
such interest. Supporting the above, a definition of the ‘industrial-complex’ operating in 
the CT sector is offered as flowing from this research: 
A complex network of public-private security coordination, cooperation 
and transactions in the non-military CT aspects of UK national security 
strategy, whether monetary or non-monetary, that is often - but not 
necessarily always - mutually encouraged and fostered by a multiplicity of 
state, corporate (i.e. particularly those companies falling within ‘Private 
Suppliers’, ‘Private Operators’ and ‘Wider Business’ categories140) and 
sometimes legislative actors, the various parts of which may possess 
potentially variable interests in promoting high levels of private sector 
involvement in ‘security’, and indeed levels of CT security spending. 
Whilst this definition could be seen as multi-faceted, and critics of ‘the SIC’ might not 
embrace it, based on this work it is argued that such a characterization of the industrial-
complex in the UK CT sector is a fair one which could serve as a useful basis for future 
debate on the scope and potential impact of this proposed system. 
As well as presenting a new understanding of the character of the ‘industrial-
complex’ in operation within the UK’s non-military CT sector, this thesis also concludes that 
there may be some value in continuing to explore whether something resembling an 
overarching ‘national security-industrial complex’ now cross-cuts all aspects of 
contemporary UK national security strategy; i.e. in keeping with the Government’s broader 
interpretation of national security covered above, and as Hughes and two other scholars 
have recently argued.141 Whilst this thesis has focused its attention on the non-military CT 
aspects of UK national security alone, thus making it impossible to make a definitive 
conclusion on this matter, there is, however, reasonable evidence above to suggest that 
there could be solid grounds for a skeptical reading of this particular theory for several 
reasons. Firstly, this thesis has clearly shown that, within the CT sector alone, there is a 
considerable lack of coordination between industry and Government on numerous issues; 
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the idea that a structured, organised system able to exert influence encompasses this and 
the interactions within so many other diverse security policy issues - many of which it is 
widely recognised are at a very early stage of development - seems implausible.  
Secondly, it is not clear that it is desirable to ‘lump’ together under the same 
overarching label the various types (and aggregation) of the public-private interactions that 
exist within the different sub-sectors of national security broadly defined; not enough is 
yet known about the character of the rapidly-evolving relationships in each area of 
security, and such a grand argument might actually help to conceal the plausible reality 
that there are a variety of systems at play. For example, it can be recalled from the opening 
chapter that the MoD continues to draw the largest share of UK national security 
expenditure; it should not be forgotten, therefore, that the MIC traditionally associated in 
the military sector continues to operate. In the non-military security arena, it is entirely 
feasible on the basis of this research that each major theme or specific area of non-military 
security (such as CT, cyber security, or organised crime, for example) could possess 
different, potentially unique or distinct public-private interactions from one another. In the 
absence of more comprehensive mapping of such dynamics within each and every sub-
sector of the security arena (and, indeed, analysis of any identifiable connections between 
them) - a task outside of the scope of this thesis - it is concluded that it may be more 
useful, at the present time, to refer to the presence of a variety of individual ‘industrial-
complexes’ existing in each specific sub-sector - as indicated by the multiple triangles 





















Whilst a case can be made, therefore, that further conceptual and empirical analysis in 
these wider areas of security is needed, this thesis has clearly illustrated that an ‘industrial 
complex’ of a new description has arisen in one contemporary non-military security field; 
the CT strand of the UK’s national security strategy.  
Finally, it should be recalled that whilst this is not the first piece of writing to have 
argued that an ‘industrial-complex’ has emerged in the context of the post-9/11 terrorism 
threat, it is novel in the UK context that, having considered new and hitherto unavailable 
data, this thesis views the system in a less negative and a more nuanced way than many 
authors. In its analysis of the character of the private sector’s involvement in the non-
military CT aspects of contemporary UK national security strategy the thesis did not find 
any meaningful evidence to support the conspiracy-type theories that have been 





of this system of public-private interaction in CT, the analysis, models, and findings it has 
provided will help to inform future policy and scholarly discussions on the character and 
consequences of the private sector’s involvement in other areas of national security 
strategy. 
8.3 Consequences 
This thesis has addressed questions of relevance to policy practitioners, and as such efforts 
have been made within the analysis to highlight some of the consequences of the private 
sector’s involvement in specific areas of CT. Having presented the character of the 
‘industrial-complex’ in CT, it is now possible to draw a more general set of lessons about 
the consequences of such involvement; and to apply them to future efforts at public-
private security cooperation.   
The first such conclusion to be drawn from this research is that, as certain 
dynamics associated with the MIC clearly now operate in the CT arena, Eisenhower’s 
previous concerns do appear equally relevant in their application to the non-military 
security field, and thus remain prescient. Whilst as noted above no overarching conspiracy 
has been detected in the UK CT arena, two insights in particular suggest that, as 
Eisenhower famously encouraged, it would be beneficial for the public to remain alert to 
the potential dangers associated with any ‘unwarranted influence’ arising in the security 
field. The thesis has shown that, in three instances, several commercial, profit-making 
suppliers gained financially from their involvement in major publicly-funded CT-related 
security contracts; contracts which ultimately were not delivered in full, or had to be 
cancelled. Furthermore, whilst none of RISC’s specific behaviour or activity has been found 
to have been inappropriate, both its motivations and the potential influence it has exerted 
to date have been shown to be at least partly commercially-orientated. Whilst many if not 





involved in working with Government in areas of national security such as CT – indeed 
Chapter 7 detailed, for example, how the current Administration is actively pursuing a 
policy aimed at promoting UK-based security companies in international markets - it is a 
cause of concern that in some cases companies (suppliers and consultancies) have profited 
financially from programmes that have simply not been delivered.  
It should also be recognised, as this thesis has consistently noted, that the 
industries supporting national security do have many critics; any balanced analysis of the 
private sector’s involvement in CT (or any ‘SIC’ more generally) must recognise this, along 
with the conclusion that, as Eisenhower explained, it would be alarming if any individual or 
coalition of companies were able to unduly exert influence in directing Government 
security policy.  Many critics have suggested, for example, that the terrorism threat to the 
UK has been over-inflated – and, indeed, that companies are either involved in or are set 
to profit from such an assessment. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 7 there may be 
some emerging, specific areas, or public-private interaction where critics may be justified 
in expressing concern. The UK Government’s growing level of support for CT-related 
industry exports, for example, including to countries where human rights concerns have 
been expressed, is an area that warrants greater attention. In the same way that 
Government strategies on defence exports have historically been strongly associated with 
concerns over the MIC - and generated considerable scholarly scrutiny - so this is an area 
of public-private coordination around which the proximity in the relationship should 
generate greater debate. 
Whilst it is clear that difficulties arising with major UK Government contracts 
(including those leading to complete failure) are not limited to the CT or wider security 
sector142, it is noticeable how three of the largest CT-related contracts let after 9/11 and 
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examined in this thesis all encountered significant problems. The reasons for the 
challenges associated with each of FiReControl, e-Borders, and the G4S Olympic security 
contract have been covered extensively in Chapters 3-5, and will not be repeated here; 
suffice to say that the lack of experience within the Government’s non-military 
departmental structures for managing such major schemes can be seen to have 
contributed to the difficulties. Furthermore, the need for deep and extensive external 
stakeholder engagement in implementing each contract - a much broader type of 
engagement than has been seen with classic military procurements - was in the cases of 
FiReControl, e-Borders and the G4S security contract not properly executed for several 
reasons. Serious challenges and obstacles were encountered, with unfortunate scenarios 
emerging whereby requirements were changing frequently; the sense left was that those 
in Government who were responsible for them were simply not equipped to handle the 
level of complexity they encountered.  
The thesis concludes, on the evidence of the examined CT case studies, that the 
system of non-military security procurement in the UK requires a radical overhaul. The 
implication of this is that those involved in the UK CT and ‘wider security’ sector should 
strive to do better in their approach to the development and implementation of major 
acquisition projects. This could be achieved by drawing on existing best practice in this 
area through training as necessary; by seeking to work with the private sector on this issue 
more strategically; and by resisting wherever possible the unfortunate political (and other 
short-term) urges that were clearly evident in the examined case studies. In considering 
any new approach or future reforms in this area, it is also suggested that all concerned 
parties would do well to take account of an argument that has been made by one UK 
analyst, Gash, who argues convincingly: 
The contracting process can’t be seen as separate from policy and 





change to shift focus from getting a ‘good deal’ upfront to securing value 
for money and quality across the contracting period.143 
In retrospect, the dynamics identified within this statement were all too evident in the 
cases of FiReControl, e-Borders and the G4S security contract; the schemes all suffered 
from short-term considerations, and it has been shown that the policymakers that were 
responsible for the programmes either mishandled or took too little interest in them. It 
has, of course, often been observed that many major UK Government contracts (especially 
IT-based solutions) frequently encounter difficulties, potentially leading to expensive 
contract failures; an idea which has arisen both inside and outside the security sector. That 
being said, it is obviously an undesirable state of affairs and should therefore not be too 
readily accepted. The non-military UK security community has lessons to learn on the basis 
of the examined contracts and must aim for improvement; particularly given that ‘security’ 
represents the State’s primary duty. At the risk of over-stating the case, an argument could 
easily be made that those involved in the sector should strive to establish new, more 
effective procurement models that might even form the basis of reform to acquisition 
across the whole of Government. 
In addition to identifying problematic CT-related security contracts, and wider 
concerns over the types and level of public-private cooperation in the sector, it has also 
been shown that the character of the current system of independent, external oversight 
over such dynamics in the non-military security arena has been ad hoc, reactive and, on 
occasion, ineffective. Whilst the NAO has conducted a number of useful reviews on 
FiReControl, and in relation to UK CT-related security acquisition more generally, 
Parliamentary scrutiny of the interactions under examination has in particular been very 
mixed. Not only did it not help to prevent - or, indeed, see a role for itself in preventing - 
the contract failures which occurred, the thesis has argued that in one case (Olympic 
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Security) the UK Parliament (in the form of the HASC) actually misdiagnosed the problems 
which occurred. Whilst this finding might offer SIC critics some comfort in the sense that 
the UK Legislature appears to have avoided becoming a part of a potentially corrosive 
system of the type Eisenhower warned against, its political posturing on the issues appears 
to have hardly been constructive. Unlike the often detailed scrutiny conducted historically 
by the Defence Select Committee around the role of the DIB in national security, for 
example, the private sector’s involvement in the non-military aspects of contemporary 
security strategy such as CT has simply not received the Parliamentary attention that it 
probably deserves in the context of the extensive levels of cooperation that has been 
revealed in this thesis.  
Whilst this dissertation’s main focus has been to analyse the character of the 
private sector’s involvement in the non-military CT field, rather than develop 
recommendations, several practical policy implications regarding public-private security 
cooperation can be drawn from the work. Firstly, it is striking how so many Government 
officials involved in the public-private cooperation under examination do not appear to 
fully appreciate the various commercial motivations at play in the private sector; a lack of 
commercial awareness and skills in Government has been cited as a major contributor to 
why the public and private sectors had not developed a stronger level of cooperation. The 
logical conclusion, therefore, is that those in Government with responsibilities for engaging 
the private sector would do well to think more commercially than they currently do, and 
that more could be done to equip them with the knowledge and tools they need to 
succeed in managing their relationships with companies. Equally, it is not clear that all the 
private sector participants engaged with during  this research - or, indeed, the industry 
structures that have been created to facilitate cooperation with Government, such as RISC 
- possess a realistic understanding of how far (and on which issues) Government may 





impression left is that, on both strategic and programme-level CT engagement, the two 
‘sides’ have not yet conducted a proper discussion on the desirable level of cooperation 
that should be developed. Given the level of interdependency that would appear to exist 
between them - a level arising from the aggregation of the large number and variety of 
public-private interactions within CT that might surprise some - this can be seen as a major, 
if not the major failing of both the public and private sectors in so far as they may have 
mutual responsibilities for providing national security.  
Secondly, whilst in its empirical analysis this thesis has focused on the CT elements 
of national security strategy, at the theoretical level it can be suggested that it is likely that 
a significant, perhaps even increasing level of interdependency may now exist between 
Government and the private sector in the implementation of UK objectives in other non-
military areas of security. As noted above, privatization has taken place extensively within 
the CT sector; whilst it was not the focus of this thesis, it often seemed when discussing 
broader security issues in interviews as if few areas are now ‘off limits’ for private sector 
involvement. Having been asked whether some security functions should never be handed 
to the private sector, for example, one Government official replied: ‘I’m not sure that there 
are many that I would say could never be outsourced.’144  
Finally, a consensus view emerged amongst interview participants that much could 
be done to strengthen public-private security cooperation. Indeed, the impression left is 
that, in contrast to defence, the level and quality of the Government’s interaction with the 
CT sector (and the ‘wider security’ field more generally) remains ‘ad hoc’ and often at an 
early stage of development. The implication of this, in the context of the UK Government’s 
perception of the strategic security risk environment (i.e. where non-military issues such as 
terrorism are seen to be the highest priority issues), is that both the UK’s formal National 
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Security Strategy and its associated documentation (such as the SDSR) should rethink their 
primary defence orientation and adopt a more security-focused outlook; especially insofar 
as its industry aspects are concerned. Within this context, having not yet properly re-
orientated their outlook, it is not implausible that in other emerging areas of security 
strategy, such as cyber security, policymakers may need to reassess the nature of their 
relationship with the private sector. It became apparent during research for this thesis that 
the private sector is already deeply involved in the implementation of the UK’s cyber 
security response, and that the Government recognizes its crucial dependence upon 
companies in this field. It is extremely doubtful, however, that the task of developing 
robust structures for public-private cooperation on cyber security is ‘complete’ - this thesis 
has shown the mixed effectiveness of the structures established for CT-related public-
private interaction over the course of more than a decade. On the basis of this research, 
the development of effective coordination mechanisms with the private sector in the cyber 
security arena may prove to be as important as other types of public-private interaction 
(such as contracts) in this emerging sector. 
In addition to highlighting these potential implications for policymakers, this thesis 
also argues that the findings of the research have significant consequences for the 
scholarly community; especially insofar as future research priorities on the ‘privatization of 
security’ and indeed ‘the SIC’ should ideally be developed. In particular, the thesis has 
shown that, in line with the emergence of the UK Government’s broader understanding of 
‘national security’, the private sector has been playing an extensive supporting role, at 
least in CT; in that context, it follows that an even broader research agenda on the private 
sector’s involvement within this arena is desirable. Whilst as noted in Chapter 1 some 
efforts have been made to direct the research agenda in this respect - and indeed to revisit 
what constitutes the ‘security industry’ in the new context - it is fair to say that the existing 





research has shown how in the CT aspects of UK security policy a much wider variety of 
under-researched public-private interactions have emerged, encompassing a considerably 
broader range actors than the scholarly community has to date properly acknowledged. 
The consequences of the aggregation of these multiple public-private dynamics and 
associated interests - an aggregation or a system which this thesis presents as an 
‘industrial-complex’ of a different character to the MIC - have not been properly 
considered within the research community. In the absence of stronger scholarly analysis 
and oversight in this context, it can be stated that academia has not properly scrutinized 
Government activity in this area.  
Furthermore, it has become apparent that the primary preoccupation of both 
policymakers and scholars within the ‘security privatization’ field has been, and remains, 
focused on the activities of the traditional DIB and/or PMSCs operating overseas. These 
sectors will obviously continue to draw substantial investment and present important and 
difficult policy, legal, operational and ethical questions, all of which will continue to 
demand expert attention and analysis. However, this thesis has considered the multiple 
interactions, difficulties, tensions and even accusations relating to the private sector’s 
involvement in the non-military CT arena after 9/11, and shown how enormous difficulties 
have emerged in this emerging area of public-private cooperation. In this context, the 
adoption of an even broader approach to future research on the privatization of security - 
an approach incorporating both CT but also many other additional non-military security 
issues - is not only completely warranted, but now overdue.  
Whether the result of academia’s lack of awareness, or interest, to properly 
address the substandard operation of many of the public-private interactions illustrated in 
the CT field - a situation which has contributed not only to the loss of billions of pounds of 





existing security arrangements - has been a regrettable oversight. It is not to seek to 
dismiss or undermine the important research that has been completed in the defence 
sector to say, in support of the argument made previously by Abrahamsen and Williams, 
that it is time to broaden perspectives outside the current PMSC preoccupation.145 The 
private sector’s involvement in national security strategy is more widespread and this 
suggests that additional scrutiny should be applied to other public-private relationships. 
This thesis seeks to make a contribution towards a new understanding of the UK’s CT 
sector in this respect, and offers a framework that could be adapted to conduct analysis of 
the private sector’s involvement in other security sub-sectors. The application of this 
approach to the field of cyber security may actually be the most pressing immediate 
research priority. Indeed, an apparent shortage of analysis in this area is potentially 
creating the situation where - much like with the experience of the many negative 
presentations of ‘the SIC’ examined in this thesis - misconceptions may be arising about 
the roles of the private sector in mitigating challenges in the cyber area. In particular, the 
suggestion that a damaging ‘cyber-industrial complex’ may be emerging - as Brito and 
Watkins have recently argued in a U.S. context146 - would warrant further scrutiny. 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has found that a direct application of the MIC (as it has been traditionally 
defined) - or, rather, some of its individual dynamics - to the security sector is appropriate 
in several identified areas, but that ultimately any presentation of ‘the SIC’ in exactly the 
same terms does not sufficiently capture the character of the public-private dynamics now 
present in the non-military aspects of contemporary security such as CT. In presenting a 
more detailed analysis of such dynamics in the UK’s CT field than has even been 
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attempted, the dissertation has sought to provide a reassessment of the ‘industrial-
complex’ in this sector. 
In analysing the dynamics of this system, the thesis highlights several shortcomings 
in respect of how public-private security cooperation (especially in relation to contracts) 
has been handled in the UK CT sector after 9/11. The CT sector (and ‘wider security’ arena 
more generally) has been shown to be characterized by complexity, and in this context 
numerous issues have arisen around the effectiveness of public-private cooperation within 
it; despite every best effort, there is discontent within the sector that the ‘terms of 
engagement’147 between the Government and the industries supporting national security 
are not operating as effectively as they could. Furthermore, whilst there have been some 
successful examples (such as ‘New Dimension’), the UK has experienced a series of costly 
contract failures in the CT sector; ‘failures’ seen both from a financial and operational 
perspective. When problems have arisen, rather than these being addressed more 
constructively we have seen how ‘blame games’ have played out very publicly. Whilst such 
dynamics are not unique to the security sector, it is striking how Government 
representatives in particular pointed the finger of blame towards industry forcefully in two 
of the three examined contract case studies (e-Borders and the G4S contract). Whilst these 
experiences support this thesis’ overall argument that it is unlikely, therefore, that an 
industrial-complex of a more conspiratorial character has emerged in the UK’s CT sector, 
that such disputes appear to have arisen so frequently in this arena can hardly be viewed 
as being reflective of an ideal situation. 
The final recommendation of this thesis, therefore, is that all those concerned with 
the examined issues would do well to seek to develop a much more informed and nuanced 
approach towards public-private engagement in CT and other areas of ‘wider security’. This 
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thesis offers some ideas on how the public and private sectors might come together more 
effectively on public security (and wider government) contracts; in the end, however, it 
seems that what is really needed is an improved attitude towards engagement. One 
interviewee for this thesis perhaps summarised it best when offering ideas on how public-
private engagement might be improved in the security sector: 
Certainly government would get more out of industry if they tried to get 
their heads round how industry work (…) as well as sort of acknowledging 
the huge part that industry plays in delivering security, and making it more 
of a partnership in terms of how they acknowledge it explicitly[.]148 
The reality, therefore, is that whilst after 9/11 the public and private sectors have probably 
cooperated more closely on CT than on any aspect of national security in recent centuries, 
it is not as much of a ‘partnership’ (or shadowy conspiracy) as some authors have 
previously asserted. A variety of attitudes and outlooks exist in the sector, but Stephen 
Phipson summarized it well when describing the character of the relationship:  
…it’s almost like two different universes in many respects. I think there are 
different motives and different objectives between the public and private 
sectors. (…) And it’s quite hard to mesh those two things together.149 
Some critics of the SIC might be reassured that the public and private sectors are seen at 
senior levels of Government to be so far apart, and that they are so difficult to ‘mesh’ 
together.  
This thesis offers an analysis on the origins, character and consequences of the 
private sector’s involvement in the non-military CT aspects of contemporary UK national 
security strategy and has found that a form of ‘industrial-complex’ exists in this sector. The 
evidence found does not support the contention that it is an exact replica of the MIC, or 
that it has hitherto constituted a conspiracy. This is not to say, however, that ‘the SIC’ - 
whether it exists within an individual sector or more generally across national security 
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strategy - should not continue to be discussed or debated. On the contrary, this thesis 
argues that in the CT sector an ‘industrial-complex’ of a new character has emerged, which 
demands considerable additional attention, and that the spirit of Eisenhower’s final 
Presidential address should continue to be heeded in this context. It is vital, therefore, that 
these emerging public-private security relationships are developed in as ‘open’ a manner 
as possible, and that they draw a new, heightened level of analytical attention from 
policymakers and researchers alike. To start the new debate, this thesis concludes that the 
extensive network of public-private interaction is not only a reality within contemporary 
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Michael Clayforth-Carr - Executive Director of International Subsidiaries, Selex ES, 
Chairman of Security Sector Advisory Group, UKTI; Formerly Chairman, RISC 
  
Rob Coleman - Director of Centre for Applied Science and Technology, Home Office 
 
Ruth Davis - Head of Programme - Cyber, Justice and Emergency Services, techUK 
Charlie Edwards - Director, National Security and Resilience, RUSI; Formerly Deputy 
Director for Strategy and Planning for Security and Counter Terrorism, Home Office (OSCT) 
 
David Evans - Chief Executive, IntraVires; Formerly Co-Chairman of Industry Advisory 
Group on London 2012 Olympic Security and Project Director, BSIA 
  
Simon Everest - Senior Security Advisor, UKTI DSO 
Richard Fletcher - Formerly Security Policy Advisor, EADS (UK) 
 
Paul Hamilton - Head of Industrial Policy, Ministry of Defence 
 
Shaun Hipgrave - IBM i2 Lead UK and Ireland, IBM (UK), Vice President of Security, ADS 
Group, and Member, RISC Council 
 
John Howe - Member, RISC Council; Formerly Vice Chairman, Thales (UK) and Chairman, 
RISC 
 
Alan Jenkinson - Director Strategic Business, Home and Foreign Affairs, Hewlett-Packard 
(UK); Formerly Industry Secondee, Home Office (OSCT) 
  
Derek Marshall - Formerly Director of Policy, ADS Group; Secretary, RISC 
 
Francesco Norante - VP Smart Cities and Major Events, Selex ES; Formerly Director of 
Security Integration and Planning for Vancouver 2010 and Turin 2006 Olympic Games 
 
Professor Adam Ogilvie-Smith - Security Consultant, CGI and Visiting Professor, Robert 
Gordon University;  Formerly Industry Secondee, Home Office (OSCT) and Industry 
Secondee, UKTI DSO 
 
Professor Sir David Omand - Visiting Professor, King’s College London; Formerly UK 
Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Cabinet Office, Permanent Secretary, Home Office, 
and Director, GCHQ 
 
Mark Phillips - Policy Adviser, ADS Group and Secretary, RISC; Formerly Head of the Land 







Stephen Phipson - Director Security Industry Engagement, Home Office (OSCT); Formerly 
Chairman, RISC and Chairman of Security Sector Advisory Group, UKTI 
  
Robin Southwell - CEO, EADS (UK); Formerly President, ADS Group 
Neil Stansfield - Head of Head of Knowledge, Innovation, and Futures Enterprise, DSTL; 
Formerly Head of Science and Technology Unit, Home Office (OSCT) 
 
Sir David Veness - Chairman Security and Resilience Board, London First; Formerly 
Assistant Commissioner (Specialist Operations), Metropolitan Police Service 
 
Admiral the Lord West of Spithead - House of Lords; Formerly Minister for Security, Home 
Office 
 
























Appendix B: Interview Process 
Ethical Approval  
This thesis planned to generate new and potentially sensitive material relating to UK 
national security through semi-structured interviews and, as such, it was necessary to 
receive ethical approval from King’s College London’s War Studies Group Research Ethics 
Panel. In completing this requirement, the author proposed that several risks would be 
managed in completing the interviews; robust confidentiality and withdrawal 
arrangements were designed and codified by a ‘consent form’, for example, and the fact 
that many of the participants would already be known to the author meant that steps 
were taken to ensure that the research was conducted in an appropriate way. The author 
would also mitigate more sensitive security risks by focusing on the philosophical aspects 
of the research questions, rather than operational aspects which might relate to them. The 
Ethics Panel was satisfied with the design and approach of the interview methodology, and 
granted ethical approval to the author on 19th May 2011. 
Participants: Selection and Breakdown 
37 potential interviewees were invited to participate in interviews on the basis that they 
were identified as having had some direct experience of working on, or possessing detailed 
knowledge about, issues pertaining to this thesis’s examination of the private sector’s 
involvement in the CT aspects of contemporary UK national security strategy since 9/11.  
Judgments informing the issuing of invitations were based on three factors 
relevant to the individuals’ relevant involvement or knowledge: 1) their likely direct 
working knowledge/experience of the subject arising from publicly-available biographical 
information; 2) their direct involvement in government-industry initiatives (such as RISC 
and the SSAG, for example); and 3) consideration of whether the individual was directly 
involved in, or would be aware of, the specific case-studies included in the thesis. In two 





recommended that the author might benefit from meeting with them. Decisions to issue 
invitations were also informed by the author’s previous experience in the sector (outlined 
in Appendix C). 
26 of the 37 people who were invited to be interviewed agreed to participate; the 
remaining 11 declined (seven of whom were crown officials and one of whom initially 
agreed to participate before later declining). The 26 participants were individuals who at 
the time of their interview were actively working on issues relating to the private sector’s 
involvement in CT from within government (7), industry (10), trade associations (2), or 
academia (3). The remaining four (4) individuals who participated in the research were 
retired individuals who had until recently been operating at senior levels in the sector 
(three of whom had operated in both government and industry, and one of whom was a 
former senior industrialist). It should also be noted that 15 of the 26 participants had 
during the course of their careers worked in more than one of the categories of 
interviewee (i.e. government, industry or academia). 
Question Design  
A programme of semi-structured, elite interviews - each approximately 45 minutes - was 
conducted to explore the philosophical aspects and case-studies examined in this thesis; its 
design allowed for discussions on a wide and varied range of topics relating to the thesis, 
and provided considerable scope for the generation of new material. 
Seven general questions were formulated to guide and help structure the interview; this 
number was judged to be optimal in that it allowed for a response time of around 5 
minutes for each. Having been introduced to the aim of the research, each participant was 
asked the following opening question to explore their own understanding of the core 
questions around/issues pertaining to the thesis: 
1. How would you describe the character of the relationship between the public and 






Six (6) additional general questions were also asked of every participant in order to help 
facilitate discussions / generate viewpoints on the origins, characteristics and the 
consequences of the private sector’s involvement in CT since 9/11: 
2. Is there anything specific about the character of the relationship between the 
public and private sectors in the CT aspects of national security, i.e. in contrast to 
other areas of security policy? 
3. Are there any national security tasks/functions that you would consider to be 
‘inherently governmental’? (i.e. that should only be conducted by the state and not 
the private sector) 
4. How effective do you consider public-private engagement in UK national security 
strategy to be at the level of policy and strategy-making?  (e.g. RISC) 
5. How effective do you consider public-private engagement in UK national security 
strategy to be at the programme and procurement level? (e.g. G4S / e-Borders / 
FiReControl) 
6. What accounts for the levels of expenditure in CONTEST, and/or specific contracts 
discussed in question 5. (as relevant)? 
7. How could public-private cooperation in the CT/wider security sector be improved 
in the future?  
 
Possible alternative ‘leading’ interview questions were considered; these related to such 
issues as the private sector’s role in stimulating investment in CONTEST and the 
appropriateness of the methods of private sector oversight in the CT sector. Whilst these 
issues are addressed in this thesis, they were not selected as ‘core’ interview questions 
because they were considered to be too ‘loaded’ and/or not seen to relate to the main 
research questions as directly as those listed above. 
Transcription and Quotation Process 
All 26 interviewees who participated agreed to sign a consent form prior to the interview, 
and all were content with the author using a digital recorder for the purpose of subsequent 
transcription. Three interviewees requested that their contributions be non-attributable 
under all circumstances, with the remaining 23 participants indicating that they would be 
happy to be quoted (or be approached for a direct quotation) following their interviews. 
Having completed each interview, the author completed a full note of the session for his 





directly-relevant to the thesis. A phase of consultation took place during later stages of the 
project; all of the quotations arising from interviews in this thesis appear after the 
participant confirmed that: 1) it was a fair reflection of what was said / their interpretation 
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